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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 27, 1978 conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 78-329
BELLOTTI (Mass. Attorney General)

v.

~ from 3-judge DC
~ (Aldrich, SCJ,
Julian, SDJ,
DJ)

BAIRD, et al. (Citizens, Abortion
Centers, Pregnant Minors, etc.)

Federal/Civil

&

Freedman,

Timely

No. 78-330
HUNERWADEL (Mother of minor
daughters)

(Same)

v.
BAIRD

(Same)
1.

SUMMARY:

(Same)

This case involves a challenge to the constitutional i t

of a Massachusetts abortion statute which basically provides that a

r te
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minor under 18, unless married, widowed, or divorced, who desires an

v

abortion must obtain the written consent of both parents, unless unavailable, or failing that, the approval of a judge of the superior court
~'--- --·- ......__·
held
upon a finding of "good cause."

The first time that the DC/the statute

unconstitutional, this Court vacated the judgment (on abstention grounds)
and remanded to the DC with directions to certify appropriate questions
concerning the interpretation of the Mass. statute to the Mass. Supreme
Judicial court (SJC).
received.

The questions were certified, and answers were

A majority of the DC again held the statute unconstitutional

and permanently enjoined its enforcement.
again.
2.

Judge Julian dissented once

Appellants contend that the DC majority erred.
STATUTE INVOLVED:

The Mass. statute at issue here provides in

pertinent part:
"(1) If the mother is less than eighteen years of age
and has not married, the coruent of both the mother and
her parents L<> required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such coruent, coruent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such h earing as he deems necessary. Such a

hearing will not require the appointment oi 2 guardian
for the mother.
"If one of tne parents has died or has deserted his or he:
family, coruent by the remaining parent is sufficient. If
both parents have died or have deserted their family, consent of the mother·s guardian or other person haYing
duties similar to a guardian, or any person who haci assumed the care and custody of the mother is sufficient."
"(2) The commissioner of public health shall prescribe
a written form for such consent. Such form shall be
signed by the proper person or persons and given to the
physician performing the abortion who shall maintain it
in his permanent files.

-

3.

BACKGROUND:

statute, appees

3 -

In 1974, prior to the effective date of the

(an abortion counseling organization, unmarried pregnant

minors, etc.) brought this class action against the Mass. Attorney Genera :
et al., claiming that the abortion statute violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth

Ame~dment.

The three-judge

DC held the statute unconstitutional as creating a "parental veto" over
the performance of abortions on minor children because the statute
applied even to those minors capable of giving informed consent.

The DC

permanently enjoined the statute's operation, thus denying by implication
appts' motion that the court abstain from deciding the issue pending
authoritative construction on the statute by the Mass. SJC.

In 1975,

after the DC's decision, Mass. enacted a statute dealing with consent
by minors to medical procedures other than abortions, and on appeal to
this court appees raised an additional claim of impermissible distinction
between the consent procedures applicable to minors under the abortion
statute and the consent required by the 1975 statute in regard to other
medical procedures.
This Court found the abortion statute susceptible of the Ivlass.
Attorney General's suggested interpretation that although the statute
prefers parental consultation and consent, it permits a minor capable
of giving informed consent to obtain a court order allowing abortion
without parental consultation and further permits a minor incapable of
giving informed consent to obtain an abortion order without parental
consultation when it is shown that abortion would be in the minor's best

- 4 -

interests.

If interpreted in this manner, the statute "would be funda-

mentally different" from a statute that creates a "parental veto" of
the type invalidated in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danfortr
428 U.S. 52

(1976).

Holding that the DC should have abstained, this

Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the DC with instructions to certify appropriate questions concerning interpretation of the
abortion statute to the Mass. SJC.

The court also noted that it would

be appropriate for the DC to certify a question concerning the extent to
which consent procedures under the 1975 statute differ from procedures
required under the abortion statute.
4.

MASS. SJC'S ANSWERS:

In answer to the nine questions posed by

the DC, the Mass. SJC ruled substantially as follows:

(1) when consider-

ing whether or not to grant consent, a parent must under the statute
consider "exclusively what will serve the child's best interest."
The superior court

(2)

must disregard all parental objections, and

other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what would
serve the minor's best interests.

"Good cause" means that the judge

may give consent to an abortion where it is shown that,

in spite of the

disapproval of one or both parents, the best interests of the minor will
be served if the abortion is performed.

The judge's role is not limited

to determining that the minor is capable of making, and has made, an
informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion.

In circumstances

where he determines that the best interests of the minor will not be
served by an abortion, the judge's determination should prevail.

(3)

- 5 -

Parental consultation is required in all cases.

{4)

"Unless barred by

constitutional considerations," the parents must be notified, in advance
if possible, of any proceeding brought by the minor to obtain judicial
consent to an abortion.

{5) Under the 1975 statute dealing with medical

procedures other than abortions,

"a married, widowed, or divorced mine-r

may consent to any and all medical services without the intervention of
either his or her parents or of a court.

Thus, the requirements of

~he

qbortion statute] concerning parental or judicial approval of an abortio :
are inapplicable to such minors.

All other minors described in [the

197 ~

statute] seeking abortions must pursue the procedures of [the abortion
statute], although they are free to consent to any other medical procedure {except sterilization) without the involvement of their parents
or of a judge.

Minors not described in [the 1975 statute] have only

their common law rights to consent to medical services, except as expand
or limited by statute."
5.
parts.

DECISION BELOW:

The DC majority divided its decision into four

The DC first dealt with the statute's requirement, as interprete

by the Mass. SJC, that the minor's parents be notified before the super i
court passes on an application for a consent order.

Noting that there

are often many reasons why it would be in the minor's best interests for
one or both parents to be kept in ignorance of her pregnancy, the court
held that the notification requirement "is an improper burden in those
cases where a court, if given free reign, would find that it was to the
minor's best interests that one or both of her parents

no~

be informed,

- 6 -

(

but is forbidden by the statute to make this decision."

App. at 9.

The DC next turned to the Mass. SJC's ruling that the superior court

l

may overrule an informed and reasonable decision by the minor to have
an abortion.

Observing that except for sterilization, abortion is the

only form of surgery to which a mature minor mc.y not consent, the DC
held that there is "no reasonable basis for Massachusetts distinguishing
~

between a minor and an. adult, given a finding of maturity and informed
consent."

App. at 13.

Thus, the judicial override provision was held

"an undue burden in the due process sense, and a discriminatory denial
of equal protection."

Third, the majority discussed the Mass. SJC's

interpretation of the statute to require that parents consider only the
c~

child's best interests when deciding whether to consent to the abortion.
The majority held the Mass. SJC's limiting judicial construction insufficient to cure the impermissible chill which the statute's excessively
broad language creates.

The majority doubted that every parent who

knows of the statute will be equally cognizant of the Mass. SJC's interpretations, and many parents who are aware of the limiting interpretation
are likely to chose the language of the legislature over that of the
court.

Because the Mass. legislature had reenacted the statute without

amendment in 1977, after this Court's remand order had indicated what
might pass constitutional muster, the DC majority concluded that "the
legislature prefers the chilling effect rather than to have the statute
expressed in terms that the ordinary person can sufficiently understand."
Since there was no justification for the

statute's failure to precisely

- 7 (

define the limits placed on parental consent, "the shadow it casts is
an undue burden upon the minor's rights."

App. at 15.

Finally, the DC

turned to the following language of the Mass. SJC's ruling:
"If the Supreme Court concludes that we have
impermissibly assigned a greater role to the
parents than we should or that we have otherwise
burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally,
we add as a general principle that we would
have construed the statute to conform to that
interpretation."
The DC majority rejected this language (and similar language in the
and questioned the Mass. SJC's authority ~
Mass. SJC's ruling pertaining to other provisions)/give the DC power to
interpret the abortion statute in any manner necessary to save its
constitutionality.

"While it is ultimately, of course, for the Supreme

Court, we must doubt our authority to fix terms of a

st~te

statute con-

trary to the prima facie interpretation given it by the state court.

n

App. at 18.
6.

DISSENT:

Judge Julian wrote a lengthy dissent.

Because the

Mass. SJC had construed the abortion statute to require parents to consider only what will serve the child's best interests when deciding
whether or not to grant consent, Judge Julian disagreed with the majority
conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional because its language did
not expressly require that parents consider only the child's interests.
"The 'state interpretation is as though written into the ordinance itself
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953)

•••• "

App. at 30.

He also noted that the purpose of the 1977 reenactment of the abortion
1(\

statute was simply to make corrective changes of' the numbering of the

- 8
\

statute.

No changes in substance were made.

Thus, the majority's finding

that the legislature "welcomed" imprecision is inaccurate.

Indeed, one

must assume that the legislature intended the Mass. SJC's construction
to be a part of the abortion statute.
Judge Julian also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that

th ~

statute's requirement of parental notification in all cases was uncons·titutional.

He found the evidence to indicate that the cases where parenta l

notification may not be in a minor's best interests are rare.

"The

statute should be 'judged by reference to characteristics typical of the
affected classes rather than by. focusing on selected, atypical examples.'
Califano v. Jobst, 46 U.S.L.W. 4004, 4007."
Judge Julian agreed with the majorit.y that the statute was invalid
insofar as it authorizes a judge to override a minor's mature and informec
decision to have an abortion.

He thought, however, that this facit of

the abortion statute could be severed from the remainder of the statute.
The Mass. SJC had indicated in its answers to the certified

questions

that the legislature had intended the statute to be severable.
Finally , Judge Julian turned to the equal protection arguments.
He felt that if the provision on judicial override was severed, the
statute would no longer unreasonably distinguish between a mature minor
and an adult.

Because abortion has psychological and emotional conse-

quences which are unique and because decisions to abort involve considerations that are not present in decisions to undergo other medical procedures (i.e., the termination of potential human life), he believed that

- 9 the state•s compelling concern for its minor citizens justified the
imposition of consent requirements not found in the 1975 statute relating
to other medical procedures.

He found the distinctions drawn by the

abortion statute rationally related to a constitutionally permissible
purpose.

In rejecting the argument that the statute irrationally discrim j

nates between unmarried and married minors, Judge Julian stated that the
statute simply recognizes that marriage alters the relationship between
a minor and her parents.
7.

CONTENTIONS:

A.

Appellant BellottL Relying on Mr. Justice Stevens• observation

in Danforth that .. a legislative determination that [the decision to
abort] will be made more wisely in most cases if the advice and moral
support of a parent play a part in the decisionmaking process is surely
not irrational," 428 U.S. at 103, appellant first maintains that the DC
went far beyond Danforth when it invalidated the parental consent require ment in the case of "immature minors" and minors "not capable of understanding the procedure and of appreciating its consequences ...

Second,

appellant argues that the DC erred in entertaining plaintiffs•

11

facial attack on the abortion statute.

procedura :

According to appellant, a pro-

cedural facial attack upon a state statute on overbreadth grounds and a
the
resulting injunction against I statute's total enforcement is 11 Strong
medicine .. which is justified only when the First Amendment rights of
absent persons is involved.
(1973).

Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413

u.s.

601

Appellant also maintains that the DC based its decision upon

- 10 "an admixture of evidence and speculation (see, e.g., DC' s comments
concerning parental behavior)" and that this Court should review the
case "in order to clarify the limits of reliance upon extra-record infermation, establish the proper allocation of evidentiary burdens in cases
such as these, and correct what appellants submit are mistaken
minations based upon insufficient information."

deter-

Fourth, appellant argues

that the DC's injunction against enforcement of the abortion statute
violates the equitable principle that injunctions be narrowly drafted to
meet only the specific remedial needs of the complaining parties.

(Appel

lant is apparently arguing that the specific provisions invalidated by
the DC should have merely been severed from the remainder of the abortion
statute.)

Finally, appellant attacks the last sentence of the majority's

opinion, which awarded plaintiffs' costs,

"including recovery of costs

paid as a result of the previous appeal, lost because of defendants'
mistaken advocacy."

App. at 18.

Appellant argues that the award amounts

to a reversal of this court's prior determinations concerning costs
for
related to Bellotti I and that it penalizes appellant • s I performing
their constitutional duty to defend a state statute thought to be constitutional. Appt Bellotti's brief is exceedingly poor.
B. Appellant Hunerwadel:

Appellant Hunerwadel notes that unlike

the unbridled veto given parents in

Da~forth,

the Mass. statute merely

requires that minors consult with their parents.

If a minor's parents

refuse to consent to an abortion, consent may be obtained from a judge
of the superior court "for good cause shown."

The superior court judge

- 12 -

(

mechanics of a medical procedure such as therapeutic abortion does not
necessarily mean that the minor girl has the intellectual and emotional
ability to make a decision which serves her long term best interests."
Even if the judicial override provision is unconstitutional, argues
appellant, the DC erred in invalidating the entire statute.

c.

Appellee Planned Parenthood League of Mass., et al.:

Appellees

first maintain that the statute's judicial override provision assigns
to the state court an impermissible third-party veto in violation of
Danforth.

Secondly, appellees argue that the parental consultation

provision of the statute is unconstitutional because it requires consultation even in those cases where such consultation is judicially deter\~

mined to be against the minor's best

inte~ests.

The DC merely held that

the state may not mandate parental consultation in all cases.

Appellees

further contend that the DC properly invalidated the entire statute and
appropriately declined to accept the Mass. SJC's invitation to construe
the statute in whatever manner the Constitution requires if the Mass.
SJC's interpretation is impermissible.

To have accepted the Mass. SJC's

invitation
would have been to exercise legislative functions which
does
Art. III I not grant to the federal courts. Finally, appellants urge
that the award of costs was proper and, in any event, does not raise a
substantial question.

The DC's short hand

~erm

"mistaken advocacy"

refers to appellants' frequently changing, frequently inconsistent, and
frequently mistaken representations as to the meaning of the statute.
D•

Appellees Baird, et al.

These appellees largely restate the

- 13 -

(

arguments made by appellee Planned Parenthood
8.

DISCUSSION:

~eague

of Mass.

Language in this Court's abortion cases, particular!

Danforth, strongly suggests that the Mass. statute's judicial override
provision is constitutionally impermissible at least with respect to
minors capable of giving mature and informed cnnsent.

On this point the

DC was unanimous.
If this provision of the statute is -invalidated, the
substantially
statute would/provide:
Parental consultation is required in every
instance where an unmarried minor seeks a nonemergency abortion.

If the

minor's parents are unavailable, parental consultation is not required.
In deciding whether to consent to an abortion for their unmarried minor
daughter, parents may consider only her best interests.

If one or both

parents refuse consent, a superior court judge must nevertheless authoriz
the abortion if the minor is capable of giving informed and mature
consent.

The parents, if available, must be notified of the court pro-

ceeding and must be allowed to participate in it.
In this court's earlier opinion in Bellotti, a unanimous Court
observed:

"We do not accept appellee's assertion that the [Mass. SJC]

inevitably will interpret the statute so as to create a 'parental veto,'
require the superior court to act other than the best interests of the
minor, or impose undue burdens upon a minor capable of giving an informec
consent."

428 U.S. at 147.

The Bellotti court specifically recognized

that when dealing with minors rather than adults, "there are unquestionably greater risks of inability to give an informed consent."

Id.

Assuming the unconstitutionality of the statute's judicial override

- 14 (

provision, the issue presented in this case would appear to be whether
the statute's requirements of. parental consultation and parental notification of the court proceeding constitute "undue burdens" upon a mature
minor's ability to obtain an abortion.
substantial, and I

th~nk

The issue appears to be clearly

that Judge Julian and appellant Hunerwadel

have raised questions about the DC majority's decision - that are deserving
of this court's concern.
In Danforth, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, joined
in by Mr. Justice Powell, contains language suggesting that a parental
consultation requirement like that found in the Mass. statute might
strike a permissible balance between the competing interests of the
state and the minor.
concurring)

(see

See 428

7B

u.s.

above).

at 90-91 (Stewart and Powell, J., J.,

Four members of the Court expressed

the view in Danforth that a requirement of parental consent, as opposed
to parental consultation, is constitutionally permissible.
94-95

428 U.S. at

(White, J., Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part);

19·

and dissenting in part).

at 101-105 (Stevens, J. concurring in part

Thus, the DC's invalidation of the pa r ental

notification requirement of the Mass. abortion statute is open to quest ic
The DC majority held that the statute casts an undue burden upon
the minor's rights by its failure to expressly instruct parents that
they may consider only the child's best interests when deciding whether
to consent to an abortion.

This holding is nothing short of a blatant

refusal by the DC majority to accept a Mass. SJC's interpretation of the

-

.l!:>

r

abortion statute to require parents to limit their consent considerations
to the child's best interests.

The DC majority is grasping at straws

when it relies on the Mass. legislatures failure to revise the language
of the statute when it reenacted the statute in 1977 in order to correct
a numbering duplication with another, unrelated statute.
In sum, I think that the issues presented in this - appeal are substantial.
There are motions to affirm in both appeals.
I

would note.
Cooper
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of her pregnancy and does so without a sufficient
justification for the restriction. . . "

l

Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Powell joined,
concurring with the Court, noted (at pp . 90-91):
~

""--~___...

"With respect to the state law's requirement of parental consent, § 3 (4), I think it clear that its primary constitutional deficiency lies in its imposition of an absolute
limitation on the minor's right to obtain;an abortion. The
Court's opinion today in Bellotti v. Baird, post, [ 428
U.S.] at 132, 147-148, suggests that a materially different
constitutional issue would be presented under a provision
requiring parental consent or consultation in most cases
but providing for prompt (i) judicial resolution of any
disagreement between the parent and the minor, or
(ii) judicial determination that the minor is mature
enought'Ogive ai1informedC"onsent without parerrtal
Z<mcu~ orthatabo~vent
is in the minor's
~- ·- -.
.....__. .......--_
best interest. Such a proYision would not impose parental"'approval as an absolute condition upon the minor's
right but would assure in most instances consultation between the parent and child. (Footnote omitted.)
"There can be little doubt that the State furth ers a constitutionally pC'rmissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
parents in making the very important decision whether or
not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a girl of
tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped
to make it without mature advice and emotional support.
It seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
t ake place." (Footnote nm itkd. )

-. -

----------

BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Eric

DATE:

3-1-79

RE:

Bellotti v. Baird, No. 78-329
Hunerwadel v. Baird, No. 78-330

As you already are familiar with this case, this memo
will attempt only to offer some general, and very cursory,
thoughts on the analysis of the important constitutional issues
it involves.

-·
I

The Court long has struggled with the problem of how to
apply the constitutional rights developed in litigation involving
adults to disputes in which children are involved.

This problem,

of course, is intertwined with the related one of parental
rights.

Beyond the idea that "the Constitution is not for adults

alone," a coherent general analysis of these issues has not
emerged in the Court's opinions.

While I certainly do not claim

to have a solution for that problem, I believe there are three
related, general principles applicable to this case that would do
much to put the questions presented in proper perspective.

They

originate in the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
"Children have a very special place in life
which law should reflect. Legal theories and their
phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious
reasoning if uncritically transferred to
determination of a state's duty toward children."
May v. Anderson, 345 u.s. 528, 536 (1953).

(r)

The first idea is that minors generally are entitled to

those constitutional rights that protect citizens from adverse
action or harm by the state.

Thus, in the line of cases

beginning with In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court has
applied the

du~

juveniles.

It also has protected their "property" interest in

process protections of the Bill of Rights to

attendance at school by requiring some kind of hearing before
expulsion or suspension.

Goss v.

~opez,

419

u.s.

565 (1975).

would assume that children are entitled to the benefits of the
Equal Protection Clause as well.

The denial of the right to a

I

jury trial in McKeiver v. Pernsylvenia, 403

u.s.

528 (1971), was

not really an exception to this trend; the Court there believed
that denying the jury trial right to minors was necessary to the
continued existence of the juvenile court system, itself an
attempt at giving protection to minors beyond that found in the
criminal justice system generally.

I L ) The second idea is that children are not necessarily

~

I

entitled to the full enjoyment of constitutional rights of
choice, e.g., those involving the First Amendment right not to be
denied access to certain literature, Ginsberg v. New York, 390

u.s.

629 (1968).

Although, as illustrated by T!nker v. Des

Moines School District, 393

u.s.

503 (1969), the state may not

deprive minors of their "choice rights" altogether, it is clear
that our legal system is founded in part on the assumption that
minors are not possessed of the full capacity for choice that
makes the exercise of all "adult" rights meaningful or
beneficial.

Thus, children, including adolescents, routinely are

subject to a variety of restrictions on their choice of lifestyle
and conduct that would be unacceptable -- probably under the
privacy right of the Constitution as well as a matter of policy
if imposed on adults.

(Restrictions on "choice rights" are

themselves a form of "protection," of course, from the minor's
own immaturity.)
(3) The third idea is that parents themselves enjoy a right
- possibly of constitutional dimension -- to be the primary
teachers of values and behavior to their children and to exercise
affirmative control over their conduct.

That right is not

absolute.

The police power of the state traditionally, and

properly, has interfered with parental conduct that threatens
serious harm to a child.

But short of that point, the decisions

of the Court strongly suggest that parents are entitled to direct
the upbriging of their children.

u.s.
v.

E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406

205 (1972); Stap+ey v. Illinois, 405

Soci~ty

of Sisters, 268

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

u.s.

u.s.

645 (1972); Pierce

510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,

Although the Court generally has been

confronted with the rights of parents against state interference
rather than parents' rights against the contrary claims of their
children, almost by hypothesis the latter should not be more
restricted than the former.
Merely because a "constitutional right" is involved, the
principle that minors' choices may be subject to certain
restrictions is not automatically dispelled.

Instead,

1

restrictions on minors choices, especially when cast in terms of
parental consent, should be presumptively valid.

Whether the

presumption is improper in a given case should depend on the
particular mix of parents', children's, and governmental
interests involved.

II
The constitutional right to choose to seek an abortion
is difficult to classify under the choice-protection distinction
suggested above, especially as it concerns adolescents, because
it involves elements of each category.

The most obvious

"protection" abortions apparently are not involved in this case;

I assume that Massachussetts permits abortions, without parental
consent, when the life or health of the pregnant woman requires
it.

Even as to "non-therapeutic" abortions, however, there is a

need to protect pregnant minors from the serious adverse health
and emotional consequences that can follow an unplanned
pregnancy.

To the extent the Massachussetts parental consent

statute interferes with this objective, it is not defensible as a
support for parental rights and a guard against the minor's
immature judgment.
It also is clear, however, that there is a substantial,
and perhaps predominant, "choice" element in the abortion
decisions at issue in this case.

Apart from personal health

considerations, the minor is choosing whether, under the present
circumstances of her life, she will become a mother.

More

importantly, she is making the awesome decision whether to cut
off the life of what soon will be a human being if nature runs
its course.

Although this Court has decided that the privacy

interest of a women is important enough to permit her to make
that choice, the Court's opinions make clear that the
countervailing state interest in potential human life a grave
one.

Clearly, the pregnant woman's interest in the life of the

fetus, if it is in her best interest to give life birth, is
equally, if not much more, weighty than the state's.

Thus, the

choice confronting a pregnant minor who contemplates abortion is
of greater consequence than many, and perhaps most, others she
ever will make.

Because the abortion decision is so heavily

value-laden, it would appear to fall squarely within the class of

decisions by a minor in which parents enjoy a presumptive right
to be involved.
Under this perspective, it seems equally important that
the choice not be simply taken from her, as was possible under
the Missouri statute struck down in Planned Parenthood, and that
it not be exempted entirely from the restrictive safeguard of
parental involvement normally accompanying important choices by
minors.

Although several of its particular aspects require close

attention, as a general matter the Massachusetts statute fits the
desired pattern:

It removes the possibility of "an absolute

veto" over the minor's abortion decision, and it requires her to
consult with her parents and (in the normal case) to obtain their
consent before having a non-therapeutic abortion.

The importance

of each of these facets of the statute seems plain.

If parents

were permitted an absolute veto, many minors would be required to
continue pregnancies that, from an "objective" point of view,
would not be in their best interests (or they would seek out the
back alley abortionists).

If parents could be bypassed at will,

on the other hand, a great many pregnant adolescents would focus
solely on the perceived immediate advJerse consequences -- damage
to their reputations, their parents' possible wrath, etc. -- and
end their pregnancies without discovering actual, but
unanticipated, parental support or considering realistic
possibilities, such as adoption, that would avoid long-ranqe

•

remorse or guilt.

Because, as a matter of fact, a law permitting

a minor to circumvent altogether the parental consent otherwise
required would result in the total bypass of any parental

Although the matter is not clear cut, I believe that the abortion
decision is distinct enough to justify this different treatment.
As noted above, the consequences of an abortion, whether
measured in terms of values, psychological impact, or future lifestyle, are dramatic.

As long as the state leaves open a

realistic avenue of judical relief from unconsenting parents, at
least the first two rules mentioned above are justified, in my
opinion.

Both fathers and mothers have something to contribute

to a daughter in trouble, and under the terms of the statute as
interpreted by the highest court of the state, they are required
to act in the best interests of the minor.

In the minority of

cases in which one or both parent are hostile, judicial review is
avaliable.

Although going to court over such an issue would

never be pleasant, appellees' contention that the mere
requirement of going is an unconstitution burden is unpersuasive;
it amounts to an assertion that any significant burden on the
minor's abortion decision cannot be tolerated.

Even if that

might be true for adults, it generally is not for minors.
The third rule, that even mature minors can be subject
to "judicial override," is the most troubling.

I tend to aqree

with appellees that this is a contradiction in terms.

If the

minor is found by a judge to have adult choice capabilities with
respect to this decision, she should not be subject to that same
judge's view of her best interests.

(Althouqh this same

reasoning also might invalidate the first rule mentioned above to
the extent it applies to mature minors, the mere requirement of
prior parental consultation for a minor who must in any event go

to court to be found "mature" does not seem unreasonable.)
I believe the Court could invalidate this one
application of the statute and leave the rest intact.

This would

not be the substantial rewriting that the Massachussetts Supreme
Judicial Court apparently invited, and which raises serious
questions about the proper judicial role of statutory
interpretation, but an unexceptional instance of severing a
particular application of an otherwise valid statute.

With this

one possible exception, I would reverse the judgment of the threejudge court and uphold the state law.
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79-330 Hunerwadel v. Baird

Dear Chief:
I am not sure that I am in agreement with four
other Justices as to how each of the separate issues in
these cases should be resolved.
I will be glad, however, to write and circulate a
memorandum, if this is your wish.
Sin~erely,
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Eric

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

May 1, 1979

78-329 Bellotti v. Baird
I have now reviewed vour April 28 draft with some
care and its reflects the thoughtful effort you have put into
it.

Although some of the "judgment calls" are close (as we

have discussed), I think your analysis is sound and the draft
extremely well written.
Not unexpectedly, however, I do have some comments.
Parts I, II (o. 11-13), and II-A prompt no
questions.

They look fine.
Part II-B (o. 16-19) also is good, except the

summary sentence

co~~encinq

at the bottom of p. 18 seems

unclear, especially in its characterization of Part A.
Part II-C {p. 19-23) is quite qood on the role of
parents in guiding minors.
as you will note.

Page 22 qave me some difficulty,

My suggested changes are largely cosmetic.

There is a need for some transition between the end
of Part II and the commencement of Part III.

I will not try

to frame it on this dictating machine, but perhaps it would
suffice if a sentence or two were added merely to the effect
that "with the status of minors under the law in mind, we now
turn to the constitutional issues presented by this appeal.
The basic contention of appellees sustained in maior part by

3.

certainly will bring the other into the consultation - either
with or in the absence of the minor.

What do you think about

taking this position?
In subparts (2) and (3) the draft would enable the
minor to go directly to the court to show that parental
consent would be denied, and that the parent or parents would
attempt to block judicial reviP.w.

Only upon the making of

such a showing would the minor be entitled to prove her case
on the merits:

i.e., to establish that she is comPetent to

make the abortion decision independently, or that the
abortion is in her best interest in any event.
have worked this out extremely well.

I think you

I have not qone back

and reread the District Court's opinion or again examined the
briefs.

But I do not recall this particular procedure having

been adopted or urged upon us.

As a practical matter, making

a satisfactory showinq as to what the parents would do will
not always be easy by any means.

Indeed, I think the dissent

will argue that these requirements impose an unduly heavy
burden on the minor's right to an abortion.
Part IV seems adequate to dispose of the equal
protection issue.

I agree that we should not take that too

seriously.
In Part V you address the severance problem.

I

-

-

5.

When you have given me the alternative drafts for
the two subsections, I will review these promptly: discuss
the choices with you, and make a decision as to what we
circulate.

I

may possibly try the two approaches on one of

the Brothers, although I probably will decide which one I
like best and circulate it.
As a result of my surgery, I am afraid this will be
your last Court opinion for the Term.

I

think your draft, as

we may revise it, fully merits being a Court opinion.
be quite proud of it.
I

hope we can move this forward promptly.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

I

can

lfp/ss
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Eric

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

May 3, 1979

Bellotti
I am still having difficulty with III-B(l), (2) and
(3).

The discussion in these three subsections seems, at

times, to overlap or to repeat, and the precise issues seem
somewhat blurred.
I am dictating this memorandum, primarily for my
own benefit, to see if I can identify in my own thinking what
I believe to be the issues and resolutions thereof.
1.

Validity of parental consultation.

In Bellotti

v. Baird, the Court suggested that a different constitutional
issue would be presented under a provision requiring parental
consent or consultation short of an absolute veto.

Thus, I

would hold that consent of at least one parent (but no
mandatory requirement to consult both) is presumptively an
initial requirement.
2.
results.

Assuming consultation occurs with negative

Then, as Massachusetts has provided
.
) the minor

should be free to seek court approval, and the state must
provide - as I believe it has - for an expeditious hearing
and decision.
3.

What latitude does the Court have?

If it finds

the minor to be mature enough to make her own decision,

2.

rationally and understandingly, that is the end of it.
Approval must be granted even though the court may believe
that abortion would not be in the best interest of the minor.
If the court concludes that the minor is not mature
(on account of age or otherwise), it then may authorize the
abortion only if this is deemed to be in the best interest of
the minor.
4.

What happens if the minor objects to any

consultation with a parent?

In the above situations, the

minor has consulted a parent and obtain a negative answer.
But there will be many situations in which minors consider
the parents the last persons in the world whom they wish to
know about the pregnancy.

There also will be other

situations where, at least in the minor's opinion, the
parents (perhaps they are members of "right to life" groups)
certainly would oppose and endeavor to frustrate recourse to
judicial relief.

I think a minor should have a right to go

directly to court where she asserts that her parents almost
certainly would deny consent and also attempt to obstruct
recourse to the judicial remedy.

The burden would be on the

minor to establish these averments.

If she carried the

burden, the court then must decide whether the minor is
mature or whether an abortion is in her best interest.

4.

where the pregnant minor is of tender years.

I am therefore

tentatively thinking of saying that the burden would be upon
the minor to satisfy the court that parental consent would be
denied ia

!~ e~

and that an attempt also would be made to

block judicial review.

If this burden were not carried, the

court would then be free to decide whether consultation with
one or both parents would be in the best interest of the
child.

Much would depend on the minor's age, whether she is

living with parents, the family atmosphere, etc.
The court should be sensitive to the fact that
relationships between parents and children vary widely, as do
family situations with respect to whether the parents are
together and whether there is in fact a normal home
environment.

Where there is such an environment, the court

properly may consider the legitimate parental interest in
their children as discussed in Part II.

But the ultimate

responsibility of the court is to act in accordance with its
perception of the best interest of the minor.

* * *
Lest I forget it, I record a suggestion to Eric
that we include in the opinion the substance of what Justice
Stewart said in the paragraph in Danforth that followe his
summary of what would be proper, a summary that I joined.

5.

The paragraph in question emphasizes that the state properly
may encourage an unmarried pregnant mother to seek the help
and advice of her parents in making this decision.

You have

said this very well in the draft opinion, but I think it
would help to quote Justice Stewart.

* * *
I think it also would be helpful at the end of Part
III, or in a little concluding part at the end of the
opinion, to summarize our decision.

We should make clear

exactly what we hold invalid - that is as to the extent of
our agreement with the District Court.
identify where we disagree with it.

We also should

In short, our affirming

and reversing should be made somewhat clearer.
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Eric

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

May 3, 1979

Bellotti
I am still having difficulty with III-B(l), (2) and
(3).
tim~s,

The discussion in these three

subs~ctions

seems, nt

to overlap or to repeat, and the precise issues seem

somewhat blurred.
I arn dictating this memorandum, Primarily for my
own benefit, to

se~

if I can identify in my own thinking what

I believe to be the issues and resolutions thereof.
1.

Validity of parental consultation.

In Bellotti

v. Baird, the Court suqgested that a different constitutional
issue would be presented under a provision requirinq parental
consent or consultation short of an absolute veto.

Thus, I

would hold that consent of at least one oarent (but no
mandatory requirement to consult both) is presumptively an
initial requirement.
2.
results.

Assuminq consultation occurs with negative

Then, as Massachusetts has provided the minor

should be free to seek court approval, and the state must
provide - as I believe it has - for an expeditious hearinq
and decision.
3.

What latitude does the Court have?

If it finds

the minor to be mature enough to make her own decision,

2.

rationally and understandingly, that is the end of it.
Approval must be granted even though the court may believe
that abortion would not be in the best interest of the minor.
If the court concludes that the minor is not mature
(on account of age or otherwise), it then may authorize the
abortion only if this is deemed to be in the best interest of
the minor.
4.

What hapoens if the minor objects to any

consultation with a oarent?

In the above situations, the

minor has consulted a parent and obtain a negative answer.
But there will be many situations in which minors consider
the parents the last persons in the world whom they wish to
know about the preqnancy.

There also will be other

situations where, at least in the minor's ooinion, the
parents (perhaps they are members of "right to life" groups)
certainly would oppose and endeavor to frustrate recourse to
judicial relief.

I think a minor should have a right to qo

directly to court where she asserts that her parents almost
certainly would deny consent and also attempt to obstruct
recourse to the judicial remedy.

The burden would be on the

minor to establish these averments.

If she carried the

burden, the court then must decide whether the minor is
mature or whether an abortion is in her best interest.

4.

where the pregnant minor is of tender years.

I am therefore

tentatively thinking of saying that the burden would be upon
the minor to satisfy the court that parental consent would be
denied in event and that an attempt also would be made to
block iudicial review.

If this burden were not carried, the

court would then be free to decide whether consultation with
one or both parents would be in the best interest of the
child.

Much would deoend on the minor's age, whether she is

living with parents, the family atmosphere, etc.
The court should be sensitive to the fact that
relationships between Parents and children vary widely, as do
family situations with respect to whether the parents are
together and whether there is in fact a normal home
environment.

Where there is such an environment, the court

properly may consider the legitimate parental interest in
their children as discussed in Part II.

But the ultimate

responsibility of the court is to act in accordance with its
perception of the best interest of the minor.

* * *
Lest I forget it, I record a suggestion to Eric
that we include in the opinion the substance of what Justice
Stewart said in the paraqraoh in Danforth that followe his
summary of what would be proper, a summary that I ioined.

5.

The paragraph in question emphasizes that the state properly
may encourage an unmarried pregnant mother to seek the help
and advice of her parents in making this decision.

You have

said this very well in the draft opinion, but I think it
would help to quote Justice Stewart.

* * *
I think it also would be helpful at the end of Part
III, or in a little concluding part at the end of the

opinion, to summarize our decision.

We should make clear

exactly what we hold invalid - that is as to the extent of
our agreement with the District Court.
identify where we disagree with it.

We also should

In short, our affirming

and reversing should be made somewhat clearer.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

IS

2.
constitutional rights whenever it is rational to do so.

WJB probably

will insist on some kind of "middle-tier" analysis, such as that he
attempted in Carey v. Population Services.

He will agree with much

of the result in part III, but won't like the limited way in which
the opinion is phrased.
part IV.

I have no good guess what he will do with

He will object to the possibility of severance in part

v.

PS:
We have a chance of getting Justice Stewart on board, as
your opinion, in large part, is an expansion of his concurring
opinion in Danforth.

His vote was to affirm in part and reverse in

part, suggesting that he thinks the statute may be severable.

I

think the approach taken in part II will appeal to him, and the
results in part III reflect his previous statements about this issue.
He may like part IV, since he is becoming skeptical of the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence.

I hope he will not object to part V.

For what it's worth, his clerk assigned to this case, Ginny Kerr,
will not like this opinion at all.

Her views are in accord with

WJB's.

BRW:
I have no feel for what Justice White will think.
been a consistent foe of the abortion decisions, of course.

He has
I

suspect he will simply write separately rather than join part of the
opinion.

It is possible, however, that he could join parts I, II,

and IV, since these provide a basis for restricting minor's access to
abortion.

4.
JPS:
The difficulty of predicting what Justice Stevens will do in

-- ---

-----

any case ranges from highly difficult to
........ ________.......

impossib~e.

He has

generally taken a pretty firm position against uncritically
transfering "adult" constitutional rights to minors, as evidenced by
his opinions in Danforth and Carey v. Population Services.

It is

therefore not unthinkable that he will go along with part II.

He is

so intent on getting is personal viewpoint in print on difficult
issues, however, that I would be surprised not to see him write
separately on the issues convered in part III.

He indicated a

willingness at conference at least to consider severance, so perhaps
a joinder in part V is not out of the question.

I have no sense for

what he might to with the equal protection discussion in part IV.

lfp/ss

6/1/79
Bellotti

Dear Potter:
I again thank you for reviewing my preliminary
first draft of an opinion in this case, and for going over it
with me.
Following this discussion on Wednesday morning, I
spent the remainder of the day - working with my clerk making substantial changes in the draft.

With these changes

incorporated, I returned the opinion to the print shop
Thursday morning.
With the view to facilitating your review of the
changes, I enclose a copy of the "first draft" that you
reviewed, marked up to reflect all of the changes made since
our conversation.
now has.

This is simply a xerox of what the printer

I also return to you the original copy of this

draft with your pencil notations.
I believe I have satisfied all of your concerns,

2.

with one exception.

You expressed reservations about what I

will call the "initial showing":

that the pregnant minor who

wishes to bypass her parents, and go directly to the court,
must satisfy the court that the parents probably would deny
consent and make it difficult if not impossible for the minor
to seek judicial relief.

I have retained this requirement

for an "initial showing", although I have tempered the

~rl-~
languageA to make clear that the showing required is rather
modest.
At least a majority of the Court viewed this case
from the outset as being different from Danforth because, and
only because, the Massachusetts statute combined provisions
for parental consent (consultation) and court review.

This

is clear from Harry's opinion in Bellotti I, 428 U.S. 132,
145-148.

Also, I understood your Danforth concurrence, which

3.

I joined, as emphasizing the importance of a parental role
provided there also is recourse to judicial review.

You

stated that the "primary constitutional deficiency [of the
Missouri statute] lies in its imposition of an absolute
limitation on the minor's right to obtain an abortion." 428
U.S., at 90. You continued:
"The Court's opinion today in Bellotti v. Baird,
post, at 147-148, suggests that a materially
different constitutional issue would be presented
under a provision requiring parental consent or
consultation in most cases but providing for prompt
(i) judicial resolution of any disagreement between
the parent and the minor, or (ii) judicial
determination that the minor is mature enough to
give an informed consent without parental
concurrence or that abortion in any event is in the
minor's best interest. Such a provision would not
impose parental approval as an absolute condition
upon the minor's right but would assure in most
instances consultation between the parent and
C h i 1 d o II PP o 9 0-91.

I read the foregoing as indicating approval of a
provision "requiring parental consent or consultation in most
cases" if there were adequate judicial review to resolve

5.

Putting it differently, the statute itself would

~

further

the interest of the state and parents only in cases where the
minor voluntarily elects to consult her parents before going
to court, or where the court rules against the minor.

In the

~~44t..t
latter event, the minor is

~ ~e~

free to seek parental consent

"
but under circumstances far less likely to result in an
amicable resolution than if the minor were encouraged by law

~T(~
to

~~ first ~ her

parents.

It also seems to me that an "initial showing"
requirement is consistent - if, indeed, not required - by the
rationale of your concurring opinion in Paraham v. LJ and JR.
That case involves the extent to which the State is permitted
to leave a child's liberty

f-o

interest~

its parents.

The

right not to be deprived of liberty without due process,
explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, is no less

6.

important than the right to seek an abortion, an interest
derived only by implication from the "privacy" concept
originating in Griswold.

I also would find it difficult to

say that the parents' interest in a minor, and their role as
parents, are less important with respect to an abortion
decision than with respect to whether

~n

the minor is to be

deprived of its liberty.
I have written at this length to make clear why I
incorporated in my draft of Bellotti what I view as an
extremely modest requirement of an initial showing of a right
to bypass the parents altogether.

If upon further thought,

you find merit my view that this is a correct reading of
Danforth and Bellotti I, I would be more than a little
pleased.
Sincerely,

June 1, 1979

78-329 Bellotti v. Baird
78-330 Hunerwadel v. Baird
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
As I stated after the writinq of this opinion was
assigned to me, there was no clear guidance from our
Conference discussion as to how a majority of the Court would
decide the several questions presented by this case.
Accordingly, following Harry's example in his
recent circulation of Jones, I submit the enclosed draft as a
"proposed• opinion of the Court. I believe, however, that
this draft is in accord with Danforth and Bellotti I, as I
understand our decisions in those cases. In Danforth we held
that a state could not lawfully authorize an absolute
parental veto of the pregnant minor's abortion decision. It
is clear, however, from Bellotti 1, 428 u.s. 132, that the
Court viewed this case as being different from Danforth
because the Masssachusetts statute could be construed to
combine valid provisions for parental consent (actually only
consultation) and court review. Id., at 145-148. These
cases recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in
assuring a parental role in the abortion decision, subject to
judicial review.
I conclude, however, that §125, as construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court, unduly burdens, in certain respects,
the right of a pregnant minor to seek an abortion: it fails
to account for minors capable of making a mature decision on
their own, and to permit minors to avoid consulting with
their parents under any circumstances.
With respect to the latter point, my draft states
that a minor wishing to avoid any consultation with her
parents must satisfy the court that her parents probably
would deny consent and make it difficult if not impossible

2.

for her to seek judicial relief. Unless a minimal showing to
this effect is required, many if not most minors simply will
bypass their parents altogether. If this were permissible,
the state and parental interests that we previously have
recognized would be frustrated.
The deficiencies that I find in the statute as
construed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
raise the severance problem. If this were a federal statute,
I would simply invalidate it, and let the legislature
commence afresh. But, as stated in the proposed opinion, the
severability of a state statute is a question of state law,
and the Supreme Judicial Court has been more willing than the
federal courts to salvage what it can of the legislature's
intent from flawed statutes. Accordingly, Part V proposes a
further certification to the state court to determine
severability. I would be equally happy simply to make the
decision here, although the question would be to rule as we
believe the Supreme Judicial Court would do. I will be
guided by the wishes of a majoritv on thi~ issue.
This proposed opinion is ~ivided into parts and
subparts. If 1 cannot persuade you to go all the way with
me, I will welcome - esoecially in view of my track record
this Term- even the most fragmenten "joins".
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

June 1, 1979

Bellotti

Dear Potter:
I again thank you for reviewing my ~reliminary
first draft of an opinion in this case, and for going over it
with me.
Following this discussion on Wednesday morning, I
spent the remainder of the day - working with my clerk making substantial changes in the draft. With these changes
incorporated, I returned the opinion to the print shop
Thursday morning.
With the view to facilitating your review of the
changes, I enclose a copy of the "first draft" that you
r~viewed, marked up to reflect all of the changes made since
our conversation. This is simply a xerox of what the printer
now has. I also return to you the original copy of this
draft with your pencil notations.
I believe I have satisfied all of your concerns,
with one exception. You expressed reservations about what I
will call the "initial showing": that the pregnant minor who
wishes to bypass her parents, and qo directly to the court,
must satisfy the court that the parents probably would deny
consent and make it difficult if not impossible for the minor
to seek judicial relief. I have retained this requirement
for an "initial showing", although I have tempered the
language of the opinion to make clear that the showing
required is rather modest.
At least a majority of the Court viewed this case
from the outset as being different from Danforth because, and
only because, the Massachusetts statute combined provisions
for parental consent (actually, consultation, since the judge
has the last word) and court review. This is clear from
Harry's opinion in Be!lotti I, 428 u.s. 132, 145-148. Also,

3.
less likely to result in ~n amicablP resolution than if the
minor were encouraged by law to consult first her parents.
Jt also seems to me that at least an "initi~l
showing" requirement is consistent with - if, indeed, not
required by- the rationale of your concurring opinion in
Paraham v. J.L. and J.R.
That case involves the extent to
which the State is permitteo to leave a child's liberty
interest under the control of its parents. The right not to
be deorived of liberty without due process, explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution, is no less important than the
right to seek an abortion, an interest deriv~d only by
imolication from the "privacy• concept originatinq in
Griswold.
I also would find it difficult to say that the
parents' interest and guiding role are less imnortant with
respect to an abortion decision than with respect to whether
the minor is to be deprived of its liberty.
I h~ve written at this length to make clPar why I
have incorporated in my draft of Bellotti what I view as an
extremely modest requirement of an 1n1t1al showing of a right
to bypass the oarents altogether.
If, upon further thought,
you agree that I have been faithful to Danforth and Bellotti
l• I would be more than a little pleased.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss

j;nprtutt <!Jllltrlttf flrt ~a j;tatts
~MJringLm. ~. <!J. 2llgi'!.;t
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 4, 1979

Re:

No. 78-329 and 78-330, Bellotti v. Baird, etc.

Dear Lewis,
I think that your proposed opinion reflects not
only a great deal of hard work, but also an admirable
effort to bring some consensus out of the diversity of
views expressed during our Conference discussion of this
case. My view, however, still remains that a pregnant
minor should not have even the rather light burden that
you would require of satisfying the Superior Court that
her parents would probably deny consent and seek to
obstruct her efforts to seek judicial relief. In my
opinion, her burden should be only to convince the Court
that she is sufficiently mature to decide the matter for
herself or that an abortion would be in her best
interest-.- My difference with the views you express
probably depends ultimately upon a differing assessment of
what is an "undue burden" as that phrase is used in the
last full paragraph on page 145 of the Court's opinion in
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 u.s. 132.
Realizing, however, that we are quite fragmented
in this case but nonetheless have a duty to produce a
Court opinion if one is possible, I would give hospitable
consideration to joining your opinion if my vote would
make a Court. As to the specific question contained in
your Memorandum to the Conference, I would prefer not to
request further certification on the part of the state
court with respect to the question of severability. It
seems to me that severability is something of a misnomer
in this context, and I would simply hold the state statute
unconstitutional to the extent described in the opinion.
The problem will then be one for the state legislature.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

-

,jnprttttt

<!Jcu:ri of flrt 'Jnitt~ ,jta.Us

jlasftingtcn. ~. <!J. 2llc?'1~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 5, 1979

Re:

78-329 and 78-330 - Bellotti v. Baird, et al.

Dear Lewis:
After some agonizing, I have decided that I can join
your proposed opinion for the Court on much the same basis
that Potter advanced in his letter regarding the draft presently
in circulation. I will join if you retain the present analysis
on the merits, as opposed to Potter's stated preference in his
recently circulated letter~ if you would be willing to adopt
Potter's suggestion with respect to the treatment of severability~
and if my vote will make your opinion one for the Court.
Sincerely,

~

t~tf ·ry

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

atourt of t4t ~ta .jtat.ts
-asJrittghm. ~. at. 2llgt,.~

.jltJtfttnt

C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 5, 1979

Re:

Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 - Bellotti v. Baird

Dear Lewis:
I fear there may be a latent possibility for misunderstanding in connection with the comments contained in my
letter circulated earlier today about the "severability"
treatment in your opinion. My impression of Potter's
suggestion, which I have subsequently discussed with him, is
that your opinion for the Court would simply say "affirmed
in part, reversed in part", or something to that effect,
without discussing severability at all.
It would then be
up to the legislature of Massachusetts, as Potter suggested in
his letter, to decide whether it wanted those parts of the
statute which your opinion holds constitutional to remain on
the books, whether it wished to take a new try at the whole
subject matter, or whether it wished to repeal what was left
of the statute. I had thought this was in accord with our
earlier discussion, but can readily understand how without
detailed and explicit discussion there could be a misunderstanding. If your position irrevocably differs from the one
I had stated in this letter, I will have to take a second look
at my position in the case.
Sincerely,

l~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,ju:pt"tlltt

Q}ltllrlltf tlrt ~h ,jbtttg

~agfrhtgLtn. ~. ~ 2ll&f'!~
CHAMBERS QF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 5, 1979

Re:

Nos. 78-329 and 78-330, Bellotti v. Baird

Dear Lewis,
My views conform substantially with those
expressed by Bill Rehnquist in his second letter to
you today about this case. In short, if your proposed
opinion, minus any discussion of severability, becomes
the opinion of the Court, I should suppose that it
would conclude by saying 11 to the extent indicated in
this opinion, the Massachusetts statute is unconstitutional,11 or something to that effect. The judgment
of the District Court could then be 11 affirmed in part,
reversed in part, 11 without any discussion of severability.
The Massachusetts Legislature could take it from there.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

June 6, 1979

Bellotti

Dear Potter and Bill:
This ref~rs to your letters with respect to the
•bottom line• if my opinion is to become a Court opinion.
In R word, I am quite willing to conclude by
saying, in effect, that •to the extent indicated in this
opinion, the Massachusetts statute is unconstitutional•, with
the judgment to be •affirmed in part, reversed in part•.
I laid out the full discussion of severability
becnuse of unc~rtainty as to the views of the Conference.
am more than content not to discuss it.

I

I suppose ~lohn's letter this morning makes it less
likely that my draft will attract a Court. If I understand
his letter correctly, he would leave the abortion decision
entirely to any minor! Although this is difficult to
believe, I read his letter as saying that since Danforth
takes the decision away from parents he sees no reason to
think judges should be substituted as decision makers. Thus,
I suppose a 12 year old could become one of Dr. Zupnick's
uncounseled but no doubt contented patients.

The Chief said to me on yesterday that he had not
read my opinion, and I have heard from no one else.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

,ju:pt"tutt Qf.ttud of tlft -,ttittb .ihdts
J)'ztsfrittghm. ~.

<!f.

2llgi){.~

CHAMBERS OF"

June 7, 1979

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

No. 78-329 & 78-330 - Bellotti v. Baird;
Hunerwadel v. Baird

Dear Lewis,
I shall shortly circulate a very brief
dissent in this case.

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference
erne

/

To: 'l'hr CiJi ef Jus ti ce

Mr. Juet!ce Jrennan
li:- . J u.::;i;:ce :Sts·.;·,?.r t

Mr . JustlcJ M~rsha ll
Mr . J u~t lca Black~un
~r . Jus t:ce Po~~l l
Mr. Ju ~t! ce R ~h n~uis t
Mr. Justice Stevans

From: Mr . J ustice White
Circulat ed: June 7 ' 1979

Re: No. 78-329- Bellotti v. Baird; and,
No. 78-330 - Hunerwadel v. Baird

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

[··:·:·:·:·:·:··:·:::.

0

I

I was in dissent in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 42 8
U.S. 52, 94-95 (1976), on the issue of the validity of requiring the consent
of a parent when an unmarried woman under 18 years of age seeks an abortion.
I continue to have the views I expressed there and also agree with much of
what MR. JUSTICE STEVENS said in dissent in that case. Id., at 101-105.
I would not, therefore, strike down this Massachusetts law.
But even if a parental consent requirement of the kind involved in
Danforth must be deemed invalid, that does not condemn the Massachusetts
law, which, when the parents object, authorizes a judge to permit an abortion if he concludes that an abortion is in the best interests of the child.

........... .
f ..
.:. .........•.

Going beyond Danforth, the Court how holds it unconstitutional for a state
to require that in all cases parents receive notice that their daughter seeks

.....

an abortion and, if they object to the abortion, an opportunity to participate
in a hearing that will determine whether it is in the "best interests" of the
child to undergo the surgery.

Until now, I would have thought inconceivable

...................
......... .. .

..

.....

············

.. .

Nos. 78-329 and 78-330
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a holding that the United States Constitution forbids even notice to parents
when their minor child who seeks surgery objects to such notice and is able
to convince a judge that the parents should be denied participation in the decision.
With all due respect, I dissent.

.......

··~·

•····

..

...... ....
.. .....

.....- ........... .

.. .. .
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...

'

. ..... ...... ..
. ......•....

.. ... ....... .. .... ........... ........... ... .............. . ... .. .

.inprtntt at~url ~f tlrt ~b ~tatt.s
Jfu~ ~.

<q.

2llbi~~

CH A M B ERS O F

J U STI CE

w,. , J .

BRENNAN, JR.

June 7, 1979

78-329 Bellotti v. Baird
78-330 Hunerwadel v. Baird
Dear Lewis,
As I suggested in our conversation yesterday, since (1}
it's possible that any opinion detailing what kind of statute
would be constitutional may have difficulty attracting five
votes, and (2} there seem to be five of us who agree that the
Massachusetts statute as authoritatively interpreted
unconstitutionally burdens the minor's right to choose whether
or not to have an abortion, the best course may be to construct
an opinion for the Court around the points of general
agreement, avoiding even mention of areas of disagreement. I
would suggest a short, "bare bones" opinion simply identifying
the respects in which the Massachusetts statute is recognized
as unconstitutional by a majority of us, and not discussing the
"applications" of the statute that your opinion holds would be
constitutional. Although this would not give Massachusetts the
rather extrordinary assistance they have asked for in writing a
constitutional statute, it would avoid the hazards of an
advisory-type opinion and would contain as much guidance as the
Court, given our division, is presently capable of giving
authoritatively. I recognize that this means a bottom line of
"affirm", but I see no other alternative.

Sincerely,

/J;d
Mr. Justice Powell

,jnprttttt Qj:ottrto-f tlrt ~tb .i'tatts

jtasftittghm. ~. <!f. 2ll,?'!$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 8, 1979

Re:

Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 - Bellotti v. Baird7 and
Hunerwadel v. Baird

Dear Lewis:
I originally wrote you that I W)uld join your presently
circulating opinion if it became a Court opinion, and if it
left entirely to the state courts the issue of severability
as I understood Potter's memorandum to suggest. I have just
read Byron's dissent7 as I said in my earlier letter, I
basically agree with his position, and yet I also feel strongly
the necessity of some dec is ion of :~the issues by this Court
which is not totally fragmented. As of now, therefore, I am
willing to recede from my earlier position that only if your
opinion became an opinion for the Court would I join it7 I
will join it now on the "condition subsequent" that it
attracts two additional votes, so that my departure f!Dm my
views assists in making it the controlling opinion, if not a
Court opinion. I will also file the attached concurrence.
Sincerely,

~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
Att.

~u.prtntt

arourt of Urt ~b .itatts:

'Jhts:Jringhtn. ~.

ar.

2n,?~~

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

June 8, 1979

/

(78-329 - Bellotti v. Baird
(

(78-330 - Hunerwadel v. Baird

Dear Lewis:
I join. However, there are some points on which we
can discuss several possible changes as the "paperflow"
proceeds.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE

w ...

J. BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

June 8, 1979

Nos. 78-329 & 330 Bellotti & Hunerwadel v. Baird

Dear John:
Your opinion expresses precisely my view and therefore please join me. I would be delighted if it attracted
the joins of three more of our colleagues. If it should
not, I'd be willing to consider some other disposition
with a bottom line of "Affirm" provided it was not inconsistent with what you've written.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

lfp/ss

6/18/79

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Eric

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

June 18, 1979

Bellotti
In order to avoid delay, we must assume, as I have
indicated, that Justice Blackmun is preparing a separate
opinion in which he takes a different view from ours.

The

best guess is that he will go down the line with Stevens,
Brennan and Marshall except he will include a requirement
that a minor consult a physician, and probably obtain his
written approval of a "best interest" abortion.
Depending on what HAB writes, we will be confronted
with several possibilities:

(i) he may entice PS to defectp

(ii) he may leave PS where he is now, with PS electing to
write separately because I would not have met his condition
of "four joins"r or (iii) PS may join us as a plurality,
either with or without the Westin modification of what we
have written.
As a remote possibility, HAB might join us in part,
but agree with PS that there must be direct access to the
court without any showing of parental hostility.

In any

event, we should be prepared to fall back to the

alternative

suggested by David and concurred in by Bruce and Paul.
his rider of 6/6/79).

(See

As a practical matter, I do not think

there is siqnificant difference between the draft we

2.

circulated and David's suggestion.

Under either formulation,

a court is going to feel free to do what it thinks is in the
best

int~rest

of the minor.

I like our draft

bett~r

because

it contains a more specific recognition of a parental role.
But I am willing to

acce~t

David's somewhat softened approach

if it wins PS's vote without losing WHR's vote.
I therefore would like for you to mark up a copy of
our opinion, and hold it in reserve.

A number of changes

will be required.
We will have the further difficulty with WHR on
concluding merely with an affirmance of the District Court's
judgment.

Please take a look, Eric, at the precise language

of the judgment which - as I recall - is in the form of an
injunction.

I believe it holds the statute invalid and

enjoins its enforcement.
In marking up a copy to embody the Westin approach,
consider the following - some of which apply to our present
draft:

• • *
1.

I believe I gave you a copy of the opinion on

which PS had suggested a couple of verbal changes.
2.

Since it is probably that Parham (the CJ's

opinion) will come down no later than Bellotti.

What would

3.

you think of a citation of Parham, say on, or in a note on,
page 17, where we refer to the role of parents.
3.

What would you think of adding, perhaps in

connection with one of our references to consent of the
attending physician (possibly where we talk about your friend
Dr. Zupnick), something along the following lines:
"In Roe and Doe we emphasized the importance of the
role-o? the attending physician. those cases
involved pregnant adult women presumably capable of
selecting and obtaining a competent physician. In
this case, however, we are concerned only with
minors who may range in age - according to the
record - anywhere from children 12·14 to 17-yearold teenagers. Even the latter are less likely
than adults to know qualified and ethical physicians
or, when a physician is known , to have the means
to engage him. In all likelihood, a high percentage
of minors who wish to by-pass their parents will
seek an abortion clinic without being able to
distinguish the comp~ tent and ethical from those
that in effect operate 'abortion mills' for easy
profit. As Mr. Justice Stewart observed in Danforth,
it is 'unlikely' that disinterested and competent
counsel will be obtained in such clinics. See n. 21.
4.

the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page

ll needs revision.

this is the second in a two paragraph

subpart addressing the point that the "vulnerability of
children" justifies "the qualification by the state of
· minors' constitutional rights"*.

The first paragraph (p. ll)

cites four cases that sustain specified rights of minors that
do not seem - at least to me - to support the premise that
*We should cliange this language to say 19 qualification of the
exercise of certain constitutional rights by minors . "

4.

vulnerability justifies qualification of constitutional
rights.

The second paragraph does refer. to the sepaor·ate

juvenile court structure, which by implication supports the
thesis of the subpart.

Then McKeiver is cited with a quote

about "parental attention" - that seems irrelevant.

I

suggest that you revise this second paragraph to emphasize
that the juvenile court system, based on the vulnerability of
children, is designed to protect their privacy, assure
informality in the administration of their constitutional
rights, and afford an opportunity for parental participation
with the juvenile judge on an informal basis.
5.

If we revise the opinion to the extent

indicated by David's rider, language changes will have to be
made in several places in addition to pp. 24 and 26.

For

example, on page 20 we state that if parental consent is
required the state "also must provide a procedure whereby a
denial of parental consent may be reviewed and possibly
reversed".

This (and similar statements in other places)

assumes an initial requirement to seek parental consent or
satisfy a judge that this would be a futile effort.

The

Westin revision changes this, as it would allow the minor to
go directly to the court in the first instance.

The court

would be free, however, to consider the desirability of

5.

parental consultation in determining what may be in the
child's best interest.

I have suggested, on page 20, the

type of revision that may be sufficient on that page. This is
merely illustrative.

There are other places, and there may

be better ways to make the chanqe.
6.

As you review the draft consider, with respect

to IliA and IIIB, whether we are using the words "notice",
"consultation", and "consent" clearly and consistently in
light of what the statute provides and of our holding on the
various issues.

I have not done this with any care, as the

thought came to me only after completing my review.

7.

I do not recall that we have stated anywhere in

Part I I I that if the minor consults her parents, as the
statute seeks to encourage, we may assume that in most cases,
certainly where families are intact - that the abortion issue
will be resolved without recourse to a court.

Only when

there is a withholding of consent, or where the minor elects
independently of her parents to satisfy a court that she is
mature or that the abortion is in her best interests, will
recourse to the Superior Court be necessary.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

lfp/ss

6/18/79
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Eric

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

June 18, 1979

Bellotti
In order to avoid delay, we must assume, as I have
indicated, that Justice Blackmun is preparinq a separate
opinion in which he takes a different view from ours.

The

best guess is that he will go down the line with Stevens,
Brennan and Marshall except he will include a requirement
that a minor consult a physician, and probably obtain his
written approval of a "best interest" abortion.
Depending on what HAB writes, we will be confronted
with several possibilities:

(i) he may entice PS to defect:

(ii) he may leave PS where he is now, with PS electing to

write separately because I would not have met his condition
of "four joins"' or (iii) PS may join us as a plurality,
either with or without the Westin modification of what we
have written.
As a remote possibility, HAB might join us in part,
but agree with PS that there must be direct access to the
court without any showing of parental hostility.

In any

event, we should be prepared to fall back to the

alternative

suqqested by David and concurred in by Bruce and Paul.
his rider of 6/6/79).

As a practical matter, I do not think

there is siqnificant difference between the draft we

t

(See

2.

circulated and David's suqqestion.

Under either formulation,

a court is goinq to feel free to do what it thinks is in the
best interest of the minor.

I like our draft better because

it contains a more specific recognition of a parental role.
But I am willinq to accept David's somewhat softened approach
if it wins PS's vote without losing WHR's vote.
I therefore would like for you to mark up a copy of
our opinion, and hold it in reserve.

A number of changes

will be required.
We will have the further difficulty with WHR on
concluding merely with an affirmance of the District Court's
judgment.

Please take a look, Eric, at the precise language

of the judgment which - as I recall - is in the form of an
injunction.

I believe it holds the statute invalid and

enjoins its enforcement.
In marking up a copy to embody the Westin approach,
consider the following - some of which apply to our present
draft:

* * *
1.

I believe I gave you a copy of the opinion on

which PS had sugqested a couple of verbal changes.
2.

Since it is probably that Parham (the CJ's

opinion) will come down no later than Bellotti.

What would

-

3.

you think of a citation of Parham, say on, or in a note on,
page 17, where we refer to the role of parents.
3.

What would you think of adding, perhaps in

connection with one of our references to consent of the
attending physician (possibly where we talk about your friend
Dr. Zupnick), something along the following lines:
"In Roe and Doe we emphasized the importance of the
role-a£ the attending physician. Those cases
involved pregnant adult women presumably capable of
selecting and obtaining a competent physician. In
this case, however, we are concerned only with
minors who may range in age - according to the
record - anywhere from children 12-14 to 17-yearold teenagers. Even the latter are less likely
than adults to know qualified and ethical physicians
or, when a physician is known, to have the means
to engage him. In all likelihood, a high percentage
of minors who wish to by-pass their parents will
seek an abortion clinic without being able to
distinguish the competent and ethical from those
that in effect operate 'abortion mills' for easy
profit. As Mr. Justice Stewart observed in Danforth,
it is 'unlikely' that disinterested and competent
counsel will be obtained in such clinics. See n. 21.
4.

The paragraph beginning at the bottom of page

11 needs revision.

This is the second in a two paragraph

subpart addressing the point that the ''vulnerability of
children'' justifies "the qualification by the state of
minora' constitutional rightsn*.

The first paragraph (p. 11)

cites four cases that sustain specified rights of minors that
do not seem - at least to me - to support the premise that
*We should change this language to say ''qualification of the
exercise of certain constitutional rights by minors."

4.

vulnerability justifies qualification of constitutional
riqhts.

The second paragraph does refer. to the sepa,·ate

juvenile court structure, which by
thesis of the subpart.

im~lication

supports the

Then McKeiver is cited with a quote

about "parental attention" - that seems irrelevant.

I

suggest that you revise this second paragraph to emphasize
that the juvenile court system, based on the vulnerability of
children, is designed to protect their privacy, assure
informality in the administration of their constitutional
rights, and afford an opportunity for parental participation
with the juvenile judge on an informal basis.
5.

If we revise the opinion to the extent

indicated by David's rider, language changes will have to be
made in several places in addition to pp. 24 and 26.

For

example, on page 20 we state that if parental consent is
required the

~tate

"also must provide a procedure whereby a

denial of parental consent may be reviewed and possibly
reversed".

This (and similar statements in other places)

assumes an initial requirement to seek parental consent or
satisfy a judge that this would be a futile effort.

The

Westin revision changes this, as it would allow the minor to
go directly to the court in the first instance.

The court

would be free, however, to consider the desirability of

~

~

5.

parental consultation in determining what may be in the
child's best interest.

I have suggested, on page 20, the

type of revision that may be sufficient on that page. This is
merely illustrative.

There are other places, and there may

be better ways to make the chanqe.
6.

As you review the draft consider, with respect

to IliA and IIIB, whether we are using the words "notice",
"consultation", and "consent" clearly and consistently in
light of what the statute provides and of our holding on the
various issues.

I

have not done this with any care, as the

thought came to me only after completing my

7.

r~view.

I do not recall that we have stated anywhere in

Part I I I that if the minor consults her parents, aa the
statute seeks to encouraqe, we may assume that in most cases,
certainly where families are intact - that the abortion issue
will be resolved without recourse to a court.

Only when

there is a withholding of consent, or where the minor elects
independently of her parents to satisfy a court that she is
mature or that the abortion is in her best interests, will
recourse to the Superior Court be necessary.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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CHAI,415ERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 18, 1979

•

Re:

No. 78-329 - Bellotti v. Baird
No. 78-330 - Hunerwadel v. Baird

Dear John:

I

Please JOln me in your opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

•

0
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CHAMBERS OF

June 18, 1979

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 78-329 - Bellotti v. Baird
No. 78-330 - Hunerwadel v. Baird

Dear Lewis:
I have read and reread your proposed opinion for the
Court in these cases. Potter stated in his letter of
June 4 to you that the proposed opinion reflects a great
deal of hard work and an effort to bring some consensus
out of the diversity of views expressed during our
Conference discussion. I have been through these woods
before and I know how sticky and difficult the going is
in this general area.
There is much in your opinion with which I could
agree, but there are also parts I could not join. I
have concluded, after much thought, that on balance I
shall vote merely to affirm. I definitely would not
reach the question of severability by way of certification to the Supreme Judicial Court. I therefore am
joining John's brief opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

~u:prtmt

<¢tntrt &tf tltt ~b .:§tafts
11htsltbtgton. ~. Qt. 211~~~

CHAMBERS 01'"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 19, 1979

· Re:

Nos, 78-329 and

78~330

~

Bellotti and
Hunerwadel v. Baird

Dear John:
Please join me in your concurring in part and
dissenting in part opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference·

ea

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Eric

DATE:

6-19-79

RE:

Bellotti

I hope the accompanying draft of Bellotti includes all the
major changes that will have to be made in order to satisfy Justice
Stewart and make the opinion internally consistent.

My work

necessarily has been hasty, and further "fine-tuning" undoubtedly can
be done.
With respect to the changes suggested in your memo of 6-18,
most of these have been incorporated with my editing.
trouble with a couple of them:

(1) I do not understand the problem

with the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 11.
should discuss this.

I did have

Perhaps we

(2) I agree with the substance of your

propopsed paragraph dealing with the inability of minors to find and
engage competent, ethical physicians, but I recommend against -including it.

~

The assumption of this opinion as written is that many

minors are competent to make the abortion decision itself
independently.

Even minors found to be immature but whose abortions

are approved by the court, without parental involvement, apparently
will be on their own when it comes to actually having the abortion

?
'

2.
performed.

It could be viewed as inconsistent to rely on these

assumptions in the holding of the case, then to express concern that
pregnant minors won't even be able to locate a decent physician.

(3)

As I read it, your proposed change on page 23 would alter the
previous meaning of the text.

If this concerns you, perhaps we

should discuss it.
I suppose we should consider the possibility of including a
brief reply to the Stevens' position.

I think it deserves no more

than a brief, politely contemptuous footnote.

----------

June 20, 1979

Bellotti

Dear Potter:
I return herewith your copy of the first draft of
my opinion, which you were good enough to review with great
care, suggest some quite helpful changes, and returned to me
on yesterday.
Also, I deliver herewith a master copy of the draft
on which I have included many of your changes verbatim, and
others that I have revised. By comparing the two drafts, you
will be able to see exactly where revisions are suggested. I
do not think I have changed the substance anywhere. In some
instances I simply reframed the language in my words1 in
other cases, I tried to harmonize it with the general tone of
the opinion. In all cases, I have preserved carefully your
basic point: that the pregnant minor always has the option
of going directly to the court in the first instance.
Where it seemed appropria.t e, I have retained
language emphasizing the importance of parental consultation
as a basic norm. We are dealing here not just with 16 and 17
year old, street wise minors (the type Thurgood visualizes)J
we are addressing the spectrum of ages.
Before we make a final decision as to omission of
the equal protection discussion, I have had one further
thought. If Massachusetts should reenact this statute in
accordance with our opinion, I suppose it is possible - if
not probable - that these same plaintiffs (appellees) may
renew the challenge on equal protection grounds unless we
settle that issue. I would like to put an end to this
protracted liti~ation. Therefore, on balance, I slightly
favor retaining the equal protection section - with any
changes you may wish.

2.

As time is running out, I would welcome your view
whether you and I both should go to Bill Rehnquist. He will
not like the one basic chanqe we have made. Yet, as we have
often aqreed, he is a team player and the alternatives to
obtaining four votes for our opinion are not attractive. I
am assuming that the CJ, who assigned the case to me, would
join three of us.
I will be available whenever you want to talk.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss

'l:__...
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 25, 1979

Re:

78-329 - Bellotti v. Baird
78-330 - Hunerwadel v. Baird

Dear Lewis:
I'm still with

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.iuprttttt '!Illltrl d

tlrt Jnlttb .itattg

'Jifu!pnghm. ~. <!J.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 25 ~ 1979

Re:

Nos. 78-329 and 78-330~
Bellotti v. Baird~ etc.

Dear

Lewis~

/

I am glad to join your opinion as recirculated today~ also agreeing to your proposal
to delete a large part of the second paragraph
of Part IV.
Sincerely

yours~

()~'
I,
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/

/
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CHAMBERS OF

/

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 25, 1979

Re:

Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 - Bellotti v. Baird, et al.

Dear Lewis:
Please JOln me in the second draft of your circulation
of June 25th in this case.

Sincerely, ~ ,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~~

June 25, 1979

Bellotti

Dear Bill:
First, may I say that I hope you found your mother
improved, or at least to be in a stable condition.
During your absence, the printer delivered the
second draft of this worrisome case. Indeed, I just missed
you on Friday afternoon when I wanted to brief you on the
changes that ~ay be viewed as substantive. They arec
1. The first draft provided that before the
Superior Court considered whether the minor was mature or
that an abortion. was in her beat interest, it must be
8atisfied that a prior consultation with parents would be
fruitless and likely to result in their attempt to obstruct
access to the court. Potter thinks this imposes a
precondition that cannot be squared with Danforth. Although
I do not share Potter's concern, I do understand it and
recognize that it is entirely arguable. Accordingly, I have
made the changes, with Potter's assistance, you will find on
pages 24 and 25. There are minor conforming changes
elsewhere. E.g., P• 26.
As Potter agrees, I do not believe this change except in theory - has practical siqnificance. If a judge
believes a minor is mature, or that the abortion is in her
best interest, he is quite likely to have ascertained why she
didn't want to consult her parents. If he is in doubt, he is
free to - and undoubt.edly will in most eases - reserve
judgment until the parents are brought into the
consultations. We must assume (as the opinion indicates) an
extremely informal and confidential procedure.
2. Potter prefers to omit discussion of the Equal
Protection issue since it is irrelevant in view of our

-

2.

holding. li!onft of the other opinions addressfl!s the issue.
Accordingly, I have omitted what was Part IV.
3. As indicated in prior correspondence, I was
villinq - indeed, entirely content - to resolve the
severability issue here. As the good and bad features of
§12S are interwoven into a single paragraph, I see no way in
which the statute can be saved by severability.
This means that we affirro the judgment of the
District Court, hut only insofar as it invalidates the
statute an~ enjoins its enforcement. The opinion makes
clear, however, that Sl2S •satisfies constitutional standards
in large part•, and falls short only in two specifically
identified respects (p. 27). Accordingly, assuming that what
I have written becomes a plurality opinion, it will - in
light of ayron's vote to reverse - become the controlling
opinion. Thua, it will constitute the authoritative guidance
to Massachusetts and other states that wish to prevent wholly
unrestricted and unsupervised exercise of the abortion right
by children of all ages.
To my astonishment (and I think contrary to
Bellotti I) four of our Brothers apparently would impose no
restrictions whatever upon the exercise of this right by
minors.
As time is short, I am available to discuss this
further if you wish. I am sending copies of this letter to
the Chief and Potter, hopinq that we can settle upon an
opinion promptly.
I hardly need say that I . appreciate, as do others,
your typical willingness to accept a position different from
your preference (at least for the time being), where by doing
so you facilitate the maklnq of a majority for a position
that at least you can view as a moderate one.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/sa
cc:

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Stewart

i'o: The Chief Justlor>
Mr. Justice Bren .• an
Mr. Justiue Stewa1·t
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justtce Powell
Mr. Justice Stevens
From: Mr. Justice Rehnqu13t
Circulated: __B_J_UN_1_9_79_

1st DRAFT

Rsctrculated: _________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOS.

78- 329

AND

78-330

Francis X . Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, et al. ,
Appellants,
78- 329
v.
William Baird et al.

On Appeal from the
United States District
Court for the District
of
Massachusetts.
Jane Hunerwadel, Etc , Appellant .
78-330
ti'.
William Baird et al.
[June -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, concurring.
I join the opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL and in the judgment of the Court. At such time as this Court is willing to
reconsider its earlier decision in Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976) , in which I joined
the dissenting opinion of MR. JusTICE WHITE, I shall be more
than willing to participate in that task. But unless and until
that time comes, literally thousands of judges cannot be left
.by this Cottrt with nothing more than the guidance offered by )
ll truly fragmented holding~ this Court.
I

~

.I

---

~

June 26, 1979

Bellotti v. Baird, No.s 78-329, 78-330
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
The next draft of my opinion in these cases will
include the change indicated on the enclosed pages.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss

6/2b{ 79

Bellotti footnote

Possibly add a footnote along the following lines, in
response to JPS's note 4 added to his opinion on yesterday:

The opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in
the judgment, joined by three members of the Court,
characterizes this opinion as "advisory" and the questions it
addresses as "hypothetical".

Apparently this is criticism of

the attempt of this opinion to provide some guidance as to
how a state constitutionally may provide for adult
involvement - either by parents or a state official such as a
judge - in the abortion decisions of minors.

In view of the

importance of the issues raised, and the protracted
litigation to which these parties already have been
subjected, we think it would be irresponsible simply to
condemn §12S without stating our views as to the controlling
principles.

2.

The statute before us today is the same one that
was before us in Bellotti I, supra.

In a unanimous opinion,

joined by Justice Stevens, we remanded the case with
directions that appropriate questions be certified to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts "concerning the
meaning of [§12S] and the procedure it imposes".
151.

Id., at

We directed this procedure because, as stated in the

opinion, we thought the construction of §12S urged by
appellants would "avoid or substantially modify the federal
constitutional challenge to the statute".

Id., at 148.

The

central feature of §12S was its provision that a state court
judge could make the ultimate decision, when necessary, as to
the exercise by a minor of the right to an abortion.
id., at 145.

See

We held that this "would be fundamentally

different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto'
the kind rejected in Danforth]

id., (footnote omitted)."

[of

3.

Thus, providing for decision-making authority in a judge was
not the kind of veto power held invalid in Danforth.
Apparently, the Justices who join the concurring opinion now
read Danforth as standing for precisely the opposite
proposition.

It would have been well, and some may think

fairer to the litigants and the courts below, had our
concurring Brethren expressed their views when §128 was
before us in Bellotti I rather than having agreed to a remand
that they believed could not possibly result in a decision
upholding the statute.

- ,~-~-----

'

-~--,----------------------------~----------------------------~---

June 26r 1979
Bellotti
Dear Chiefr Potter and Bill:
In a fourth draft of his opinionr circulated
yesterday afternoonr John added two concluding sentences and
footnote 4.
In his final sentence he states that we are
addressing the constitutionality of an abortion statute that
•Massachusetts has not enacted•.
In footnote 4 he chides us at greater lengthr
stating that our opinion is •advisory• and that there is no
•real case or controversy•.
The enclosed draft of a footnote that might be
added to my opinion is sent to you for your comments. At
this late date, I am weary of trading •insults• with
respected Brothers. I must say, howeverr that John's
footnote arouses my coabative instincts. My disposition is
to reply, but I view our opinion - at this stage - as a joint
enterprise and therefore I would welcome your views both as
to the desirability of some reply, and the merits of my
particular draft.
If convenient (and particularly since the Chief is
leaving after the Conference tomorrow), your views before his
departure would be helpful.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Rehnqulst
lfp/ss

,jnp:rttttt C!fanri of tqt ~~ ,jtaftg
,rzudfhtghtn, ~. (!}. 2ll.;t~~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 26, 1979

Re:

(78-329 - Bellotti v. Baird
(78-330 - Hunerwadel v. Baird

Dear Lewis:
I agree there are risks in the final hours of a
Term -- a hard one especially -- in "losing our
cool." I try to govern my advocate instincts and
ignore barbs of the Brethren.
We should always avoid deciding cases not here
notwithstanding the natural desire to put things to
rest. Just as a dozen to twenty years ago our
predecessors opened "cans of worms," we have done so,
notably in Roe and Doe, but there are others.
Getting the worms back in the can is difficult.
At this stage I am prepared to go along with you.
I do not read your June 26 material as harsh, strident
or unseemly.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

I~
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CHAMBERS OF

June 27, 1979

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

78-329 - Bellotti v. Baird

Dear Lewis:
Your proposed new footnote is satisfactory
to me.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

LFP/lab

6/--/79

Additi~al

Footnote

Bellotti v. Baird, Nos. 78-329, 78-330

The opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in the
judgment, joined by three members of the Court, characterizes
this opinion as "advisory" and the questions it addresses as
•hypothetical".

Apparently this is criticism of our. attempt

to provide some guidance as to how a State constitutionally
may provide for adult involvement - either by parents or a
state official such as a judqe - in the abortion decisions of
minors.

In view of the importance of the issue raised, and

the protracted litigation to which these parties already have
been subjected, we think it would be irresponsible simply to
invalidate §12S without stating our views as to the
controlling principles.
The statute before us today is the same one that was
here in Bellotti I, supra.
then deemed "hypothetical".

The issues it presents were not
In a unanimous opinion, we

remanded the case with directions that appropriate questions
be certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
"concerning the meaning of [S12S] and the procedure it
imposes•.

Id., at 151.

We directed that this be done

because, as stated in the opinion, we thought the
construction of S12S urged by appellants would •avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to

~

~
I

'II

the statute".

Id., at 148.

The central feature of §125

its provision that a state court judge could make the
ultimate decision, when

n ~ cessary,

as to the exercise by a

minor of the right to an abortion.

See id., at 145.

Ne held

that this "would be fundamentally different from a statute
that creates a 'parental veto' [of the kind rejected in
Danforth.]"

Id. (footnote omitted).

Thus, all members of

the Court agreed that providing for decision-making authority
in a judqe was not the kind of veto power held invalid in
Danforth.

The basic issues that were before us in Bellotti I

remain in the case, sharpened by the construction of §125 by
the Supreme Judicial Court.

~

I

r)

I

June 27, 1979

No. 78-329 Bellotti v. Baird
No. 78-330 Hunerwadel v. Ba1rd

Dear John:
In response to note 4, pq. 5, added to your
opinion, I intend to add the enclosed note at an appropriate
place in my plur~lity opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice StPvens

Copies to the Conference

LFP/lab

arquri: ll'f tlft ~ttittb' ~hdtg
JTMJrittghtn. ~. ar. 2.o~'!.;l

.jnpumt
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 27, 1979

78-329 - Bellotti v. Baird
78-330 - Hunerwadel v. Baird
Dear Lewis:
Thanks for your note.
I will not respond
to your additional footnote.
I believe the case
is therefore ready to come down.
Respectfully,

Jt
Mr, Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

LFP/lab

7/2/79

78-329

Bellotti v. Baird

This case is here from a three-judge federal district court
in Massachusetts.
In 1974, Massachusetts enacted a statute, j regulating the
access of minors under

18~to

abortions.

In essence the statute

requires a minor/ desiring an abortion/ to obtain the consent of both
of her parents/ or, failing that,/ the approval of a superior court
judge.

~Appellees

here, j and parties since this litigation commenced

in 197; ;include Parents Aid Society, an abortion clinic;/ Dr. Zupnick,
who performs abortions at the clinic;j and Mary Moe - at time of suit,
an unmarried/ pregnant minor.

Planned Parenthood of Massachusetts

participated as amicus.
The original defendant - and the appellant here -

u-

~

Francis Bellotti, the Attorney General of Massachusetts.
~- «c;l4.rAlc.f....t/
The ~ s law was challenged ~ as violative of the
principles announced by this Court in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton.

--

---

fallowed/ is outlined in the

In brief,
1975.

court invalidated the statute in

When the case reached us on appeal in 1976,( we decided that

the statute

~

capable of a construction/ that would meet

constitutional standards.

We remanded the case with directionsj'that

the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts be requested to construe
the statute.

2.
That court complied, but appellees again challenged the
Massachusetts law as it had been construed.
~ Jk 2. '!:!
The district court~ aga ~ found the statute to

t...:--::-

restrictive ;bf the constitutional rights of minors.
the case was appealed to us J

a.-.JL

Ul-t'_

~L/t..

be ~

Once more,

J- ~,

Although a majority of this Court have not agreed on an
opinion, j eight of us do

agree~that the judgment of invalidity

must be affirmed.
I speak for the Court;'as to the judgment.

I also speak

for the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
who make a plurality for my opinion.
The Court long has been supportive;fof the interest of
parents in the upbringing of their children,j and in the interest of
the state in fostering that parental role.

Our opinion reiterates;'

the importance of these interests.
But the abortion decision is different in many respects
from other choices faced by minors.

Consequently, the state is

required to exercise special sensitivity

~nd

carej'when it legislates

in this area.
The Massachusetts statute goes far;'toward satisfying
constitutional standards.
procedure )-

As construed, it provides an expeditious

3.

provides an expeditious procedure; 'by which a minor;fdesiring
an abortion/ may obtain judicial authorization, without
parental consent ; lif the operation is found to be in her best
interest.
Thus, the parents do not have an absolute veto .

' 7" holding
;;::::;r
This is consistent with ourA
in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth that a state may

over a minor's abortion

~ give parents; 'an absolute veto

decision~_..~,~

-

In spite of provisions that do meet constitutional

---

•

standards,; 'we find that the Massachusetts statute is
deficient in two respects.

First, it permits the Court to

- ..

~~~

-

withhold authorization j'tor an abortion / frgm • pregnant minor ~
'f
A
A
found to be competen ~nd mature enough to make this decision
independently.

Second, it does not permit a pregnant minor
_.-"7

-

to go directly to the courtJ'to seek authorization for an

'/ :__., .

abortion / without parental consultation, f even when this is in
her best interest. ,(

W..e.. ~ ~ ~ ~·

While joining the plurality opinion, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist has filed a concurring opinion.ff Mr. Justice
Stevens, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall
and Mr. Justice Blackmun, has filed an opinion concurring in
the results,/ but upon a different analysis.
White has filed a dissenting opinion.

Mr. Justice
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ne country Is
a onal broth·
tsts, the Ger1 for the effi.c Geneva ma·1

' . ·· · · ,
· •· . · :
·
. ·
Such Is the sorry state of artairs an
I had cause to dis- ·
ever that maybe they'll accept the like the cartwheels .
Susan B. Anthony dollar as real money only !or ·half an
in Salt Lake City, but they wouldn't hour at a time once

- '-

·. t..::~ ~ dl t1 a'J- t : 'i ~ · ,

AnyWaY?

~!~~~a;~~:; ,:

'

'! '

Why is 1t that every time somebody nsse~ts a ~·her rather and mother for submission to some \'ate behav1or..Every citizen becomes answerable
to some public authority, usually a federal bureaunew right, all of us wind up less free than we were judge who barely knows her.
·
before?
· :. ·
·
, '> Justice Byron White,· the lone dissenter, asked crat, for an ever-broader range of personal deciThe Supreme Court has now ruled unconstitu· how on earth the Constitution can be construed to sions•.
tlonal a Massachusetts law requiring minors to get deprive parents of the right to. decide whether ' The last stronghold of private freedom is the
parental approval before obtaining an abortion. their minor child shall have surgery. It is a ques- family. A few weeks ago, the court recognized this
Though divided, the majority seems to think a girl . tlon that should give pause even to those who re- when it held that parents have the right to commit · ..
their children to mental hospitals. In so ruling, it
should be able to get the necess<U)' permission gard abortion as a valid freedom.
!rom a judge who deems her "mature." And if the
So-called children's rights mean, in practice, in·' acknowledged that this is a decision better made .
judge deems her immature, he himself should be creased state power over parents. In Sweden, it is by parents than by publlc officials. It would be unthe one to decide whether the abortion is in her . now lliegal to spank your own children. Whether .fair, therefore, to characterize the court simply as
·. this makes children freer in any real sense is very an enemy of the family as an Institution.
best interest.
Nevertheless, the court is afflicted by the gen.
Leave aside the ethics of abortion. Leave aside doubtful. What is certain is that the state has a
eral
confusion about the public and private
the question how these minutiae are quarried : new jurisdiction over the home and the f3.mily. In
,
spheres.
In limiting the range of private discretion ·
from the Constitution. Let us simply consider what : .·effect, Swedish parents are being whittled down
-even
in
.the name of "rights"-it limits our freethe court'~ ruling implies about the rights of par- > .into minor-grade civil servants. That is the shape
ents, the relations of parents and children, and the · , of things to come in the totally bureaucratized so- dom. 1'his is nowhere more obvious than in it! in·
· creasing tendency to treat the famUy as nothing ·
scope o! state power.
.
l
· ., cicty our social reformers aspire to.
.
but the lowest administrative level of the state.
In the first place, the court holds that the girl . ~very right requires some agency to enforce it. · By conferring on children so-called "rights," the
who .wants an abortion owes no obedience to her · The perennial polltical problem is how to establish state actually alters the structure of the family.
own father r.~d mother. In the second place, it· : a power to protect our real rights, while ensuring Some think this is a fine thing: Reform should
holds that she does owe obedience to the court, ' that such power won't itself be used to violate our know no bounds. But we have come a long way
· which has · the discretionary power of deciding · rights. · ·
·
,
·.. ·
from the days when it wa! assumed that there
· whether she rr.ay or may not lllake the abortion de- (· A peculiarly modem problem Is this: that many were some things no man could put asunder. And
· . .;
. :.
, of the so-called "rights" we enjoy-or are about to what has been the result of all our tampering with
. .clsion for herself• .: · .,
· ' · To put it another wa~ The court assumes the . have inflicted on us-are not protections against the traditional family? Soaring rates of divorce
~. right to act in loco parentis- while denying par·. p~wer, but claims against the freedom of our fel- and abortion; a tripling of the number of children
ents themselves that right. · . ·
. ., .· i · · .· .. low citizens _for the discretionary use of their own who grow up with a single parent. If there is any
· .., The girl herself hd no new freedom. Sh~ bM, it ·,. property. ' '
·· ·
·
evidence of a corresponding increase in human
1s true, a right to defy her parents, but not to defy
, They do more. They create a power in the state · happiness, I have yet to hear of it.
CIV78, Lot An&elea Ttmea 87t1dleate
the ~?~~,-~~~ ~. ~.er~ly e~~ged sub.miss~~n to to set explicit standards for what was formerly pri·
1
. ·t·
.(· • • 1•·.-· · '1·-'.t-,:·i':'';':\f!ll;"-: .• (~'.· ·· ..~';·~ "' . ,~~~.
. t
... ·'
• ;~-..L~·.·" ~ . \' -~ ' - .; . ·.- ' f! ~ .$ • • ·• •
' ·. ,;·, i"t··· ,;.. ·~J·.,,J..i'i ·1~,;f ;'i i.- r;."~·;.:.~\11~ " 1:' ·,: •.
·.
. · ~·.•:· .····· ·' · · ·. ·· ... , · ·
" .. ,
" ·~r~ -~f t ~, ...:·:f~~.\ ~·~~-.r: :;.~ tJ~i .'1.' ·_r ·~- -~ • ,
'•,
. ~' ·,':.: ' :.. ~:·.....

estimates,
tarly Italy,
ith an atti
go-go days, ·
are taking
ial and systg acquired
price.
· 60 ::nill!on
size of Oree very serl·
urturing or
prosperity.
IYS its dues
·accelerator
>ry that nil
ieneva, but ·. ·
1llar labora- · ·
Jrg, as well.
;eneva !acil.osed down
at would be .
:esearch admportant to .
fort, but it's ·,
: own !acill·· ·.
,
burg labora·orld, 1nclud-. •
.e's Republic ·
Jinething .as ·t•. ·•
lerator. "The ,.
1n industrial.\
' an ad min- ,·.·
mntry gets a .·:
.ne like this."
to the little-

tj•i: : • :.~.

~s, ThiS,

!

•t•

i !.

•

'

•

""'"

· - • 6 ... '

-!

., _.

#

-_ 11 ~-., •

r--

.. ,11~1""()

'0

'Vnf"l.r

;i'

-.' !
I

',

• I

•- ·~

i

.,
,1

•

sumably stillis-I haven't been back in
a long time-a handsome building.
On those journeys, a private cop
walked six feet behind me, his revolver
.. ~ .. ~~"'

~;-

.., n .. o~+ " o'"Jl nl rn l,_.t ,..,.. nn r ..

woman at that. But, it seems to me, she
stands in relation to other persons portrayed on our small change-Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, FDR and JFKabout as Jeb Stuart compares with Wei-

·~.... ..

·. · ,.• .~.~·w. ~ ·:

, .

.. ........ 1
,,_,,...

s

:. T~ .~ ;·... . ..·...:
~ .. b
. · : .,; · /~. .:,/ :.: ;: ~:.· ·ot•. ·.:·~-' vt. 1i .. 1.,,~·~.'!·.,.
·:; 'rr"~f'
l
" i .•,; ....'·'~ (·lt•
' 'll
1

..

····""·
.... ,.,,~. • ~-~·" r:•W
f:' ~
. ·. 1'N
"1\q~..6~
:.l 'H. !... 1
•• • ..
•
. "'
•
1
JOSenrt · 0 ran'~ 1·r.1~'"~ t'1~' ~ . ..J . ·.,.. ;~', .' l.i.",,; 1 ~ ·t•·•:·. · r..'. · ..~.:q '· f, ~ 1. ·•
'" .
._,: ~ · •
j I

'I' .

..

11, . ... ...,;., ' ·"
<.u ....
.. . . . . .... ,. . .
I·

, · •· .
.

•

· · . .·

.

.

.

. . . ..

•·

.·

, .. .> .

...

.

.

·• ·r•· ·. ·

·}

~i/

( :'' .WhOse C}l~ld IS' Thi~i, AllyWay? , ·. a
-

\' .
(.)... '

~ . , .,.
estim \es. ._,,
larly Ita;[: ···.
ith
andays
a i ·
go-go
. are taking
·
d •
1a1an .sys
1g acqul.l'ed
price.
~ 60 million

~iz:e~ ~errt .

urturing of
ity .
l.~~oi~eJu~ \.
-accelerator· ..,
lry that all ·.·
ieneva, but · ·
1ilar !abora~rg, as well.
•en eva !aclllosed down
.at wouhld bde ·
researc a •·
mportant to . .
fort, but it's ~~
r own faclli·· :.
.

. f;:

burg labora· .'
rotld,includ-.. :
le's Republic ·
1ans, there is .IY.'
1ic ·sense in '·
)mething .as.?~

'

)

•

1\'

.

.

.

; · . '.•'

/.:)~·~
~

1 1 ,,:

. .' {
•'

,

·1·:• ! 1
i, ..

.

•

<

in

. . ,,

lnelikethiS.
to the little- ·

•·

·:'.'· ,:,'·

·
,t... I

~;" ."··>· o .:-} . i .,:.c,_;•· ·
"i. r !.; ., · · .-~;:; .:

:of ~;. -· ,: /

·- · '

I •

. 1•

'·- ··~

r~ ~" J1 ~·· rr """

1 "1"'' t,.,

t"ll """·

:· •

~--, : . •'

~

,.

•

... ...

nr t.wire a

i

.,·,

.._{

·~.. : . ~ ..

..an:

'

.-':; •

I

' .

.. .. \

;.

1: •··• ·•

. < :......:~~.: .. ~ :: "

tech· ,.·_..
Jration.Eve~:r;; .
.
·e an..u takes - ··.
·. .
..
·
.
.
. , . , '·
.
·. •
necountryls .·
'·
·•
., . . ··
· · .,, >·. · ·:
tional broth·
Such Is the sorry state or atfairs ali
lsts, the Ger· over that maybe they'll accept the
, for the effi· Susan B. Anthony dollar as real money
.e Geneva ma· in Salt Lake City, but they wouldn't
_,,.., ~-, ~d.

,.. ~

Why 1s 1t that every time somebody asserts a :·. her father and mother for submissi~n .to some . vate behavlor•.Every _citizen becomes answerable .
new right, all of us wind up less free than we were judge who barely _knows her. .
. . . . . to some public authonty, usually a federal bureau. . .
before? .
. . · ·· ·. '· · . · ,... .·.· ~ ·
· .: ,'> Justice Byron .'White,; th~ lone diss~nt~r. asked • crat, for an ~~er·yfrpader range of personal dec!~ . ,
. . The Supreme Court has now ruled unconstitu· how on earth the Const1tut1on can be construed to . ~ons. ·
..::J· -~
•
' tional a Massachusetts law requiring minors to get deprive parents of the right to. decide whether ' The last stronghold of pnvate freedom is the
ago, the
this
.
parental approva 1 bef ore obtai ning an abortion. their minor child shall have surgery• It is a ques. family.i A
h few
ld hweeks
1
h court
h recognized
1 ht to comm!t ·· · ·
Thougli divided, the majority seems to think a girl . tion that s~ould give.pause even to those whore- when t e t at parents ave. t erg
h ld b bl to t th necesS"Mt permission . gard abort10n as a valid freedom.
.·
their children to mental hosp1ta~s. In so ruling, It
s ou
e a e
ge
e "
-J,
·
,
acknowledged that this is a deciSion better made .. · .
from a judge who deems her mature. And if the
So-called children s rights mean, in practice, in·' by parents than by public officials. It would be un· .
judge deems her immature, he himself s~ould be c~eased state power over parents ..In sweden, it l.s .fair therefore to characterize the court simply as .·
the one to decide. whether the abortion lS in her now illegal to spank your own children. Whether an ;nemy of the family as an mstltution.
. ~ ·,
best interest.
·
.. . .
·. this makes children freer in any real sense is very
Nevertheless, the court is afflicted by the gen. ..-:
Leave aside th~ ethics of abortion. Leave aside .. doubtful. What is certain is that the state has a eral confusion about the public · and private ..,
the question . how these minutiae are quarried ·, new jurisdiction over the home and the family. In spheres In limiting the range of private discretion . .
from the Constitution. Let us simply consider what ; .·effect, Swedish parents are being whittled down · -even .the name of "rights"-it limits our free. ·. ~
the.court's ruling .implies about the rights of pa~· :;·. into minor-grade civil servants.·That is the shape dom. This is nowhere mbre obvious than in its ·in· · :;
. ents, the relations of parents and children, and _1pe.; , of things .to come in the totally bureaucratized sa. . creasing tendene}T.to treat the family as nothh1g ··•. .
scope ofstate power.
. ·· · ·
· i :.. ·. ciety our social refo~ers aspire to.
· .:but the loWest administrative level of the state.
·
In the first place, the court holds that the girl ·. Every right requires some agency to enforce it. . By conferring on children so-called "rights," the '
who wants an abortion owes no obedience to her ' . The perennial political problem l.s how to establish state actually alters the structure of the !amJty•
own father and mother•. In the second place, it"-,: a power to protect our real rights, while ensuring Some think this iS a fine thing: Reform should
holds that she does owe obedience to the court, ·i· that such power won't itself be. used to violate our ·know no bounds. But we have come a long way
· which has the discretionary power ot deciding · rights. · ' ' ·· ··'
.
..~
·from the days when it wa! assumed that there
·
h
t...,.ak th b rti d
1· A
·
.whether s e may or_ ~~Y ?~ ~ e:,. _e a 0 . on .e- · : : peculiarly ~ode~.problem l.s this: that many . were some things no man could put asun~er. ~d
, ;c~ion for herself. ::,.,·!· _.,. :• ., . . .._.:.
• :·; . . . ~ : of the so-called 'rights we enjoy-or are about to what has been the result of all our tampenng With
· · . · To put lt another way: The Ctlttrt assumes the . have inflicted on us-:-are not protections against the traditional family? Soaring rates of divorce •
'. ~. right to .act in loco pat;ent~~~~ ~enying P~·.. P.ower, but claims against the freedom of our fel· and abortion; a tripllng of the number of children
. ~ entiJ themselves that righ~ ..:•· .~:i-: ·; · ·•, .: ·. :'Y .i' . · .~.. , low cltlze~}or the discretionary use ot their o'n . who grow up with a single parent. If there 1s any
",.:/,., The girl herself ha! no new treed om. Sha hM, tt :· ·· property~ ··;..:" · .
:·
....
· : · e'1dence of a corresponding increase in human
iS true, a tight to defy her pareiltiJ, but riot to defy ; They do more. They create a power in the state · happiness, I have yet to hear of it.
• ::· · the court. She 1w merely exchanged kubmission to to set explicit standards for what was formerly pri· ·,
. clvrt;LoeAn,eteanmeasrndJeate
·: · · ;::., ·,··:J~ir.: ·, : :., ;;;~:~:-:·. :•:.~: . ~. ~ ~ . :·.. _,, !"'
·, , •
•
·· ·
.
·
·>:'~:.. ~ . ·,~:::;i. ~,~~1~~i.t' ~t!f~:;.W;1~:r"'~";~\ 1/ ·;;!/;'·,.· ~.; : .:~: · t.:::~:::t ·
"· ,

!:~E~~~~;'" j(t;;~i~;;;~:,~;;.~~~~~~;;:J;.';
.
•
·
:
~
;
,
.
·
,
,
:
·
·
•
.
:
:
.
·
t;·ix. ;.. {'·'·· ·•·: ·• · ·•.• ·. ....
e , nen
·t ··• . ·
Iropea~
c·u· . r"'1r'·'~''e·.·:n·:•'t'' ·:· C' u·~·.·, ·."r·::.·r·' e!n· ·c···y,·. -~).~,!;.'i, , ~·.;;,,:;- ·< ~;', :~ ·~ ·,
Ie

...
tL · · n1 __;-;-:-; 1 .' '

.11'' ~'~ ~~ 1:.·'·.

~
. · •. •. :· · •

.

:.c-- . . ,...;
·'· . ... ,

. .. :.. . · : .. . "· · . . ... · ..
. ..· . • ·. · . ·. ·- . . · .....
·' . ·,.·.·".... · : '· .. " ·. ·· ·
·

week.

•

.

·

.

·· ;·j"

.. .
. .

ir

· . ·

.

:lO

:. . -- .. .

.. ;· r;i. . . :·..(;..i;i. :l/ .....
1,(

,·'h·'if..

'j•.if'''r:
··'·'1!!!J"'

.
· 1.,. 1' . .

..

'·i'·.

, :

sumably still is-I haven't been back in'. 1 woman at that. But, it seems to me, she
a long time-a handsome building.
stands in relation to other persons por·
on those journeys, a private cop trayed on our s~all change-Washing·
walked six feet behind me his revolver ton, Jefferson, Lmcoln, FDR and JFK· "'";"" him " "rP:~t rlP:~I ~' !:l'lf.fmnnr. about as Jeb Stuart compares with Wei-

20 JUL f979
1775 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N . W.
WASHINGTON, D . C . 20006

.///~

July 19, 1979

Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Supreme Court of the United States,
One First Street, N.E.,
Washington, D.C. 20543.
Dear Justice Powell:
In a thoughtful opinion in Bellotti v. Baird
(No. 78-329), on July 2, 1979, you said:
"Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of
particular ethical, religious, or
political beliefs is something we
expect the State not to attempt in
a society constitutionally committed
to the ideal of individual liberty
and freedom of choice."
I understand that it is wrong to read too much into one
sentence, but for some time I have wondered whether it
can be argued that the constitutional requirement, which
prevents the State from teaching religious doctrine, means
also that the State can not teach any ethical doctrine.
To put it concretely, I can imagine an argument that a l
public school can teach children that the criminal law
punishes stealing, but it can not teach them that it is
wrong to steal.
I am enclosing a copy of a letter which appeared
in a recent issue of the Princeton Alumni Weekly. An
alumnus of the class of 1958 expresses dismay regarding the
news that the Honor System is not working as well as it did
when he was an undergraduate. I share the same concern.
However, I have noticed that the universities, including
Princeton, are at a loss to know whether they have any standing to take any position regarding ethical standards. I must
admit that their doubts spring from many factors, aside from
any question of constitutional law. However, Princeton undoubtedly receives federal government money for many purposes,
and if constitutional doctrine prevented the teaching of
ethical standards in public institutions, it might be that
Princeton would be next in line. In any event, the Boards
of Trustees and Administrators of private institutions are
undoubtedly affected by the climate in which their colleagues
work in the public institutions.

7

I realize that you have many other things to think
about, including a well-earned vacation.
Please give our good wishes to Jo, and say that
Marie hopes that she will be free for tennis some day.

·CMJ

r~

oward C. An
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July 27, 1979

Dear Howard,
Thank you for writing about the language in
Bellotti.
Perhaps it would have been better to have
omitted the word "ethical", as I certainly agree with
you that certain ethical standards traditionally
accepted by the civilized world (e.g. with respect to
lying, cheating and stealing) could and should be
inculcated in students - whether or not an honor system
is in effect.
Perhaps the word "moral '' .would have been more
precise. Many people are quick to rush to judge other
people and their views as being "immoral" (e.g. the
abortion issue, for example).
On a less wearisome topi~, Jo continues to play
tennis rather regularly. Perhaps she and Marie can get
together.
Sincere:,ly,

Howard C. Anderson , Esquire
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOS.

78-329

AND

Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, et al.,
Appellants,
78-329
v.
William Baird et al.
Jane Hunerwadel, Etc., Appellant,
v.
78-330
William Baird et al.

78-330

On Appeal from the
United States District
Court for the District
of Massachusetts.

[May -, 1979]
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
I

A
On August 2, 1974, the legislture of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1 The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12S
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents {to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and. given to
the physician. performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions. and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12V (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
§ 128 never has been enforced by Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivi ions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
wero made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout this
opinion.
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94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 3 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent '[to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978). 5
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that provide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stubble3 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the conrt's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, tha.t it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category of
minors were properly adjudicated in this case.
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field, M. D., (intervenors) 6 appeared as amicus curiae on be-'
half of the plain tiffs. Tho District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
{of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp., at 999.
Defendants in the suit, appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts (now Francis X.
Bellotti) and the district attorneys of all counties in the State.
Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant
and representative of the class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She and the class she represents are apellants in No. 78-330. 7
Following throe days of testimony, the District Court issued!
an opinion striking down § 12S. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird {). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of [these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." I d., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." !d., at 855-856. The court
6 In 1978, tho District Court permitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
7 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively as
appellants.
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, ...
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." I d., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 128,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor. 8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
§ 12S wa~ susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976). We
therefore vacated the judgment of the District Court, concluding that it should have certified to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts appropriate questions concerning the
meaning of § 12S, pursuant to existing procedure in that
State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21
(1976).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
8 One member of the th11ee-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without, due
process of law, and that § 128 was entirely consistent with the decisions
of this Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct of children. See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows:
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant con ent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
"b) If the parent is not limited to considering exclusively the minor's
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opmwn styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 128, as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court, are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter's
best interc.~ts, can the parent take into considera.tion the 'long-t{)nn
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standard or standards is the superior court to apply?
"a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are
not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests ?
"b) If tho superior court finds that t.l1e minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have
an abortion, may the court refuse its con8ent ba ed on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Docs the Massachusetts law permit a minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informed consent,' 'to obtilln
[a court] order without parental consultat.ion'?
"4. If tho court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 12S] which wilt expedite 1he application, hearing,
and decision phases of tho superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112.,
.§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S] ?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigcncy, have court-a.ppointed
,counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician perfonns an
abortion solely with minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith, erroneou8ly, believed that she was eighteen or more
years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statuto which,
in its opinion, mi"'ht a. Rist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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-abortion, parents are required by § 12 to consider exclusively
which will serve her best interests. See id., at 292- 293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
~'for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
!d., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the;
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." w I d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents ma,y be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. I d., at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
10 Section 128 itself sta.tes an exception for any parent who "has died
or has deserted his or her family."
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. I d., at 294. See n. - , infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three parti'cu1ar aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S r&"quires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." Id., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent-even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .... " I d., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. !d., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." !d., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 128 suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the statute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents natura.lly would infer from the
statute tha.t they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair."
!d., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Jndicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. - , infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional ru1d permanently enjoining its enforcement. 11 Appellants sought
The dissrnting judge agrerd that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consrnt to an abortion. He disagrerd with the remainder
of the court's conclusions, however: the best-int~rests limitation on the
withholding of par.ental consent in the Suprrme Judicial Court's opinion,
he argued, must be trrated as if part of tho statutory language itself; and
he read the evidentiary record as proving that only rarrly would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
11
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted probable jurisdiction. - U . S . - (1978).

II
The Constitution contains no explicit statement regarding
the legal relationships between parents, their children, and the
State. Yet, we long have recognized that the status of
minors under the law is unique in many respects. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, " [ c] hildren have a very
special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories
and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious
reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a
State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345 U. S.r
528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The special
place of children in our society and its legal system has resulted in our recognizing several important principles pertaining to the role of parents and children under the
Constitution.
The most basic of these is that a child, merely on account
of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967),
"whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone." 12
a desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 12S proceeding of having the parents before him as a sourco of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve hrr best interests. Judge
Julian thought tho unconstitutional aspect of § 12S could be severed under
established principles, and that the effect of striking down the statute
in its entirety would be to interfere unnecessarily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilies during the minor's
formative years. Sec id., at 1006-1020.
12 Similarly, tho Court said in Planned Parenthood of Central Missow'i
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976):
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
.adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
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This observation, of course, is but the beginning of the
:analysis. The unique role in our society of the family, the
institution by which "we inculcate and pass down many of
our most cherished values, moral and cultural," Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion), requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the peculiar needs of
parents and children. In particular, we have recognized three
reasons justifying the qualification by the state of minors'
constitutional rights: the peculiar vulnerability of children,
their inability of make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and the importance of the parental role in childrearing.
A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these protections, we have concluded that the child's right
is virtually coextensive with that of adults. For example,
we have held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law is
applicable to children in juvenile delinquincy proceedings.
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 ( 1967). In particular, minors involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358
(1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingr.aham v. Wright,
430 U. S. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of school
children implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double Jeop-1
ardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult after
an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had violated
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a criminal statute). Similarly, we have found children to be
the beneficiaries of the constitutional protection against the
deprivation of property interests without due process. Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistinguishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults, even when precisely the same
behavior is involved. In order to preserve this separate
aveune for dealing with minors, the Court has said that hearings in juvenile delinquincy cases need not necessarily "conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of
the usual administrative hearing." In re Gault, supra, at 30,
quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications, even when juvenile delinquency proceedings result in a loss of liberty that, if imposed
on an adult, would trigger the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment right to trial by jury. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971).
The common principle underlying these cases is that, although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are
adults, the State may modify its treatment of minors in order
to respond to their grea.t er vulnerability to physical and psychological harm and their greater amenability to rehabilitation. The Court recognized in Gault that attempts at such
beneficence may, ironically, result in less rather than more
protection for the juvenile, and thus has required deviations
from the procedures afforded adults to "measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment," In re Gault,
supra, at 30, quoting Kent v. United States, supra, at 562
(1966). But we never have intimated that the Constitu-
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tion requires the State to treat children and adults identically.
Instead, it is entitled to adjust its legal system to account
for children's vulnerability and their needs for "concern, ...
sympathy, and ... paternal attention," M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, at 550 (plurality opinion). In so doing, it may
modify the procedural protections that would be constitutionally required for adults, provided it can be shown that this is
necessary to protect minors from certain aspects of the adult
legal world, such as "the traditional delay, the formality, and
the clamor of the adversary system," M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, at 550 (plurality opinion), that they may be
ill-equipped to endure.
B
Second, the Court has allowed the States to qualify children's constitutional right when the exercise of those rights
permits or requires the making of important, affirmative
choices with potentially serious consequences. Such qualifications are grounded in the recognition that, during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
tho avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. 13
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over children's inability to make mature
choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are para13

As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "·ecur[ e] . . . the liberty of each man to
decide for him::elf what he will read and to what. he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result):
1'at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacit.y for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right t.o marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be const.itutionally int.olerable for adults." I d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted).
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digms of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice. At
issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under 17 in violation of a New York
state law. It was conceded that the magazines were protected by the First Amendment; i. e., that the conviction
could not have stood if based upon a sale of the same material
to an adult. Id., at 634. Notwithstanding the importance
the Court always has attached to First Amendment rights, it
concluded that "even where there is an invasion of protected
freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 1'he Court was convinced that the
New York Legislature rationa1ly could conclude that the sale
to children of the magazines in question presented a danger
against which they .should be guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at
641. It therefore rejected the argument that the New York
law violated the constitutional rights of minors. 14
Although the State, is asserting its "independent interest l.n
the well-being of its youth," Ginsberg, supra, at 640, has
considerable latitude in limting a minor's constitutional rights
oil the basis of his lesser capacity for mature, affirmative
choice, Tinker v. Des Moines independent Community School
District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969), illustrates that it may not
14 In considering the extent to which the State may regulate t.he conduct
of children which, if practiced by an adult, would clearly be protected by
the First Amendment, the Court's opinion in Ginsberg relied heavily
upon Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In P1·ince an adult
had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public
street in violation of a state child-labor statute. The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own since11e request. !d., at
l62. In upholding the adult's conviction under the statute, we found that
"the interests of society to protect the welfare of children" and to give them
"opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men
and citizens," id., at 165, permitted the State to enforce its statute, which
"[c]oncededly . . . would be invalid," id., at 167, if made applicable to
adults.
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arbitrarily deprive him of those rights altogether. The Court
held in Tinker that a school child's First Amendment freedom
of expression entitled him, contrary to school policy, to attend
school wearing of black armband as a silent protest against
American involvement in the hostilites in Viet Nam. The
Court acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit
conduct otherwise shielded by the Constitution that "for any
reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the first Amendment right of the schoolchildren in
that case, however, not only because it found no evidence in
the record that their wearing of black armbands threatened
any substantial interference with the proper objectives of the
school district, but also because it appeared that the challenged
policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate whatsoever-even nondisruptive discussions- on important political
and moral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 510. When impinging upon such fundamental constitutional rights, the State
must defend such restrictions with a rational a.r gument that
the challenged regulation will forestall genuine harm to the
class of minors to which it applies or avoid the disruption of
important state interests, such as the proper functioning of
the public schools or the juvenile courts. 1 5
15 Although the propriety of limitations on minors' rights due to their
relative lack of capacity for responsible choice is most evident in First
Amendment cases such as Ginsbetg and Tinket, such limitation also
may play a role in the application of other constitutional rights. The
Court suggested in Gault, for example, that special precautions may be in
order when a minor accused of juvenile delinquency chooses to waive his
privilege against self-incrimination. Although an adult is considered free
knowingly and intelligently to waive his privilege, in the case of a juvenile
who attempts such a waiver in the absence of counsel, "the greatest care
must be taken to assure that the admission [is] voluntary, in the sense
not only that it [is] not coerced or suggested, but also that it [is] not the
product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair."
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (footnote omitted).
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c
Third, the role of parents in guiding and directing the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the constitutional rights of minors. To be sure, the State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from
their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors. 16 But the
State's interest in consistent deference to parental authority
in such matters is rooted in an additional and more important
ground, one which makes clear why the a.:ffirmative support
and reinforcement by the State of parental authority generally
is not an impermissible limitation on the rights of children.
The exceptional justification for state deference to parental
control over children is that " [ t] he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). "The duty to
prepare the child for 'additional obligations' ... must be read
to include the inculcation of moral standa.rds, religious beliefs,
and elements of good citizenship." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 233 (1972). Inculcating such traits is something
much more fundamental than merely guarding a child against
overreaching or preventing him from improvident choices. It
involves the affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example that is essential to the growth
of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens." 17
16 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
196- & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must be
made through parent or guardian).
17 The nature of both the State's interest in fostering parental authority
and the problem determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally must resort to inevitably arbitrary criteria such as age limits,
marital status, or membership in the armed foroes for lifting some or all

78-329 & 78-330-MEMO
BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

17

We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added).
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and traditheories, and deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradimeasure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supof the legal disabilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to define, let
alone determine, maturity, but the fact that a minor may be very much an
adult in some respects does not mean that his need and opportunity for
growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended. Although, as
discussed below, the peculiar nature of the abortion decision may require
the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of tho maturity of minors,
both practicality and prudence support the general rule that emancipation
from childhood occurs when legislatively established, objective criteria are
met.
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portive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.
See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their
"Rights," 1976 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605. Under the Constitution,
the State can "properly conclude that parents and others,
teachers for example, who have [the] primary responsibility
for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg
v. New York, supra, at 639. 18
The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Ginberg-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against un.due, · adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Orgmiization of Foster !!amilies, 431 U.S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. Jus·ricE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550
{1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). As§ 12S is supportive of the interests of parents in their daughter's abortion decision,
we have no occasion to consider here whether the Constitution places any
limit on the State's authority to restrict. a parent's involvement in that
decision. To the extent these opinions refer to constitutional barriers
against tate infringement of parental rights, therefore, they are not
dispositive of the i ·sue before us. They arc highly relevant, however, in
defining the importance of the role of parents within our constitutional
system, and in illuminating the magnitude of the state interest in fostering
that role.
Nor do we consider any questions concerning state support for a parental decision that a minor's pregnancy should be aborted despite her
wishes to the contrary. For present purposes, it is enough to say that in
this, as in other child-parent-state problems, there exists a broad range
within which the State is free, in the exercise of its legislative judgment
and the furtherance of its legitimate interests, to support or limit the
rights of children and parents in various contexts, such as compulsory
·education, the prevention of child abuse and neglect., and consent for medical treatment necessary to preserve life.
18
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III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. Appellees'
and intervenors' basic contention, sustained in large part by
the District Court, is that § 12S is unconstitutional because
it unduly burdens a pregnant mnior's decision to seek an abortion. They argue, for example, that the requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden. From what has been
said, it is evident that parental notice and consent are the
kinds of qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a child's right to make important decisions. The
inability of minors to make a fully informed choice that takes
account of both immediate and long-range consequences generally makes parental consultation entirely appropriate.
Moreover, the profound moral, ethical, or religious implications that abortion has for many people suggest that this is
the kind of decision in which the State may conclude the parental involvement should be encouraged. 1 9 As MR. JusTICE
STEWART wrote in concurrence in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U. S., at 91: 20
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
1 9 The expert testimony at the hearings in the District Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See p. - , supra.
2 0 MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion in Danforth underscored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abort,ion decisions by describing the procedures followed at the clinic operated by appellees here :
"The counseling . . . occurs entirely on the day t he abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The
physician t akes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited t o a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control t echniques . . . .
"The abort ion itself t akes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days t hat abortions are being
performed at t he [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions

78-329 & 78-330-MEMO
QO

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.)
A pregnant minor's constitutionally protected interest in an
abortion, therefore, does not include the right not to consult
with her parents about whether she should seek an abortion
merely because she anticipates that they will disapprove or
seek to dissuade. 21 Nevertheless, the abortion decision differs
in important ways from other decisions that may be made
during minority. We conclude that these differences require
special limits on the extent to which the State may restrict
a minor's exercise of her right to seek an abortion.
A

When a minor becomes pregnant, the decisions she faces
with respect to her condition take on an awesome finality, for
the status quo already has been altered irrevocably. The
pregnant minor's options are much different from those facing
a minor making other important decisions, such as whether to
,on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients arc scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . . " 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Baird, id., at 132.
21 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we empha~
size[d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturit.y, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
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marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later ma.rriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting. The option for abortion is short-lived, effectively expiring in a matter of weeks from the onset of
pregnancy.
Moreover, the consequences of denying an abortion to a
minor may be particularly severe. The possible detriment
facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., at 153, is
not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and
emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor. Moreover, the pregnant
minor stands on the verge of parenthood; the denial of an
abortion in all probability will result in her attaining that
status. In many respects, the fact of having a child brings
with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditonal criteria
for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. 22
There are few situations in which denying a minor the right to
make an important decision will have consequences so grave
and indelible.
To be sure, the best choice for a pregnant minor may not
be to abort. Marriage to the father of the child, arranging
for the adoption of the baby, or even assuming alone the responsibilities of motherhood might well be in her best longrange interests. Parents or others might continue to furnish
needed economic support and mature guidance, even though
22
In Massachusetts, for rxample, although parenthood alone does not
remove a minor from the reach of § 128, it does confer adult legal o-tatus
in other respects, such as the right to consent to medical C'are for the
minor's own child and t.o other kinds of medical care for the minor herself.
See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F (West); n. - , infra.
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determined must not be unduly burdensome; it must assure
that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be handled with sufficient expedition, anonymity,
and lack of procedural complication to provide an effective
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained if parental consent
is withheld improperly or found not to be required at all. In
sum, the procedure must ensure that the withholding of papossibly arbitrary, veto" that was found impermissible in
posibly arbitrary, veto" that was found impermissible in
Danforth. Id., at 74.
B
It is against these requirements that § 12S must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies many of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parenta.l consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 128 proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." 25 Attorney General,
360 N. E. 2d, at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also'
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a [§ 128] proceedings
24
As noted above, n. - , supra, determining a minor's maturity necessarily is difficult. Such tasks are not entirely foreign to the judiciary
however. Some States have chosen to permit judicial procecdngs for early
emancipation in limited circumstances. See Katz, Schroeder, & Sidman,
Emancipating Our Children-Coming of Legal Age in America, 7 Fam.
L. Q. 211, 232-237 (1973).
25
The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 12S imposed this st~ndard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. See p. - , supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be ent.itled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." /d., at
293.
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may be expected . . . . The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W] e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge
may also be achieved." I d., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. Ibid. 26
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succcsfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvrment
in the minor's abortion derision is prrmiRsible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parent.al consent for any reason not believrd to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
though § 12S was construed by the highest state court to impose thi
restriction, the s1:ttute is flawed becanRe the restriction is not apparent on
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourag<' parents to withhold con ent for imprrmisl3ible
reasons. See Baird III, 450 F. Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
On the record before us, there is no bal'is for this a.~sertion. As a general rule, the int<:'rpretation of a state statute b~r the State's highrst court
"is as though written into the ordinance itsrlf," Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U. S. 395, 402 ( 1953), and we are obliged to view the restriction on the
parental consent rrquirement "as if [§ 12S] has bren so amrndrd by the
[Massachusetts] legislaure." Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 514
(1948).
26 Intervenors take issue with the Supreme Judicial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of rrsolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 128-and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effect-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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(1)

Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or immature--to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
parental consultation whatsoever. See n. - , supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. 11 [T]he
consent required by '[ § 12S must] be obta.ined for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has 11 died
or has deserted his or her family." 27 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained 11 where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion. 28 !d., at 297.
27

The statute also provides that "[i]f both parents have died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
28 This reading of the sttaute more strictly requires parental consultation and consent than appellants th('mselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 128 was not intended
to abrogate 11assachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also sugg('sted that, under
some circum tances, § 128 might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absence of § 12S: "The ma.t ure minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely bendit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
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In assessing whether the judicial relief of § 128 provides
meaningful access to review of denials of parental consent, we
must consider the fact, recognized by the District Court, "that
there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go to court." Baird Ill, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant girls, especially those living at home, are particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct both
an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic,
therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal right
to seck relief in superior court provides a meaningful avenue
of relief for some of those who need it the most.
We conclude that, at least in the absence of special provisions ensuring that a minor's parents will not prevent her from
seeking judicial authorization for an abortion, the State must
permit the minor to approach the court without first notifying
her parents. She must be given an opportunity to prove that
consent would be denied, and that subsequent attempts to
seek a review of that denial would be effectively blocked by
her parents. If such a showing is not made, either because
the judge is persuaded that the minor is mistaken, or because
he simply is unable to make an intelligent determination of
these factual questions in the absence of the parents, he is
entitled to require that they be consulted. If, on the other
hand, the court is convinced that informing the parents effechowever, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warra11t his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of tho rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
from statutory limitations which arc constitutional, where the b 2st interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of intended medic..'\1 treatment and where the minor is capable of giving informed consent to that treatment, the mature minor rule applie,; in this
Commonwealth." !d., at 296.
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tively would nullify the minor's opportunity for judicial review of the denial of parental consent, the minor is entitled to
prove her case on the merits-to establish either that she is
mature enough to make the abortion decision independently,
or that the abortion is in her best interests in any event.
We recognize the challenge facing a superior court judge
asked to determine, in the absence of the parents, whether
they would refuse consent and obstruct their daughter's access
to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or judging what
decision is in her best interests also would be facilitated, in
many cases, by the testimony of the parents. In spite of
these difficulties, we are convinced that, absent the opportunity to approach the superior court prior to seeking parental
consent/ 9 a substantial number of pregnant minors would be
prevented from having a realistic opportunity to do so later.
Massachusetts may choose to give the parents the initial and
presumptive right to determine the best interests of their
minor daughter in this complex and important decision, but
it must provide a safeguard against the genuine risk that some
parents effectively will prevent review of their own decision. 30
29 This is not to say that the judge's determination must be made ex
parte. As long as the procedure does not become unduly burdcnscme,
the Stat<~ itself, through a designated official, may chao e to be the defendant in such a proceeding. This, apparently, was contemplated by
tho Supreme Judicial Court as the correct procedure in Massachusetts,
should it be held that the requirement of parental not.ice was unconstitutional in some cases. Sco Attorney General, supra, at 298. Moreover,
subject to preservation of tho necessary speed and confidentiality of judicial eonsent proceedings, our decision imposes no extraordinary restrictions
on the sources, other than the parents themselves, to which the court may
turn for evidence.
30 The District Court believed that parental notification should be dispensed with whenever it was in the "best interests" of the minor to do
desires to terminate her pregnancy. But the Constitution does not protect
so. See Baird III, supra, at 1001. While the best-int,erests standard is
applicable in determining the underlying issue of whet her the abortion is
proper, we do not believe it correctly states the rule for deciding when
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(2)
Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to- perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird III, supra, at
1004 n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. Fathers and
mothers both have an interest in helping to determine what is
in their daughters' best interests in this matter, and the State
is not prohibited from supporting the involvement of both
parents, even though doing so may increase marginally the
parental notice may not be required. Or would hope that the parents
of a pregnant minor would not become hostile toward her because she
against all possible adverse consequences when problems as sensitive and
volatile as unwanted, illegitimate pregnancy and elective abortion confront
a 'family. Although it is regrettable if the minor's relationship with her
parents suffers, that circumst~nce, tanding alone, doe, not provide a
constitutional ba~is for forbidding a State to require her to seek their
consent for an abortion. Seep.-, supra.
Moreover, at least where abortion is concerned, serious difficulti'es arise
In attempting t.o determine wl1ether parental notice would be in a minor's
best interests. Undoubt,edly, strong pre ·ures on the parent-child relationship are possible when a minor requests consent for an abortion. But
serious implications for that rPlationship also are inherent in a minor's
decision to conceal her pregnancy and abortion from hPr parents. Deciding which course would serve the minor's best interests is necessarily problematic. For these reasons, we conclude that the conRtitutional limit on
state-supported parental involwment in minors' abortion decisions is that
a parental notice and consent requirement must not be permitted effectively to become the kind of absolute parental veto disapproved in
Danforth.
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chance of denial of consent. As we have said, the fact that
parental disapproval is likely is not itself a reason for dispensing with an otherwise valid consent requirement.
This general rule, however, must be subject to the same
exception as the requirement of parental notice in every case:
If, in a particular instance, the minor proves to the court that
seeking the approval of both parents rather than one clearly
would result in both the denial of consent and the effective
frustration of the right of judicial review of that denial, then
the State must permit the minor to prove this fact in advance
of notice to the hostile parent. If that proof is made, the reviewing body should consider whether to grant consent either
because of the minor's maturity or because the abortion would
be in her best interests. 31
(3)
Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed an reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own , contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered:
"[W] e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
31 If the one parent whose consPnt has been sought approves of the
minor's abortion decision , or at least is supportive of her right to seek
review, the reviewing body may be assisted considerably in its difficult
factual determinations.
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all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not be served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." I d., at
293.

As stated above, the unique character of the abortion decision mandates that a State choosing to impose a parental
consent requirement also must provide a method of review
of denials of such consent. If the minor satisfies a judge that
she has attained sufficient maturity to make an informed and
reasonable decision, authorization for the abortion may not
constitutionally be refused on the basis of parental disapprovaJ.32 When such a showing is made, it makes little sense
to permit the judge to disregard the minor's own decision.
Having proved the requisite maturity to exercise her independent judgment in consultation with her physician, as described in Roe v. Wade, supra, the minor's decision no longer
may be countermanded by the State. We therefore agree
with the District Court that § 12S cannot constitutionally
permit judicial disregard of the abortion decision of a minor
who has been determined to be mature and fully competent
to assess the implications and consequences of the choice she
has made.

IV
The District Court concluded that, in addition to the substantive infirmities in § 12S, discussed above, the statute also
32 This rule applies not only when parental consent has bem sought and
denied, of course, but t,o cases described in Parts III-B. (1) and (2),
supra, as well, in which the minor is entitled to proceed in court without
notice to one or both parents: In such cases, a judicial finding of maturity
means that the abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age of
the minor.
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violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, apparently because it excepts minors seeking
abortions from the operation of Massachusetts' common-law
mature minor rule. See n. - , supra. Appellees and intervenors argue that virtually every difference under Massachusetts law between the treatment of abortions and that of other
medical procedures to be performed upon minors a.lso violates
the Equal Protection Clause. 33
For the reasons stated in Part III, supra, we have concluded
that Massachusetts cannot constitutionally permit a judge to
veto the abortion decision of a minor and her physician when
the minor has been found to be mature and fully competent
to act independently in this respect. In light of that conclusion, we need not decide whether such a veto also would violate the Equal Protection Clause. The remaining procedural
requirements imposed on these mature minors, but not on
adults-parental consultation in most cases and judicial review-are amply justified by the State's weighty interest in
preventing improvident abortion decisions by those not fully
qualified to act on their own.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded that treating minors desiring
abortions differently from those seeking other forms of medical
treatment offends the Equal Protection Clause. As we noted
when this case was before us in 1976, "not all distinction
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden." Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S., at 149. This is especially true where
minors are involved. The statutory and common-law rules
at issue are designed to determine when minors in various circumstances should be permitted to give independent consent to
different kinds of medical care. We see no reason to subject
33 Under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F, minors falling into any
of six categories, such as tho~c who arc or have been married and those
serving in the armed forces, may consent to most kinds of medical and
dental care. Only minors who are m:uried, widowed, or divorced, however, may consent independently to abortion or sterilization.
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to heightened judicial scrutiny Massachusetts' decision to
allow such consent less readily with respect to abortion than
to other medical treatment. "The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements are not imposed for other
medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
termination of a potential human life." Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 480 (1977).

v

We have concluded that, although it satisfies constitutional
standards in large part, § 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits judicial authorization for an abortion
to be withheld from a minor who is found by the superior
court to be mature and fully competent to make this decision
independently. Second, it requires a minor to seek the consent of one or both parents, even if she can demonstrate to the
superior court that as a result consent clearly would be denied
and access to judicial review of that denial effectively blocked.
Such a minor must be given an opportunity to obtain judicial
authorization for the abortion, as described above, pp. - - , supra, without notice to one or both parents, depending
upon the circumstances. 34
34 Section 12S evidently applies to all nonemergency abortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are performed during tho rarly stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. S<:>e Baird III, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164-165 (1973).
The propriety of parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision
does not depend upon the stage at which the pregnancy is aborted. As
we have said, the State has an import.ant. interest in deferring to the parents of a pregnant minor seeking an abortion; the reasons for that deference are, if anything, strengt.hened as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for the pregnant minor's health incrense. Furthermore,
the limits we have specified on the extent to which a State may defer to
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As § 12S does not comport entirely with constitutional
standards, it remains to be decided whether the statute must
be invalidated as a whole, or whether only its unconstitutional
applications need be enjoined. This is a close question requiring analysis of the principles governing the severability
of statutes. 35
Severance problems typically require deciding whether
striking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
parents are adequate t.o safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests of a minor in the abortion decision. Access
to review of a denial of parental consent, which must accompany the
State's decision to require such consent, and the best-interests standa.rd
applicable to judicial review assure that no minor need be denied an
absortion found to be in her best interests that could not otherwise be
prohibited by the St,a te under Roe v. Wade, supra. Thus, although a
significant number of abortions within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of pregnancy, we do not believe a different
analysis of the statute is required for them.
35 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized that its construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court. that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney Oeneral, supra. at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that, we have impermissibly
as~igned a great•er role to the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretation." Ibid.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 12S differently than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered t.o the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691
n. 11 (1975), the federal courts are bound by the construction of a state
statute by the highest court of that State. E. g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist. No.1 v. Ilortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482,488 (1976); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952). We
therefore, are obligated to read § 12S as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitut.ional infirmities discussed in Part III, supra.
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preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
proper when upholding the law in other applications will be
consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect
of the law. "[W]e need not find the language of [a sta.t ute]
'constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular
'Case.]" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971).
Cf. Del Duca v. Town Administrator, 368 Mass. 1, 13-14, 329
N. E. 2d 748, 756 (1975); W. & J. Sloane v. Commonwealth,
253 Mass. 529, 534, 149 N. E. 407, 409 (1925). It is only
under this latter form of severance that § 12S could remain
enforceable l.n part.
It is essential to bear in mind that we deal here with state
iegislation. As is true of state-court constructions of state
law generally, see n. - , supra, the decisions of such courts
"as to the severability of a provision [of state law] is conclusive upon this Court." Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286,
290 (1924). "What they say the statutes of that State mean
we must accept them to mean whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their language or by separating their provisions into valid and invalid parts." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 43 (1900).
In this case, of course, the Supreme Judicial Court was not
asked to rule on the severability of § 12S, as it was then unciea.r to what extent, if any, the statute would be declared
unconstitutional. We therefore are not precluded from reaching the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, supra, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave this important question of state law to the tribunal best suited to decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure already successfully
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
I
A

On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1 The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12S
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be pei:formed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health sha.ll prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
were made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout this:
opinion.
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 3 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978).5
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro3 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stubble·
field, M. D., (intervenors) " appeared as amicus curiae on be •.
half of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
{of the plain tift' classes in ·the suit]." Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp., at 999·.
Defendants in the suit. appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attor.
neys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was per·
mitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the·
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued
an opinion invalidating ~ 12S. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. \
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird I). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion. or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of [these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." I d., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." Id., at 855-856. The court
6 In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgm{'nt intervention by·
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenor~
appellees.
7 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in·
Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively a.'! '
appellants.

f'
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, ...
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." Id., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 12S,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor.8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
§ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
·substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976). We
therefore vacated the judgment of the District Court, concluding that it should have certified to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts appropriate questions concerning the
meaning of § 12S, pursuant to existing procedure in that
State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21
(1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
8 One member of the three-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 128 was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F . Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows :
" 1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
"b) If the parent is not limited to consiqering exclusively the minor's
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opmwn styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 128, as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court, are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter's
best interests, can the parent take into considerat-ion the 'long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standnrd or s1xwda.rdR is the superior court. to a.pp]~r?
"a) Is the suprrior court to disregard all parental objections that are
not based exclusively on what. would serve the minor's best. interests?
"b) If the superior court finds t.lwt. t.he minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, an informed· and reasonable decision to have
an abortion, rna.? the court. rrfuse its consent basf'd on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachusetts law prrmit a minor (a) 'capable of givinginform€d consent,' or (b) 'incapablr of giving informed consent.,' 'to obtajn
[a court] ordrr without parental con><ultat.ion'?
"4. If the court answers an~· of question 3 in the affirmat-ive, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Suprrmr Judicial Court prescribr a set of procrdures to
implement c. 112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application , hraring;
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to giv.e consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good causr undrr c. 112, [§ 12S]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed·
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith, though rrroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comll\ent.'l about. the statute which~
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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-abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292-293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
'" for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
ld., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a ~ 12S proceeding finds "that the
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 l d. , at 294.
Unless a parent is not available. he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 128 cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. I d., at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Atin. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
Section 128 itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any
parent who "has died or has deserted his or her family."
10
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State's common law "mature minor rule" cre11te an exceptioll
to § 12S. I d., at 294. See n. 28, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforceme11t of ~ 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (19f7)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird Ill). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered . it
unconstitutional.
·
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S !e·quires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." Id., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent-even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Alth6ugh the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an iinpermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionaily insist that parental permission be
sought ot notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .... " ld., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the ahortiO'n 'decision 'of a 1nin'Or
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. ld., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." /d., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the sta.t ute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repait."
Id., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 35, infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitution~tl and permanently enjoining its enforcement. 11 Appellants sought
11 The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court':; conclusion~: thr best-interr,:ts limitation on the withholding of parrntal con~ent. in thr Suprrmr .Judicial Court's opinion,
'he argued, must be trrated as if part. of the statutory language itself; and
·he read t.he evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a preg·nant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
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review in tl1is Court a second time. and we again noted probable jurisdiction. - U . S . - (19'78).

II
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." 12 ·This observation, of course,
is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 ( 1953) (concurring opinion). ·The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass clown many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 ( 1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensia desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 128 prooeeding of having the parents brfore him as a source of evidencl' as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best, interest~;. Finally,
he concludro that the unconstitutional aspect of § 128 could ])(' severed·
under establi..'<hed principles, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unneoesRarily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights ~wd respon:sibilities during the minor:s
formative years. See id., a.t 1006-1020.
12 Similarly, the Court said in Planned Pat·enthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) :
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being ma.girally only
when one at.tainR the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights:" ·
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tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying the qualification by the state of minors' constitutional rights : the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child-rearing.

A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example, we a_
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 ( 1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358
(1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U. S. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of school
children implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double Jeop..:
ardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult after
an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had violated
a criminal statute). Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. \
565 (1975), the Court held that children may ·not be deprived
of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assump..
tion that the constitutional rights of children are indistip.-
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guishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
"conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administra.tive hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
"concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention." Id., at
550 (plurality opinion).
B
Second, the Court has allowed the States to qualify children's constitutional rights when the exercise of those rights
permits or requires the making of important, affirmative
choices with potentially serious consequences. Such qualifications are grounded in the recognition that, during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. 13
18 As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that. "securr e] . . . the liberty of each man to
decide for hiimelf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result) :
'" at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
·captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
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Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the
·scope of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors. 15
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults." !d., at
'649-650 (footnotes omitted).
14 In Prince an adult had pertnittlld a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public sheet in violation of a state child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's convictjon
under the statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independen1, well-developed mPn and citizens," id .. at 165, pPrmitted
the State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncededly .. . would be invalid,"
id., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State has considerable latitude in limiting a minor's
'constitutiohal tights on tl1e basis of his lesser capacity for mature, affirm-

\
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c
Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the constitutional rights of
minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16 But an additional and more important
justification for state deference to parental control over children is that " [ t] he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
ative choice, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969), illustrates that it may not arbitrarily deprive
him of those rights altogetJ1er. The Court held in Tinker that a school
child's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a silent protest
against American involvement in the hostilities in Viet N am. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by th~ Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." /d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence iir the record that their
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever--even nondisruptive discussions-on important political and
moral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 510. When impinging upon <;uch
fundamental constitutional rights, the State must defend such restrictions
with a rational argument that the challenged regulations will forestall
genuine harm~o the class of minors to which it applies or avoid the disruption. of impo ant st~te i~terests, such as the proper functioning of the
pubhc schools r the Jtlvemle courts.
16 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must be
made through parent or gua.rdiim).

\
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him for additional obligations." Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). "The duty to prepare the child
for 'additional obligations' ... must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements
of good citizenship." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233
( 1972). This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth
of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added).
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most e~ective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. Wh~le we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." (Jinsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those sup-
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portive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.17
Under the Constitution, the State can 11 properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639. 18
17 See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
1 8 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yode1·,
P1ince, and Ginberg-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550
(1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) . As§ 12S is supportive of the interests of parents in their daughter's abortion decision,
we have no occasion to consider here whether the Constitution places any
limits on the State's authority to restrict a parent's involvement in that
decision. To the extent these opinions refer to constitutional barriers
against state infringement of parental rights, therefore, they are not
dispositive of the issue before us. They are highly relevant, however, in
indicating the importance of the role of parents within our constitutional
system, and in illuminating the magnitude of the state interest in fostering
that role.
Nor do we consider any questions concerning state support for a parental decision that a minor's pregnancy should be aborted despite her
wishes to the contrary. For present purposes, it is enough to say that in
this, as in other child-parent-state problems, there exists a broad range
within which the State is free, in the exercise of its legislative judgment
and the furt.herance of its legitimate interests, to support or limit the
rights of children and parents in various contexts, such as compulsory
education, the prevention of child abuse and neglect, and consent for medical treatment necessary to preserve life.
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III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. Appellees'
and intervenors' basic contention, sustained in large part by
the District Court, is that § 12S is unconstitutional because
it unduly burdens a pregnant minor's decision to seek an abortion. They argue, for example, that the requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden. From what has been
said, it is evident that parental notice and consent are the
kinds of qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make such important decisions. The
inability of minors to make a fully informed choice that takes
account of ,both immediate and long-range consequences generally ma~es parental consultation entirely appropriate.
Moreover, the profound moral, ethical, or religious implications that abortion has for many people -suggest that this is
the kind of decision in which the State may conclude that parental involvement should be encouraged. 19 As MR. JusTICE
STEWART wrote in concurrence in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S., at 91:
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequip~d to make it without mature advice and emotional
suppol't. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
19 The expert testimony at the hearings in the District Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings or
the court :re~ect this consensus. See Baird I, .393 F . Supp., at 853.
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clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 20
A pregnant minor's constitutionally protected interest in an
abortion, therefore, does not include the right not to consult
with her parents about whether she should seek an abortion
merely because she anticipates that they will disapprove or
seek to dissuade her. 21 Nevertheless, the abortion decision
differs in important ways from other decisions that may be
made during minority. We conclude that these differences
require special limits on the extent to 'which the State may
restrict a minor's exercise of her right to seek an abortioJ?..

A
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion in Danforth underscored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abort.ion decisions by describ·
ing the procedures followed at the clinic opera.ted by the Parents Aid
Society and Dr. Gerald Zupnick:
"The counseling . . . occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The
physician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques •...
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performeq at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the aQortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Baird, id., at 132.
21 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize[d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
20

pregna~cy/'

\
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majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilt:Y
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a preg·n ant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emo•
tional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal tesponsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the 1egal disabilities of minority. 22
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
To be sure, the best choice for a pregnant minor may not
be to abort. Marriage to the father of the child, arranging
for the adoption of the baby, or even assuming alone the responsibilities of motherhood might well be in her best longrange interests. Parents or others might continue to furnish
needed economic support and mature guidance, even though
the young mother has become legally an adult in some respects. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that cannot
be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching
consequences.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), "the State may not impose
22 In Massachusetts, for example, although parenthood alone does not
·remove a minor from the reach of § 128, it does confer adult legal status
in other respects, such as the right to consent to medical care for the
minor's own child and to other kinds of medical care for the minor herself.
See Mass. Gen. La.ws Ann ., ch. 112, § 12F (West) ; n. 33, infra .
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a blanket provision ... requiring the consent of a parent or
person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents
may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a
minor, the unique nature and consequences of the abortion
decision make it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy,
regardless of the reason for withholding consent." Ibid. If
the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or
both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide a
procedure whereby a denial of parental consent may be reviewed and possibly reversed.
We conclude that approval of a minor's abortion in such a
review proceeding must be given upon a judicial finding 23 of
either of two facts: (1) that the minor is mature enough and
well enough informed to make her abortion decision independently of her parents' wishes; 24 or (2) that even if she is not
able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion
As § 12S provides for involvement of the state superior court in
minors' abortion decisions, we discuss the constitutional issues raised. in
theso cases in terms of judicial revirw. We do not decide, however,
whether a State choosing to require parental consent properly could assign
the task of reviewing denials of that consent to an administrative agency
or officer.
24 The nature of both the State's interest in fostering parential authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may rei'ort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as age limits, ma.rital status, or membership in the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal disabilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, maturity, but the fact that a minor may be
very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his nred and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
As discussed in the text, howevrr, the peculiar nature of thE' abortion deoision may require the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the
maturity of minors.
23
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would be in her best interests. The proceeding in which these
facts are determined must assure that a resolution of the issue,
and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with sufficient expedition and anonymity to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained if parental consent is
withheld improperly. In sum, the procedure must ensure
that the withholding of parental consent does not in fact
amount to the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that
was found impermissible in Danforth. Id., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 128 must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies many of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained· by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such llearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
'§· 128 proceeding "must disregard ·all parental objections, and
other consiqerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." 25 Attorney General,
25 The Supreme Judicial Court held tbat § 12S imposed this standard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. See pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." Id., at
293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is permissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
though § l2S was con&irued by the highest state court to impose this
restriction, the statute is Ra.wed becausE> t hP restriction is not apparent on
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
tbe statute will encouragp parentR to withl10ld consent for impermissible
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360 N. E. 2d, at 293. The Supreme Judicial COurt also
stated that "[p] rompt resolution of a [ § 12S] proceedings
may be expected . . . . The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W] e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge
may also be achieved." I d., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power. or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens . by
rule or order. Ibid. 26
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
·
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or imlllature-to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
reasons. See Bail·d Ill, 450 F . Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F . Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this nssertion. Ail a grneral rule, thr inh•rpretation
of a state statute by the State's highf'Rt court "is as though writtrn into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953),
and we are obliged to view 1he restriction on the parental consent. r~:>qnire
ment "as if [§ 12S] ha::; been so mnend~:>d br tlw rMa:,:sachusetts] l~:>gisla.
ture." Winters v. New York. 333 U.S. 507,514 (1948) .
20 Intervenors take issue with thE' Supreme Judicial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and sp~:>ed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 128-and tJwre is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effect-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T]he
consent required by [§ 128 must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
'294. The text of § 128 itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has deserted his or her family." 27 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court alse
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion. 28 !d., at 297.
27 The statute also provides that "[i]f both parents have died, or have
·deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
·having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
28 This reading of the statute requires parental consultation and consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument "before this ·c ourt, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
'See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney Oeneral, supra, at 294. The Supreme
judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absence of§ 12S: "The mature minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical prooedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not ·warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, oi
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
trom statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of intended medical treatment and where the minor is capable of giving in-
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In assessing whether the judicial relief of § 12S provides
meaningful access to review of denials of parental consent, we
must consider the fact, recognized by the District Court, "that
there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go to court." Baird Ill, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in superior court provides a meaningful
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
We conclude, therefore, that, at least in the absence of spe( cial provisions ensuring that a minor's parents will not prevent
£..her from seeking judicial authorization for an abortion, the
State must permit the minor to go directly to the court without first notifying her parents. She must be given an opportunity to satisfy the judge that consent would be denied, and
1
that subsequent attempts to seek a review of that denial would
be effectively blocked by her parents. If such a showing is
not made, either because the judge is persuaded that the
minor is mistaken, or because he simply is unable to make an
intelligent determination of these factual questions in the absence of the parents, he may require that they be consulted.
If, on the other hand, the court is convinced that informing
the parents effectively 1would nullify the minor's opportunity
for judicial review of the denial of parental consent, the minor
then is entitled to make her case on the merits-to establish
either that she is mature enough to reach her abortion decision
formed consent to that treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwealth." Id., at 296. The Supreme Judicial Court ht>ld that
the common-la.w mature minor rule was inapplicable to abortions because
it had been legisla.tively superseded by § 128.
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independently, or that the abortion is in her best interests in
-any event.
We recognize the challenge facing a superior court judge
asked to determine, in the absence of the parents. whether
they would refuse consent and obstruct their daughter's access
to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or judging what
decision is in her best interests also would be facilitated, in
many cases, by the testimony of the parents. In spite of
these difficulties, we are convinced that, absent the opportunity to approach the superior court prior to seeking parental
consent, 20 a substantial number of pregnant minors would be
prevented from having a realistic opportunity to do so later.
Massachusetts may choose to give the parents the initial
oportunity to determine the best interests of their minor
daughter in this complex and important decision, but it mu~t
provide some safeguard against the genuine risk that some
parents effectively will prevent review of their own decisions.110
This is not to say that the judge's determination must be made ez
parte. As long as the procedure does not become unduly burdensome,
the State itself, through a designated official, may choose to be the de~
fendant in such a proceeding. This, apparently, was contemplated by
the Supreme Judicial Court as the correct procedure in Massachusetts,
should it be held that the requirement of parental notice was unconstitutional in some cases. See Attorney Generril, supra, at 298. Moreover,
subject to preservation of the necessary speed and confidentiality of judicial consent proceedings, our decision imposes no extraordinary restrictions
on the sources, other than the parents themselves, to which the court may
turn for evidence.
80 The District Court believed that parental notification should be dispensed with whenever it was in the "best interests" of the minor to do
so. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001. While the bestrinterests standard is
applicable in determining the underlying issue of whether the abortion is
proper, we do not believe it correctly states the rule for deciding when
the State is forbidden to require parental consultation or consent. One
would hope that. parents would not become hostile and attempt to forestalt
judicial review becau::;e their daughter had become pregnant and desired
an abortion. But, the Constitution does not protect against all po::>sible
adverse consequences when problems as sensitive and volatile as unwanted,
29
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(2)
Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird 1, supra, at 852. See Baird III, supra, at
1004n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. Both fathers and
mothers have an interest in helping to determine what course is
best for their daughters in this matter, and the State is not
prohibited from supporting the involvement of both parents,
·even though doing so may increase marginally the chance of
denial of consent. As we have said, the fact that parental
·disapproval may occur is not itself a reason for dispensing
with an otherwise valid consent requirement.
This general rule, however, must be subject to the same
exception as the requirement of parental notice in every case:
If, in a particular instance, the minor convinces the court
that seeking the approval of both parents rather than one
would result in both the denial of consent and the effective
frustration of the right of judicial review of that denial, then
the State must permit the minor to make this showing in advance of notice to the hostile parent. If that showing is made,
illegitimate pregnancy and elective abortion confront a family. Although
it is regrettable if the minor':; rdation:;hip with her parents suffers, tha.t
circumstance, standing alone, does not provide a. constitutional basis for
forbidding a State to require her to seek their consent for an abortion.
See p. - , sjtpra. The constitutional limit on state-supported parental
involvement ip minors' abortion decisions is that a parental notice and
consent requinement must not be permi1ted effectively to become the kind
of absolute parental veto disapproved in Danforth. 1'\

I
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pendently. See n. 24, supra. But as stated above, the
unique character of the abortion decision mandates that a
State choosing to impose a parental consent requirement ·also
must provide a method of review of denials of such consent.
If the minor satisfies ajudge that she has attained sufficient
maturity to make a fully inform-ed decision, she becomes
entitled to make her abortion decision independently. 3 2 We
therefore agree with the District Court tha.t § 128 cannot
constitutionally permit judiciai disregard ·of the · abortion decision of a minor who has been determined to be mature and
fully competent to assess the implications of the choice she
has made.

IV
The District Court concluded that, in addition to the substantive infirmities it identified in § 128, the statute also
violates the Equal Protection ·clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, apparently because it excepts minors seeking
abortions from the operation of Massachusetts' common-law
mature minor rule. See p. 9, and n. 28, supra. Appellees
and intervenors argue that virtually every difference under
Massachusetts law between the treatment of abortions and
that of other medical procedures to be performed upon minBrs
also violates the Equal Protection Clause. 33
For the reasons stated in Part III, supra, we have concluded
that Massachusetts cannot constitutionally permit a judge to
32 This rule applies not only when parental consent has been sought an·d
denied but also to the exceptional cases described in Parts III-B (I) and
(2), supra, in which the minor is entitled to proc-eed in court without no tire
to one or both parents. In such cases, a judicial finding of matu:rity
means that the abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age 6f
the minor.
33 Under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch . 112, § 12F, minors falling into any
of six categories, such as those who are or have been ma.rried and those
serving in the armed forces, may consent to most kinds of medical and
dental care. Only minors who are married, widowed, or· divorced, however, may consent independently to abortion or sterilization.
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veto the abortion decision of a minor and her physician when
the minor has been found to be mature and fully competent
to act independently in this respect. In light of that conclusion, we need not decide whether such a veto also would violate the Equal Protection Clause. The reJtlaining procedural
requirements imposed on these mature minors, but not on
adults-parental consultation in most cases and judicial review-are amply justified by the State's substantial interest in
having minors' abortion decisions resolved within the family
whenever possible and preventing improvident abortions by
those not fully qualified to act on their own.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded that treating minors desiring
abortions differently from those seeking other forms of medical
treatment offends the Equal Protection Clause. As we noted
when this case was before us in 1976, "not all distinction
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden. " Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S., at 149. This is especially true where
minors are involved. The statutory and common-law rules
at issue are designed to determine when minors in various circumstances should be permitted to give independent consent to
different kinds of medical care. We see no reason to subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny Massachusetts' decision to
allow such consent less readily with respect to abortion than
to other medical treatment. "The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements are not imposed for other
medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
termination of a potential human life." Maher v. Roe, 432
u. s. 464, 480 (1977) .

v

Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 12S falls short of them in two respects : First, it permits

judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires a minor to seek the consent of one or both parents,

\
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even if she can satisfy the superior court tha.t as a result consent would be denied and access to judicial review of that
denial effectively blocked. 34
As § 128 does not comport entirely with constitutional
standards, it remains to be decided whether the statute must
be invalidated as a whole, or whether only its unconstitutional
applications need be enjoilled. This question requires analysis of the principles governing the severability of statutes. 35
Section 128 PvidPntly applies to all non-emrrgency abqrtions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird III, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decidr, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See R(Je v. Wade,
410 U. S. 113, 164-165 (1973) .
The propriety of parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the limits we have
specified on the extent to which a State may defer to parents are adequate
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests
of a minor in the abortion deci~ion. Access to review of a denial of
parental consent, which must accompany the State's decision to require
such consent, and the best-interests standard applicable to judicial review assure that no minor need be denied an abortion found to be in her
best interests that could not otherwise be prohibited by the State under
Roe v. Wade, supra. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
35 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized that its construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney Genercil, supra, at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that. we have impermissibly
assigned a greater role to the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretntion." 'Ibid.
34
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Severance problems typically require deciding whether
f!triking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less comtnon, though well-recoghized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
fact1.1al situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
proper when upholding the law in other applications will be
consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect
of the law. "[W]e need not find the language of [a sta.t ute]
constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular
case.]" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971).
Cf. Del Duca v. Town Administrator, 368 Mass. 1, 13-14, 329
N. E. 2d 748, 756 (1975); W. & J. Sloane v. Commonwealth,
253 Mass. 529, 534, 149 N. E. 407, 409 (1925). It is only
under this latter form of severance that § 12S could remain
enforceable in part.
It is essential to bear in mind that we deal here with state
legislation. As is true of state-court constructions of state
law generally, see n. 35. supra, the decisions of such courts
"as to the severability of a provision [of state law] is conclusive upon this Court." Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286,
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 12S differently than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691
n. 11 (1975), the federal courts are bound by the construction of a state
statute by the highest court of that State. E . g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976) ; Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952). We
therefore ttre obligat€d to read § 12S as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional infirmities discussed in Part III, supra.

I.
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290 (1924). "What they say the statutes of that State mean ·
we must accept them to mean whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their language or by separating their provisions into valid and invalid parts.'' Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 28,43 (1900).
In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not asked
to rule on the severability of § 128, as it was then unclear
to what extent, if any, the statute would be declared unconstitutional. We therefore are not precluded from reaching the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, supra, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave this important question of state law to the tribunal best suited to decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure already successfully
employed in this case provides a practicable method for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule
3:21 ( 1978) ,86 the following question is certified to the Su.
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "In light of the
Court's conclusions in this opinion concerning the constitutionality of § 12S, may this provision be severed so that it remains
enforceable in part as a matter of Massachusetts law?"
So ordered

Rule 3:21, § 3 (2), calls for "a statement of all facts relevant to the
questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
the questions arose." We believe this opinion, particularly Part I, supm~
satisfies this requi11ement.
86
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976).
I

A
On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1 The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12S
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health sha.ll prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
were made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout this
opinion.
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C.§ 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94--381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 8 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978).~

Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro8 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to t.he class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolrsccnts. and Phi11ip Stubblefield, M. D .. (interwnors) 6 appeared a:s am?:rus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status somC'thin~ more than amici because of
reservations about the adC'quary of plaintiff's representation
{of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp .. at 999.
Defendants in the suit. appPlJants here in No. 78-~29. were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunf'rwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representa.tive of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents arE> appC'llants in No. 78-330. 7
Following three days of testimony. the District Court issued
an opinion invalidating ~ 12S. Baird v. Bellotti. 393 F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird I). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of {these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." ld., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." ld., at 855~856. The court
6 In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
7 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in.
Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively as
appellants.
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, . . .
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." I d., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 12S,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor. 8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted prob~
able jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
§ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976). We
therefore vacated the judgment of the District Court, con~
eluding that it should have certified to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts appropriate questions concerning the
meaning of § 12S, pursuant to existing procedure in that
State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21
( 1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
8 One member of the thl'ee-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 128 was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows:
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
"b) If the parent is not limited to considering exclusively the minor's
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opm10n styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of ~ 12S, as authoritatively construed by the
Supremo Judicial Court, are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter's
best interests, can the parent take into consideration the 'long-term
consequenres to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standard or stnndards is the superior court to apply?
"a) Is the suprrior court to disrrga.rd all parentnl ohjertions that are
not based rxclusively on what would serve the minor's best. interests?
"b) If the superior court finds that t.he minor is rapable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have
an abortion, may the court. refuse its consent based on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massarhu~>etts law permit a minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of givin11: informed consent,' 'to obtain
[a court] order without parental consultation'?
"4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to the pa.rents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors t.o giv:e consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parnllel the grounds and pro~
cedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S] ?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonnbly,
and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which,
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292-293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
ufor good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interP.sts. The judge
umust disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
!d., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds uthat the
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obta.in judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 !d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. I d., at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
Section 128 itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any
parent who "has died or has deserted his or her family."
10

78-329 & 78-330-0PINION
8

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. I d., at 294. See n. 28, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parenta.l notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." !d., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent-even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given ''in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .... " !d., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. Id., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." I d., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the sta.tute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute tha.t they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair."
Id., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 35, infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement. 11 Appellants sought
The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: the best-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consE'nt in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion,
he argued, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read the evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
11
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted probable jurisdiction. - U . S . - (1978).

II
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." 1. 2 This observation, of course,
is but the beginnin!l: of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural," Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles ·be applied with sensia desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 128 proceeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best interests. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 12S could be severed
under established principJes, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unneoessarily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at 1006-1020.
12 Similarly, the Court said in Planned Parenthood of Centml Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S . 52, 74 (197-6):
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
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tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying the qualification by the state of minors' constitutional rights: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child-rearing.

A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 ( 1967). In particular, minors
'involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358
(1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U. S. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of school
children implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double Jeop-'
ardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult after
an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had violated
a criminal sta.t ute). Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S.
565 (1975), the Court held that children may not be deprived
of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistin-
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guishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
"conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administrative hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
.30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 ( 1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
"concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention." !d., at
550 (plurality opinion).
B
Second, the Court has allowed the States to qualify children's constitutional rights when the exercise of those rights
permits or requires the making of important, affirmative
choices with potentially serious consequences. Such qualifications are grounded in the recognition that, during the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. 13
13

As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "secur[ e] . . . the liberty of each man to
decide for him· elf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
. result):
"at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
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Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors. 15
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right t.o marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally int.olerable for adults." I d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted).
14 In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a state child-labor statute.
Tho child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under tho statuto, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 165, permitted
the State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncedodly ... would be invalid,"
id., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State has considerable latitude in limiting a minor's
constitutional rights on the basis of his lesser capacity for mature, affirm-
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c
Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the constitutional rights of
minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16 But an additional and more important
justification for state deference to parental control over children is that " [t] he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
ative choice, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969), illustrates that it may not arbitrarily deprive
him of those rights altogether. The Court held in Tinker that a school
child's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a siient protest
against American involVlement in the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by the Constitufion t1lat "for any reason-whether it sterns frdrn
time, place, or type of benavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the First AmenClment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence in the record that their
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever---.even nondisruptive discussions-on important political and
moral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 510. When impinging upon such
fundamental constitutional rights, the State must defend such restrictions
with a rational argument that the challenged regulations will forestall
genuine harm to the class of minors to which it applies or avoid the disruption of important state interests, such as the proper functioning of the
public schools or the juvenile courts.
16
See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must be
made through parent or guardian).
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him for additional obligations." Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). "The duty to prepare the child
for 'additional obligations' ... must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements
of good citizenship." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233
(1972). This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth
of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institu ...
tions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added).
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief tha.t the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those sup-
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portive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.17
Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639. 18
See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Ginberg-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 ( 1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U. S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S . 545, 550
(1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). As§ 12S is supportive of the interests of parent-s in their daughter's abortion decision,
we have no occasion to consider here whether the Constitution places any
limits on the State's authority to restrict a parent's involvement in that
decision. To the extent these opinions refer to constitutional barriers
against state infringement of parental rights, therefore, they are not
dispositive of the issue before us. They are highly relevant, however, in
indicating the importance of the role of parents within our constitutional
system, and in illuminating the magnitude of the state interest in fostering
that role.
Nor do we consider any questions concerning state support for a parental decision that a minor's pregnancy should be aborted despite her
wishes to the contrary. For present purposes, it is enough to say that in
this, as in other child-parent-state problems, there exists a broad range
within which the State is free, in the exercise of its legislative judgment
and the furtherance of its legitimate interests, to support or limit the
rights of children and parents in various contexts, such as compulsory
education, the prevention of child abuse and neglect, and consent for medical treatment necessary to preserve life.
17
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III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. Appellees'
and intervenors' basic contention, sustained in large part by
the District Court, is that § 12S is unconstitutional because
it unduly burdens a pregnant minor's decision to seek an abortion. They argue, for example, that the requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden. From what has been
said, it is evident that parental notice and consent are the
kinds of qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make such important decisions. The
inability of minors to make a fully informed choice that takes
account of both immediate and long-range consequences generally makes parental consultation entirely appropriate.
Moreover, the profound moral, ethical, or religious implications that abortion has for many people suggest that this is
the kind of decision in which the State may conclude that parental involvement should be encouraged. 19 As MR. JusTICE
STEWART wrote in concurrence in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U. S., at 91:
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutiona.lly permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
The expert testimony at the hearings in the District Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I, 393 F. Supp., at 853.
19
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clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 20
A pregnant minor's constitutionally protected interest in an
abortion, therefore, does not include the right not to consult
with her parents about whether she should seek an abortion
merely because she anticipates that they will disapprove or
seek to dissuade her. 21 Nevertheless, the abortion decision
differs in important ways from other decisions that may be
made during minority. We conclude that these differences
require special limits on the extent to which the State may
restrict a minor's exercise of her right to seek an abortion.

A
The pregnant minor's options ate tnuch different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
20 MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion in Danforth underscored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortjon decisions by describing the procedures followed at the clinic operated by the Pa.rents Aid
Society and Dr. Gerald Zupnick:
"The counseling ... occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The
physician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques . . . ,
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Baird, id., at 132.
21 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize[d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
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majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. 22
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and· indelible.
To be sure, the best choice for a pregnant minor may not
be to abort. Marriage to the father of the child, arranging
for the adoption of the baby, or even assuming alone the responsibilities of motherhood might well be in her best longrange interests. Parents or others might continue to furnish
needed economic support and mature guidance, even though
the young mother has become legally an adult in some respects. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that cannot
be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching
consequences.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), "the State may not impose
22

In Massachusetts, for example, although parenthood alone does not
remove a minor from the reach of § 128, it does confer adul.t lega.l status
in other respects, such as the right to consent to medical care Jor the
minor's own child and to other kinds of medical care for the minor herself.
See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F (West); n. 33, infra.
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a blanket provision ... requiring the consent of a parent or
person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents
may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a
minor, the unique nature and consequences of the abortion
decision make it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy,
regardless of the reason for withholding consent." Ibid. If
the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or
both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide a
procedure whereby a denial of parental consent may be reviewed and possibly reversed.
We conclude that approval of a minor's abortion in such a
review proceeding must be given upon a judicial finding 23 of
either of two facts: (1) that the minor is mature enough and
well enough informed to make her abortion decision independently of her parents' wishes; 24 or (2) that even if she is not
able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion
28 As § 12S provides for involvement of the state superior court · in
minors' abortion decisions, we discuss the constitutional issues raised in
theso cases in terms of judicial review. We do not suggrst, however,
that a State choosing to require parental consrnt ~r~~~~~d/Could not a.~sign
the task of reviewing denials of that consent to a juvenile court or an
administrative agency or officer.
24 The nature of bot-h the State's intere.ot in fostering parential authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear \vhy the State generally may r·e sort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as age limits, marital status, or membership in the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal di abilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, maturity, but the fact that a minor may be
very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar na,ture of the abortion decision may require the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the
maturity of minors.
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would be in her best interests. The proceeding in which these
facts are determined must assure that a resolution of the issue,
and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with sufficient expedition and anonymity to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained if parental consent is
withheld improperly. In sum, the procedure must ensure
that the withholding of parental consent does not in fact
amount to the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that
was found impermissible in Danforth. !d., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 128 must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies many of the
concerns that require special treatment. of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be· "obtained· by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 12S proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." 25 Attorney General,
25
The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 12S imposed this standard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. See pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." /d., at
293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is permissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
though § 12S was construed by the highest state court to impose this
restriction, the statute is flawed because the restriction is not apparent on
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible
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·360 N. E. 2d, at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court aloo
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a [§ 12S] proceedings
may be expected . . . . The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W]e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge
may also be achieved." Id., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulema.king power, or the Supreme Judicial
'Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. Ibid. 26
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or immature-to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
reasons. See Baird Ill, 450 F. Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this assertion. As a general rule, the interpretation
of a state statute by the State's highest court "is as though written into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953),
and we are obliged to view the restriction on the parental consent requirement "as if [§ 12S] has been so amended by the [Massachusetts] legislature." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948).
26 Intervenors take issue with the Supreme Judicial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 128-and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effect-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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·state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T]he
consent required by [§ 12S must] be obtained for every non-emergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
·294. The text of § 128 itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has deserted his or her family." 27 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an a:bortion. 28 ld., at 297.
The statute also provides that "[i]f both parents have died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
28 This reading of the statute requires parental consultation and consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Juclicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absence of § 12S: "The ma.ture minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of tho rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of intended medical treatment and where the minor is capable of giving in27
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In assessing whether the judicial relief of § 128 provides
meaningful access to review of denials of parental consent, we
must bear in mind that the burden of initiating court proceedings, especially when placed upon a minor, is a substantial
one. Moreover, as the District Court recognized, "there
are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
pnwent, the minor's right to go to court." Baird III, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in superior court provides a meaningful
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
We conclnde, therefore, that under the statutory scheme
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be permitted to go
directly to the court without first notifying her parents. 28 a
She must be given an opportunity to satisfy the judge that
consent would be denied, and that subsequent attempts to
seek a review of that denial would be effectively blocked by
her parents. If such a showing is not made, either because
the judge is pers11aded that the minor is mistaken, or because
he simply is unable to make an intelligent determination of
these factual questions in the absence of the parents, he may
require that they be consulted. If, on the other hand, the
court is convinced that informing the parents effectively would
nullify the minor's opportunity for judicial review of the
formed coment to that treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwealth." !d., at 296. The Supreme .Judicial Court held that
the common-law mature minor rule was inapplicable to abortions because
it had been legislatively superseded by § 12S.
28 a We do not decide whether a State could require parental consultation
in cYery case if it provided a readily accessible method of review less
formidable than formal court proceedings. See n. 23, supra.
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denial of parental consent, the minor then is entitled to make
her case on the merits-to establish either that she is mature
enough to reach her abortion decision independently, or that
the abortion is in her best interests in any event.
We recognize the challenge facing a superior court judge
asked to determine, in the absence of the parents, whether
they would refuse consent and obstruct their daughter's access
to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or judging what
decision is in her best interests also would be facilitated, in
many cases, by the testimony of the parents. In spite of
these difficulties, we are convinced that, absent the opportunity to approach the superior court prior to seeking parental
<:onsent, 29 a substantial number of pregnant minors would be
prevented from having a realistic opportunity to do so later.
Massachusetts may choose to give the parents the initial
oportunity to determine the best interests of their minor
daughter in this complex and important decision, but it must
provide some safeguard against the genuine risk that some
parents effectively will prevent review of their own decisions. 30
This is not to say that the judge's determination must be made ex
parte. As long as the procedure does not become unduly burdensome,
the State itself, through a designated official, may choose to be the defendant in such a proceeding. This, apparently, was contemplated by
the Supreme Judicial Court as the correct procedure in Massachusetts,
should it be held that the requirement of parental notice was unconstitutional in some cases. See Attorney General, supra, at 298. Moreover,
subj<ect to preservation of the necessary speed and confidentiality of judicial consent proceedings, our decision imposes no extraordinary restrictions
on the sources, other than the parents themselves, to which the court may
turn for evidence.
30 The District Court believed that parental notification should be dispensed with whenever it was in the "best interests" of the minor to do
so. See Baird III, supra, at 1001. While the best-interests standard is
applicable in determining the underlying issue of whether the abortion is
proper, we do not believe it correctly states the rule for deciding when
the State is forbidden to require parental consultation or consent. One
would hope that parents would not become hostile and attempt to forestall
judicial review because their daughter had become pregnant and desired
29
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Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor 1s
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird III, supra, at
1004n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. Both fathers and
mothers have an interest in helping to determine what course is
'best for their daughters in this matter, and the State is not
prohibited from supporting the involvement of both parents,
even though doing so may increase marginally the chance of
denial of consent. As we have said, the fact that parental
disapproval may occur is not itself a reason for dispensing
with an otherwise valid consent requirement.
This general rule, however, must be sub.ject to the same
exception as the requirement of parental notice in every case:
If, in a particular instance, the minor convinces the court
that seeking the approval of both parents rather than one
would result in both the denial of consent and the effective
frustration of the right of judicial review of that denial, then
an abortion. But the Constitution does not 'protect against all possible
adverse consequences when 'problems as sensitive and volatile as unwanted,
illegitimate pregnancy and elective abortion confront a family. Although
it is regrettable if the minor,s relationship with her parents suffers, that
circumstance, standing alone, does not provide a constitutional basis for
forbidding a State to require her to seek their consent for an abortion.
See p. - , supra. The constitutional limit on state-supported parental
involvement in minors' abortion decisions is that a parental notice and
consent requirement must not be permitted effectively to become the kind
of absolute parental veto disapproved in Danforth. See p. - , supra.
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the State must permit the minor to make this showing in advance of notice to the hostile parent. If that showing is made,
the court should consider whether to grant consent either
because of the minor's maturity or because the abortion would
be in her best interests. 31
(3)
Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better.
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered:
"[W] e do not view the judge's role as limited to a deter""
mination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, aiJ. informed and reasonable decision to have an
abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determina..
tion of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
· the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
. all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
. if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." !d., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
81 If the ono parent whose consent has been sought is supportive of the
minor's right to seek review, the reviewing body may be assisted considerably in its diffi cult factual determinations. If that parent approves of
the minor's decision, that consent of course will weigh heavily in favor of
judicial approval of the abortion.
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rule that a Sta.te may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 24, supra. But as stated above, the
unique character of the abortion decision mandates that a
State choosing to impose a parental consent requirement also
must provide a method of review of denials of such consent.
If the minor satisfies a judge that she has attained sufficient
maturity to make a fully informed decision, she becomes
entitled to make her abortion decision independently. 32 We
therefore agree with the District Court that § 12S cannot
constitutionally permit judicial disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been determined to be mature and
fully competent to assess the implications of the choice she
has made.

IV
The District Court concluded that, in addition to the substantive infirmities it identified in § 12S, the statute also
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, apparently because it excepts minors seeking
abortions from the operation of Massachusetts' common-law
mature minor rule. See p. 9, and n. 28, supra. Appellees
and intervenors argue that virtually every difference under
Massachusetts law between the treatment of abortions and
that of other medical procedures to be performed upon minors
also violates the Equal Protection Clause. 33
This rule applies not only when parental consent has been sought and
.denied but also to the exceptional cases d€scribed in Parts III-B (1) and
(2), supra, in which the minor is entitled to proceed in court without notice
to one or both parents. In such cases, a judicial finding of maturity
means that the abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age of
the minor.
33 Under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F, minors falling into any
of six categories, such as those who are or have been married and those
serving in the armed forces, may consent to most kinds of medical and
dental care. Only minors who are married, widowed, or divorced, however, may consent independently to abortion or sterilization.
32
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For the reasons stated in Part III, supra, we have concluded
that Massachusetts cannot constitutionally permit a judge to
veto the abortion decision of a minor and her physician when
the minor has been found to be mature and fully competent
to act independently in this respect. In light of that conclusion, we need not decide whether such a veto also would violate the Equal Protection Clause. The remaining procedural
requirements imposed on these mature minors, but not on
adults-parental consultation in most cases and judicial review-are amply justified by the State's substantial interest in
having minors' abortion decisions resolved within the family
whenever possible and preventing improvident abortions by
those not fully qualified to act on their own.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded that treating minors desiring
abortions differently from those seeking other forms of medical
treatment offends the Equal Protection Clause. As we noted
when this case was before us in 1976, "not all distinction
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden." Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S., at 149. This is especially true where
minors are involved. · The statutory and common-law rules
at issue are designed to determine when minors in various circumstances should be permitted to give independent consent to
different kinds of medical care. We see no reason to subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny Massachusetts' decision to
allow such consent less readily with respect to abortion than
to other medical treatment. "The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements are not imposed for other
medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
termination of a potential human life." Maher v. Roe, 432
u.s. 464, 480 (1977).

v

Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits
judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
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fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires a minor to seek the consent of one or both parents,
even if she can satisfy the superior court that as a result consent would be denied and access to judicial review of that
denial effectively blocked. 34
As § 128 does not comport entirely with constitutional
standards, it remains to be decided whether the statute must
be invalidated as a whole, or whether only its unconstitutional
applications need be enjoined. This question requires analysis of the principles governing the severability of statutes. 35
34 Section 12S evidently applies to all non-emergency abortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U. S. 113, 164-165 (1973).
The propriety of parental involV'ement in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the limits we have
specified on the extent to which a State may defer to parents are adequate
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests
of a minor in the abortion decision. Access to review of a denial of
parental consent, which must accompany the State's decision to require
such consent, and the best-interests standard applicable to judicial review assure that no minor need be denied an abortion found to be in her
best interests that could not otherwise be prohibited by the State under
Roe v. Wade, supra. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
35 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized that its construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney General, supra, at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that we have impermissibly
assigned a greater role to the parents than we should or that we have
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Severance problems typically require deciding whether
striking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
proper when upholding the law in other applications will be
consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect
of the law. a[W]e need not find the language of [a sta.tute]
constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular
case.l" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971).
Cf. Del Duca v. Town Administrator, 368 Mass. 1, 13-14, 329
N. E. 2d 748, 756 (1975); W. & J. Sloane v. Commonwealth,
253 Mass. 529, 534, 149 N. E. 407, 409 (1925). It is only
under this latter form of severance that § 12S could remain
enforceable in part.
It is essential to bear in mind that we deal here with state
legislation. As is true of state-court constructions of state
law generally, see n. 35, supra, the decisions of such courts
otherwise burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have const.rued the statute to conform
to that interpretation." Ibid.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 12S differently than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691
n. 11 ( 1975), the federal courts are bound by the construction of a state
statute by the tighest court of that State. E. g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedrof! v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 99 (1952). We
therefore are obligated to read § 12S as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional infirmities discussed in Part III, supra.
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f'as to the severability of a provision [of state law] is con ..
elusive upon this Court." Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286,
290 (1924). "What they say the statutes of that State mean
we must accept them to mean whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their language or by separating their provisions into valid and invalid parts." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 28,43 (1900).
In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not asked
to rule on the severability of § 12S, as it was then unclear
to what extent, if any, the statute would be declared unconstitutional. We therefore are not precluded from reaching the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, supra, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave this important question of state law to the tribunal best suited to decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure already successfully
employed in this case provides a practicable method for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule
3:21 (1978) ,86 the following question is certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "In light of the
'Court's conclusions in this opinion concerning the constitutionality of § 12S, may this statute be severed so that it remains
enforceable in part as a matter of Massachusetts law?"
So ordered

86 Rule 3:21, § 3 (2), calls for "a statement of all facts relevant to the
questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
the questions arose." We believe this opinion, particularly Part I, supra,
satisfies this requirement.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976); and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
I

A
On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1 The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12S
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
· be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."

Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
wero made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout this
opinion.
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C.§ 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 8 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978).5
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro8 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4
Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolescents. and Phillip Stubblefield, M. D .. (intervenors) 6 appeared a.s amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. Th~ District Court "accepted rthis
group 1 in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's repreF!entation
{of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp., at 990.
Defendants in the suit. appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant a.nd representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued
an opinion invalidating ~ 128. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird I). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion , or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of {these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." I d., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." I d., at 855-856. The court /
In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intenrention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
7 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively as
appellants.
6
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, ...
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." !d., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 128,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor. 8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. · Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
§ 12S was susceptible of a construction 'that "would avoid or
/
substantially modify the federal constitution.al challenge to the
//c-fi··r'
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976~..
therefore vacated the judgment of the District Court, coneluding that it should hav'i"efbfied to tile il"uprOmO Judicii.! - a b~....<
Court of Massachusetts appropriate questions concerning the
_~
_
meaning of § 12S, pursuant to existing procedure in that
_ _--.:;.._ __
State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21
(1978).
/
remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
/
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 'These were answered in an ~

'6-.e

t

One member of the th11ee-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 12S was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows:
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
a.pply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
's /
"b) If th• P"""t ie not limited to ""'id,ing excluiDvely the minor/ 8

t

J
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opm10n styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 12S, as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court, are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter's
best interests, can the parent ta.ke into ronsidera.tion the 'long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standard or standards is the superior court to apply?
"a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are
not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
"b) If the superior court finds that the minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, an informed a.nd reasonable decision to have
an abortion, may the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a.
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachusetts law permit a minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informed consent,' 'to obta.in
[a court] order without parental consultat.ion'?
"4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the a:ffirmative, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to the pa.rents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme .Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with t.he minor's own, valid, consent, tha.t he reasonably,
and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which,
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"

• >
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·abortion, parents are required by § 12S to -consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292- 293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in t,he minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not b~ed exclusively" on that standard.
Id., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 I d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. I d. , at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298- 300. Nor does the
10 Section 128 itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any
parent who "has died or has deserted his or her family."
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. I d., at 294. See n. 28, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme .l'udicial Court, § 12S re. quires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." I d., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent-even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requ'iring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, l.t concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .... " Id., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor /

/
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. I d., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." I d., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth/' ibid. , because the statute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair."
I d., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. @, infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement. 11 Appellants sought ~
The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions : the best-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in the Supreme Judicia.! Court's opinion,
he argued, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read the evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
11
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted probable jurisdiction. - U . S . - (1978).

II
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." 12 This observation, of course,
is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural," Moore v. City of East Cleve_./
land, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensi-/
a desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 12S proceeding of having the parents before him as a. source of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best. interPSts. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 12S could be severed
under established principles, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unnecessarily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at 1006-1020.
12 Similarly, the Court said in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976):
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
odult., "'' pmtootOO by tho co..titution and PO""' oonotitutional ' i g h t /
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tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying the qualification by the state of minors' constitutional rights: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child-rearing.

A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
agams~elf-incrimination.
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358
(1970); Tn re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U. S. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of school
children implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double Jeop.:
ardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult after
an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had violated
a criminal statute). Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S.
565 (1975) , the Court held that children may not be deprived
o~in property interests without due process.
· These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indir

/
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guishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
"conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administra.tive hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 ( 1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children genera:lly are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
"concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention." Id., at
· 550 (plurality opinion).
B
/

Second, the Court

ha~!.MlawJthe State~ qualify

chil-

;.___::_...::;==::;:=~---4-~dren's constitutional rights when the exercise of those rights

the making of important, affirmative
potentially serious consequences .
...A~~>m!'-mre grounded in the recognition that, during t the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
~void choices that could be detrimental to them. 13
~
As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "secur[e] ... the liberty of each man to
decide for him·elf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result) :
"at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
13

~

/

78-329 & 78-330-0PINION
BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

13

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature ra.tionally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional ~
rights of minors. 15
~
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right t.o marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally int.olerable for adults." !d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted).
14 In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a state child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincero request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under tho statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 165, permitted
the State to enforce its statute, which " [ c] oncededly ... would be invalid,"
id., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
~ Although the State has considerabl-e latitude inAlttnHing a rtrinor~.._
\ ~~ienzd Pi~hts on the basis of · lesser capacity for mature, affirm-

'...../

~
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c
Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbrin
ch1 dren justifies limitations on the(';~~~·;;;:t:=;:;~~
minors. The State commonly protec s its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16 But an additional and more important
justification for state deference to parental control over children is that " [ t] he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare

---......:====-":.t·
Gk;r C.GW'~/-i ~tJCI'-~ lkict,
J

ative choice, /rinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis393 U. S. 503 (1969), illustrates that it may not arbitrarily deprive
r-- - - --lllii.M of ~ghts altbgether. The Court held in Tinker that a school
child's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a sil.e nt protest
against American involwment in the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by the Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence in the record that their
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also becai1se it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever-<even nondisruptive discussions--on important political ~
oral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 510. Jw~~~such
undamental constitutional rights, the State must defend such restrictions
ith a rational argument that the challenged regulations will forestall
genuine harm to the class of minors to which it applies or avoid the disrup/ tion of important state interests, such as the proper functioning of th
~schools or the juvenile courts.
16 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must be
made through parent or guardian).

G
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him for additional obligations.'·' Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
·268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). "The duty to prepare the child
.for 'additional obligations' ... must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements
of good citizenship." Wiscomin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233
( 1972). This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and in) spiring by precept and example is essential to the growth
of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
" [ i ]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added).
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adult. hood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed , "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those sup-
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portive of the parental role, may be important to the c h i l d v s
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.17
Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639. 18

Some~

17 See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text ·above--Pierce,· Yoder,
Prince, and Ginberg-a!l have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
~-I""l""znois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972); Anr:ens 1 ronQ " Mg~io 1 SSO U g, &45;-556 2:1· ___.
~Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). As§ 12S is supportive of the interests of parents in their daughter's abortion decision,
we have no occasion to consider here whether the Constitution places any
limits on the State's authority to restrict a parent's involvement in that
ecision.flci The extent those opinions -refer to consbtutionarbarriers
· t state infringement of parental rights, therefore, they are not
dispositive of the issue before us. They are highly relevant, however, in
indicating the importance of the role of parPnts within our constitutional
system, and in illuminating the magnitude of the state interest in fostering
that role.
Nor do we consider any questions concerning state support for a parental decision that a minor's pregnancy should be aborted despite her
wishes to the contrary. For present purposes, it is enough to say that in
' this, as in other child-parent-state problems, there exists a broad range
within which the State is free, in the exercise of its legislative judgment
and the furtherance of its legitimate interests, to support or limit the
rights of children and parents in various contexts, such as compulsory
education, the prevention of child abuse and neglect, and consent for medi~al treatment necessary to preserve life . .I
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III

I

- :5>

l

With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appealsfl.ppellees,_ --...,
and intervenors' basic contention, sustained in large part by
the District Court, is that § 12S is unconstitutional because
it unduly burdens a pregnant minor's decision to seek an abortion. They argue, for example, that the requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden. From what has been
said, it is evident that parental notice and consent are the
kinds of qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make such important decisions. The
inability of minors to make a fully informed choice that takes
account of both immediate and long-range consequences generally makes parental consultation entirely appropriate.
Moreover, the profound moral, ethical, or religious implications that abortion has for many people suggest that this is
the kind of decision in which the State may conclude that parental involvement should be encouraged. 19 As MR. JusTICE
STEWART wrote in concurrence in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U. S., at 91:

\

J

"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a~
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of per
parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion

~The

expert testimony at the hearings in the District Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
,.
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
tho oourt refieot thi' oon.en'"'· Soo Bai•·d I, 393 F. Supp., at 853. ~--'

78-329; 78-330

Rider A

In §12S Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the
constitutional right of a woman, in consultation with her
physician, to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973), with the special interests of both the State and
parents in assuring the responsible exercise of this right by
a minor.
428

u.s.

As noted above, §12S was before us in Bellotti I,
132 (1976), where we remanded the case for

interpretation of its provision by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts.

We had previously held in Planned

Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), that a State
could not lawfully authorize an absolute parental veto over
the decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy.
74.

In Bellotti I, supra, we

~ ecognized
I

!d., at

that §12S could be

read as "fundamentally different from a statute that creates
a 'parental veto,'" id., at 145, thus "avoid[ing] or
substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional
challenge to the statute." Id., at 148.

The question before

us - in light of what we have said in the prior cases - is
whether §12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a
manner that does not unduly burden the right to seek an
abortion.

See id., at 147.

78-329; 78-330

Rider A, cont'd

Appellees and intervenors contend that even as
interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
§12(S) does unduly burden this right.

They argue, for

example, that the mere requirement of parental notice
constitutes such a burden.

As stated in Part II above,

however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that
typically may be imposed by the State on a minor's right to
make important

~ecisions.

The inability of immature minors

to make a fully informed choice that takes account of both
immediate and long-range consequences generally makes
parental consultation desirable and in the best interest of
the minor.

~/

As a general proposition, such consultation

seems particularly desirable with respect to the abortion
decision - one that raises profound moral, ethical, and

---

religious concerns. 20/

As Mr. Justice Stewart wrote in

concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S., at
91:
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clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 20 .

frequently ~

8/

pregnant minor' ~twtion·aUy proteete4-intereflt-in an- --~..,.,.abor~ ,the~ doee ~ mdmie tire- right "Ttot
consult
€At
w -e. OLr<.
~tb her parenh; ~eH.t. ;~,;betber she shonld iik -a.n. ~t.ion CoV\ c. e.~ ~ e c{
~1¥ beeause- ehe-!nticipates that they-will 1fu!!tl'!''~l' her
, t it...
~'ik te flismittEle aQ.« ::Wev;epu~~ess,f11ie a ortion eCislOn
h cJ...
differs in important ways from other'\iecisions that may be 0.. CO'Y\..S·h
(f(l
made during minority. We conclude that these differences r'l~~t -h, ~I(
require special limits on the extent to which the State may a.M. ~ b 0 v-.J-1'dY\.
•
restrict a minor's exercise of her right to seek an abortion.

8

5

·' t

A
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether ~
marry. A minor not permitted to tnarry before the age

ov

~

1
ill MR. JusTICE 8TEWART s concurring opinion in Danforth underscored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortjon decisions by describing the procedures followed at the clinic operated by the Parents Aid
Society and Dr. Gerald Zupnick:
"The counseling ... occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The
physician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques . . . .
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . Aftev
'the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . . " 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in B ellotti v. Baird, id., at 132.
~~ In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we empha- ~-r~ (J1rt.. ~
l!Y
size[d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
e
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
\0 r v IJ
n.h<>
pregnancy."
'P ~
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majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. 22
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
To be sure, the best choice for a pregnant minor may not
be to abort. Marriage to the father of the child, arranging
for the adoption of the baby, or even assuming alone the responsibilities of motherhood might well be in her best longrange interests. Parents or others might continue to furnish
needed economic support and mature guidance, even though
the young mother has become legally an adult in some respects. Nonetheless, the abortion deci,1)ion is one that cannot
be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching
consequences.
these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
~rth-:j2s U. ~. 8~4;~'the State may not im~

---- tn!:!!f;
1~ <Ae.,u..J 01-~ j

In Massachusetts, for example, although parenthood alone does not
remove a minor from the reach of § 128, it does confer adult legal status
in other respects, such as the right to consent to medical care for the
minor's own child and to other kinds of medical care for the minor herself.
See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F (West); n. $;infra.
22

0{)

,r

/
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a blanket
... requiring the consent of a parent or
person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor . during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents
may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a
minor, the unique nature and consequences of the abortion
decision make it inappropriate "to give a third party an absoh,Ite, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy,
regardless of the reason for withholding consent." Ibid. If
thEl State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or
both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide a
procedure whereby a denial of parental consent may be re_viewed and possibly reversed.
We conclude that approval of a minor's abortion in such a
review proceeding must be given upon a judicial finding 23 of
either of two facts: (1) that the minor is mature enough and
- e....,ll enough informed to make her abortion decisionJfi1clepend'+ 1--w
ently of her parents' wishes; 24 or (2) that even if she is not
able to make this dec~ion independently, the desired abortion
23
As § 128 provides for involvement of the state superior court in
minors' abortion decisions, we discuss the constitutional issues raised in
. thcso cases in t.Prms of judicial review. We do not s~ however,
12...._
at a Stat•e choosing to require parental consent propevl.f'could not ass1gn
:IV\ ol Qe.,t) Y't\t.t.c."' C..t>-11\ be the task of reviewing dPnials of that consent to a juvenile court or an
sa..i.-l .f
Q M 1 .
administrative agency or officer.A
or
fl 0 Ylll\q
~ The nature of bot.h the State's interest in fostering parential authority
p t"O C. Qo{U V'< ,_ ~ e(. .:t.
.and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may reEort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
~V"t-<.W\. 1e.. :>~
_IJ
as age limits, marital status, or membership in the armed forces for lifting
,..~
somo or all of the legal disabilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, maturity, but the fact that a minor may be
t h c s c...
very much an adult in some resp<>cts does not mean that his need and
'l.SSod~f~...t wi~ ~ ~
~
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of the abortion de-~
Cour-t o~ ~ i!Nr~
cision may require the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the
maturity of minors.

1~

fo -·

+\.,.""""
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would be in her best interests. The proceeding in which these
facts are determined must assure that a resolution of the issue,
and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with sufficient expedition and anonymity to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained if parental consent is
· withheld improperly. In sum, the procedure must ensure
hat the withholding of parental consent does not in fact
mount to the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that
as found impermissible in Danforth. !d., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 12S must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies JJUI.fi,i..of The
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's'" abortiOn
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 12S proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." 25 Attorney General,
25 The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 12S imposed this standard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. See pp. 6-7, supm. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." !d., at
293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is permissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
though § 12S was construed by the highest state court to impose this
restriction, the statute is flawed because the restriction is not apparent on
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible

fS om e {
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·360 N. E. 2d, at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a [§ 12S] proceedings
may be expected . . . . The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W] e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge
may also be achieved." Id., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. Ibid. 26
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial C o u r v
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or immature-to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any:
parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
reasons. See Baird III, 450 F. Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this assertion. As a general rule, the interpretation
of a state statute by the State's highest court "is as though written int()
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953),
and we are obliged to view the restriction on the parental consent requirement "as if [§ 12S] has been so amended by the [Massa,chusetts] legislature." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948).
26 Intervenors take issue with the Supreme Judicial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 128-and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effect-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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state court answered that, in general, they may not. "['l']he
consent required by [§ 128 must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried.n Attorney General, supra, at
'294. The text of § 128 itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has deserted his or her family.)' 27 ·The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (ot
statutory substitute) is available.') Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion. 28 !d., at 297.
27 The statute also provides that "[i]f both parents have died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
28 This reading of the statute requires parental consultation and consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit eveh immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule tJ1at would
apply in the absence of § 12S: "The mature minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, ilie minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of tho rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of intended medical treatment and where the minor is capable of giving in-

_/

/
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r

In assessing whether the judicial relief of § 128 provides
meaningful access to review of denials of parental consent, we \
(J~c
must bear in mind that the burden of initiating court proceedings, especially when placed upon a minor, is a substantial
one. Moreover, ~s the District Court recognized, "there
__.....:;a::.:;ro parents who- would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go to court." Baird III, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living a.t home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. It would be un·realistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal -1
right to seek relief in superior court provides 8: me~Hgfl:ik. , ~ v-. c(.f(!c f.;~
av~e of relief for some of those who need it the most.
We conclude, therefore, that under the sta.t utory scheme
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be permitted to go ~
directly to the court without first notifying her parents.e!) ~
She must be given an opportunity to satisfy the judge that
consent would be denied, and that subsequent attempts to
~- seek a review of that denial would be effectively blocked by
her parents. If such a showing is not made, either because
the judge is persuaded that the minor is mistaken, or because
he simply is unable to make an intelligent determination of
these factual questions in the absence of the parents, he may
require that they be consulted. If, on the other hand , the
court is convinced that informing the parents effectively would
nullify the minor's opportunity for judicial review of the

L

J

formed con3ent to that treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwealth.'' !d ., at 296. The Supreme Judicial Court held that
the common-law mature minor rule was inapplicable to abortions because
·
been legislatively superseded by § 12S.
28 a We do not decide whether a State could require parental con sultatio~
in every case if it provided a readily acce ·sible method of review less
)
formidable than formal court proceedings. See n . 23, supra.

j
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Rider B

We think that, construed in this manner, §128 would
impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortion.

78-329~

78-330

Rider C

We conclude, therefore, that under the statutory
scheme adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be permitted
to go directly to the court without first consulting or
notifying her parents. She

m~~t

be given an oQportunity to

satisfy the judge that consent probably would be denied, and

r-

that subsequent attempts to , seek review of that denial would
be obstructed by her parents.

If the court is not persuaded

by the minor, it may require that the parents be
consulted.29/

If, on the other hand, the. court is satisfied

that informing the parents probably would have the effect of
foreclosing the minor's opportunity for timely judicial
review of a denial of parental consent, the minor then is
entitled to make her case on the merits - to establish either
that she is mature enough to reach her abortion decision
independently, or that

~he

abortion is in her best interests

in any event.

29.

Of course, if the minor consults with her parents,

either voluntarily or as directed by the court, and they
withhold consent, she is free to seek review in the court
immediately.
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denial of parental consent, the minor then is entitled to mak
ifher case on the merits-to establish either that she is mature
enough to reach her abortion decision independently, or that~
the abortion is i
·
"' ·
We recognize the challenge facing a superior court judge
asked to determine, in the absence of the parents, whether
~efuse consent and obstruct their daughter's acc_e_s_
s ___
to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or judging what
decision is in her best interests also would be facilitated, in
many cases, by the testimony of the parents. In spite of
these difficulties, we are convinced that, absent the opportufiicyto~the superior court prior to seeking parental ~
consett,(f~~tantial number of pregnant minors would be . (~
revented from having a realistic opportunity to do so later.
Massachusetts may choose to give the parents the initial
oportunity to determine the best ·interests of their minor
daughter in this complex and important decision, but it must
provide some safeguard against the genuine risk that some
arents effe~tively will prevent review of their own decisions. 30
Ahis is not to say that the judge's determination must be made ex
parte. As long as the procedure does not become unduly burdensome,
the State itself, through a designated official, may choose to be the defendant in such a proceeding. This, apparently, was contemplated by
the Supreme Judicial Court as the correct procedure in Massachusetts,
should it be held that the requirement of parental notice was unconstitutional in some cases. See Attorney General, supra, at 298. Moreover,
s~bject to preservation or the n~c.essa.ry spee~'Uld confiC!eiitiality 0~ j~di
CJal eonsent proceedmgs, our decision Imposes no ~lillQr~!t~ restnctJons
on the sources, other than the parents themselves, to which the court may
turn for evidence.
0
he District Court believed that parental notification should be dispensed with whenever it was in the "best interests" of the minor to do
so. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001. While the best-interests standard is
applicable in determining the underlying issue of whether the abortion is
proper, we o not t>eneve it correct1y sfates the rule for deciding wh~n
e tate is forbidden to require parental consultation or consent. One
would hope that parents would not become hostile and attempt to forestall
'udicial review because th~!r daughkr had b~come pregna.J'!t and...deW
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Rider D

Massachusetts may choose to require that pregnant minors
desiring abortions seek the consent of their parents, who
normally will act in the best interest of their children.
But the State must provide an adequate safeguard against the
genuine risk that consultation with some parents will result
in foreclosing the minor's opportunity to obtain judicial
review of the denial of parental consent.

l!l
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Rider E

it tends to obscure the State's important interest in
encouraging a family, rather than a judicial, resolution of
the minor's abortion decision.

As long as the minor's

constitutional right to seek the abortion itself is not
unduly burdened, we are hesitant to interfere with the
State's efforts to involve parents in this important matter.

78-329 & 78- 330-0PINION

26

BELLOTTI

v. BAIRD

(2)

---

Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird III, supra, at
'1004n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision ·has implications far broader than · those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. Both fathers and
mothers have an in~rest in helping to determine what course is
..._...,.._ .,..eSt for their daughterS'ltt '~is ~att8r 1 and the Sta.te is
~rohisiteel fToffi support~he involvement of both parents,
/ even though doing so may increase marginally the chance of
denial of consent. As we have said, the fact that parental
disapproval may occur is not itself a reason for dispensing
with an otherwise valid consent requirement.
his general rule, however, must be subject to the same
exception as the requirement of parental notice in every case :
If, in a particular instance, the minor convinces the court
that seeking the approval of both par~nts rather than one
would result in -both the denial of consent and the effective
frust:ation _of the right of judicial review of that denial, then

---..
r
\
\

an abortion. But the Constitution does not protect against all possible
adverse consequences when problems as sensitive) and volatile as unwanted,
illegitimate pregnancy and elective abortion corffront a family. Although
it is regret table if the minor's relationship wit!; her parents suffers, that
circumstance, standing alone, docs not provide a constitutional basis for
forbidding a State to require her to seek their consent for an abortion.
See p. - , supra. The constitutional limit on state-supported parental
involvement in minors' abortion decisions is that a parental notice a.nd
consent requirement must not be permitted effectively to become t he kind
of absolute parental veto disapproved in D anforth. See p . - , supra.

I

I

J
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Rider F

This general rule, however, must be subject to the

sam~lification

outlined above with respect to the

requirement of notice to both parents:

The minor must be

permitted to go directly to court without consulting the
parent who she believes will be hostile.

If she convinces

the court that seeking the approval of that parent probably
would result in the denial qf consent and the obstruction of
subsequent access to the court, then she is entitled to
establish, without notice to that parent, either that she is
mature enough to make her decision independently or that the
abortion would be in her bert interest in any event. ~
~~
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the State must permit the minor to make this showing in ad~
vance of notice to the hostile parent. If that showing.is made,
the court should consider whether to gra.n t consent either
because of the m~tur'ity or because the abortion would
be in~erests. 3 1
(3)

'·

Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making] , and has,
:in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered:
"[W] e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." Id., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
@ If the one parent whose consent has been sought is supportive of the
minor's right to seek review, the reviewing body may be assisted consider-v
ably in its difficult factual determinations. If that parent approves of
the minor's decision, that consent of course will weigh heavily in favor o
judicial approval of the abortion.
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rule that a Sta.te may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights inde- r - - -p-endently. See n. 24, supra. Jjfut as stateo a ove,
e
-~
unique character of the abortion decision mandates that a
/ '(.€-r~(' t.<-'f •
State choosing to impose a parental consent requirement also
ust rovide a method of"'review of denials of such consent.
r I ~eA.If the .minor satisfies a judge tllatshe has attained sufficient
-....)
maturity to make a ully informed decision, she becomes ~
entitled to make her abortion decision independently 32 We (!~
therefore agree with the District Court that § 12S cannot
constitutionally permit judicial disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been determined to be mature and
fully competent to assess the implications of the choice she
has made.

r

lY

IV
The District Court concluded that, in addition to the sub·stantive infirmities it identified in § 12S, the statute also
violates the Equal Protection Ciause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, apparently because l.t excepts minors seeking
abortions from the operation of Massachusetts' common-law
mature minor ruie. See p. 9, and n. 28, supra. Appeilees
and intervenors argue that virtually every difference under
Massachusetts law between the treatment of abortions and
that of other medical procedures to ?e performed upon minors ~
also violates the Equal Protection Clause.~
(.::JJ,J
82 This rule applies not only when parental consent has been sought and
denied but also to the exceptional cases described in Parts III-B (1) and
(2), supra, in which the minor is entitled to proceed in court without notice
to one or both parents. In such cases, a judicial finding of maturity
means that the abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age of
the minor.
~Under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F, minors falling into any
of six categories, such as those who are or have been married and those
serving in the armed forces, may consent to most kinds of medical and
dental care. Only minors who are married, widowed , or divorced, however, may consent independently to abortion or sterilization.
/

~
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Rider G

But we are concerned here with the exercise of a
constitutional right of unique character.

See pp.

,._..
-~'

supra.

A State choosing to impose parental consent also must provide
an effective method of judicial review when that consent is
denied.

78-329 & 78-330-0PINION

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

29

For the reasons stated in Part III, supra, we have concluded
that Massachusetts cannot constitutionally permit a judge to
veto the abortion decision of a minor and her physician when
the minor has been found to be mature and fully competent
to act independently in this respect. In light of that conclu-v - - - - sion, we need not decide whether such a veto also would violate the Equal Protection Clause. The remaining procedural
requirements imposed on these mature minors, but not on
adults-parental consultation in most cases and judicial review-are amply justified by the State's substantial interest in
having minors' abortion decisions resolved within the family
whenever possible and preventing improvident abortions by
those not fully qualified to act on their own.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded that treating minors desiring
abortions differently from those seeking other forms of medical
treatment offends the Equal Protection Clause. As we noted
when this case was before us in 1976, "not all distinction
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden." Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S., at 149. This is especially true where
minors are involved. The statutory and common-law rules
at issue are designed to determine when minors in various circumstances should be permitted to give independent consent to
different kinds of medical care. ·We see no reason to subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny Massachusetts' decision to
allow such consent less readily with respect to abortion than
to other medical treatment. "The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements are not imposed for other
medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
termination of a potential human life." Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 480 (1977).

v

Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits

judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
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fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires a minor to seek the consent of one or both parents,
even if she can satisfy the su12erior court that as a result con'"-Sentlwoula oe denied and access to- judiCial review of that
;_, ectively blocked~
__
··
As § 128 does - not comport ~with constitutional
standards, it remains to be decided wh~fter the statute must
be invalidated as a whole, or whether only its unconstitutional
applications need be enjoined. This question requires analysis of the principles governing the severability of statutes.

1
=,_-"""_ _.....,._ __

- 66)

-6> Section 12S evidently applies to all non-emergency abortions per~
---formed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during,.....-which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164-165 (1973).
Tho propriety of parental invohnement in a minor.'s abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the limits we have
specified on the ex1:ent to which a State may defer to parents are adequate
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests
•of a minor in the abortion decision. Access to review of a denial of
·parental consent, which must accompany the State's decision to require
such consent, and the best-interests standard applicable to judicial review assure that no minor need be denied an abortion found to be in her
best interests that could not otherwise be prohibited by the State under
Roe v. Wade, supra. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
-c:.d The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized that its construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attomey General, supra, at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that we have impermissibly
assigned a greater role to the parents than we should or that we have
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Severance problems typically require deciding whether
striking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
proper when upholding the Jaw in other applications will be
consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect
of the law. "[W]e need not find the language of [a statute]
9onstitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular
case.]" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88 104 (1971).
Cf. Del Duca v. Town Administrator, 368 Mass. 1, 13-14, 329
N. E:-2d 748, 756 (1975); W. & J. Sloane v. Commonwealth,.,_..__ _
Mass. 529.1...534, 149 N. E. 407 409 (1925)j tt is on~y
under this latter form of severance that § 12S could remain
enforceable in part.
.
ft is essential to bear in mind that we deal here with state
legislation . .. As is true of state-court constructions of state
, supra, the decisions of such cour
law generally, see n.
otherwise burdenecj the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interprE:tation." Ibid.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of§ 12S differently than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we m u s v
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691
n. 11 (1975), the fed,eral courts are bound by the construction of a state
statute by the highest court of that State. E. g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist. No.1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482,488 (1976); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952). We
therefore are obliga.ted to read § 12S as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional infirmities discussed in Part III, supra.
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f'as to the severability of a provision [of state law] is con ..
elusive upon this Court." Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286,
290 (1924). "What they say the statutes of that State mean
we must accept them to mean whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their language or by separating their provi~
sions into valid and invalid parts." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 43 (1900).
- - - -In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not asked
to rule on the severability of § 12S, as it was then unclear
r--........_
to_ what extent, if any, the statute would be declared unconstitutional.) We therefore are not precluded from reaching the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, supra, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave this important question of state law to the tribunal best suited to decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure already successfully
employed in this case provides a practicable method for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule
3:21 (1978),• the following question is certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "In light of the
Court's conclusions in this opinion concerning the constitutionality of § 12S, may this statute be severed so that it remains
renforceable in part as a matter of Massachusetts law?"
So ordered

~

iliRule 3 :21, §3 (2), calls for "a statement of all facts relevant to the
questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in whic/h
the questions arose." We believe this opinion, particularly Part I, supra,
satisfies this requirement.
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That court has made it clear in its prior decisions,

however, that it is willing to sever statutes found to be
invalid as applied to some persons or factual settings.

See

DelDuca v. Town Administrator, 368 Mass. 1, 13-14, 329
N.E.2d 748, 756 (1975); Thurman v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul R., 254 Mass. 569, 151 N.E. 63 (1926);

w.

& J. Sloane v.

Commonwealth, 253 Mass. 529, 534, 149 N.E. 407, 409 (1925).
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MR. JusTICE PowELL's proposed opinion for the Court.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) , and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976).
I

A
On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions " within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on t he merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
1
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of a.ge and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
wero made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout thie
opinion.
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 3 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978). 5
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro3 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5
Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to t.he class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolescents. and Phillip Stubble.
field, M. D., (intervenors) 6 appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
·[of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." ·Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp., at 999.
Defendants in the suit. appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued!
an opinion invalidating § 128. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 . F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird I). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of [these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." !d., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." !d., at 855-856. The court
6 In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
1 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively . as
appellants.
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, . . .
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." Id., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 12S,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor. 8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
~ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the·
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (Be[[otti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District
Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate
questions concerning the meaning of § 128, pursuant to existing procedure in that State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup·~
Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions tO'
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
8 One member of the three-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 128 was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows:
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
"b 1 If the parent is n<lt limited to considering exclusively the minot:'S:

T
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opmiOn styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d ' 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 128, as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court. are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter's
best interests, can the parent take into conf>ideration the 'long-tenn
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standard or standards i~ the ·uperior comt to apply?
"a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are
not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
"b) If the superior court finds that the minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have
an abortion, may the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachnfletts law permit a minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informed consent,' 'to obtain
[a court] order without parental consultat.ion'?
"4. If the court answers any of quf'stion 3 in the a:.ffinnative, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), wit.hout prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 128] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other rommentc:; about the statute which,.
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292- 293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
/d., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent~s
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 /d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. /d. , at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
10 Section 128 itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any .·
parent who "has died or has deserted his or her family." ·
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. !d., at 294. Seen. 28, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 128 until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 128 unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F . Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 128 requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." !d., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors--those incapable of giving informed consent-even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .... " !d., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 128 was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. Id., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." ld., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the statute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair."
Id., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 36, infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement.11 Appellants sought
The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: the best-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion,
he argued, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read the evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
11
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted probable jurisdiction. - U . S . - (1978) .

II
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." 12 This observation, of course,
is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, " [ c] hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
uwe inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural," Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 ( 1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensia desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 128 proceeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best interests. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 12S could be severed
under established principles, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unneoessa rily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at 1006-1020.
12 Similarly, t.he Court said in Planned Parenthood of Central Misaouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) :
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
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tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying the qualification by the state of minors' constitutional rights: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child-rearing.

A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 ( 1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof be.:.
yond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham, v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty
inter·est); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult
after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had
violated a criminal statute). Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975), the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistin-
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guishable from those of adults. Indeed , our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases. need not necessarily
11
conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administra.tive hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generaily are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
"concern, ... sympathy, and . . . paternal attention." ld., at
550 (plurality opinion).
B
Second, the Court has held that the States may qualify children's constitutional rights when exercise of those rights
involves the making of important, affirmative choices with
potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been
grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them.13
13 As MR. JusTICE S•rEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "secur[ e] .. . the liberty of each man to
decide for him;;elf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S . 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result):
"at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
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Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature ra.tionally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors.15
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults." !d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted) .
14 In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a sta.te child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under the statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 165, permitted
the State to enforce its sta.tute, which "[c]oncededly ... would be invalid,"
iil., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State has considerable latitude in enacting laws affecting
ll'llinors on the basis o£ thrir lesser capacity for mature, affirmative choice"
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c
Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16
But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that "[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). "The
duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." WisconTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Disbict, 393 U. S.
503 ( 1969), illusrates that it may not arbitrarily deprive them of their
constitutional rights altogether. The Court held in Tinker that a school
child's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a silent protest
against American involvement in the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by the Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence in the record that their
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever~ven nondisruptive discussions-on important political and
moral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 510.
16 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18} ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must. be
made through parent or guardian) .
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sin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 ( 1972). This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added) .
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief tha.t the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 17
17

See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
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Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children 's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.18

III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 12S
Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional
right of a woman , in consultation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973),
with the special interests of both the State and parents in
assuring the responsible exercise of this right by a minor. As
noted above, § 128 was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132
( 1976). where we remanded the case for interpretation of its
provision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
We had previously held in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize
an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. ld., at 74. In Bellotti I, supra, we
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Ginbetg-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Otganization of Fostet Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 (1977) ; Catey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL) ; Moote v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972) ; Meyet v. N ebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
( 1923) . As § 12S i~ supportive of the interests of parents in their daughter's abortion decision, we have no occasion to consider here whether the
Constitution places any limits on the State's authority to restrict a parent's involvement in t hat decision.
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recognized that ~ 12S could be read as "fundamentally different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto,' " id., at 145,
thus "avoid[ing] or substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute." ld., at 148. The question before us-in light of what we have said in the prior
cases-is whether § 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme J uclicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to
seek an abortion. See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts~ 12 (S) does
unduly burden this right. They argue, for example, that the
mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.
As stated in Part II above, however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make important decisions. The
inability of immature minors to make a fully informed choice
that takes account of both immediate and long-range consequences generally makes parental consultation desirable and
in the best interest of the minor. 19 As a general proposition,
such consultation seems particularly desirable with respect to
the abortion decision-one that raises profound moral, ethical,
and religious concerns. 20 As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote in
concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
91 :
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutionaUy permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize [ d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
20 The expert teHtimony at the lwarmg., in the D1~trict Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I, 393 F . Supp., at 853.
19
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parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 21
But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to
seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in important
ways from other decisions that may be made during minority.
We conclude that these difl'erences require special limits on
the extent to which the State may restrict a minor's exercise
of her right to seek an abortion.

A
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
21 MR. JuwrrcE STEWART's concurring opinion in Danforth underscored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortion decisions by describing the procedures followed at the clinic operated by the Parents Aid
Society and Dr. Gerald Zupnick:
"The counseling . . . occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The
physician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques ...•
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Baird, id. , at 132.
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majority is :required simply to :postpone h~r decision. She
a.nd her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, a.nd emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. 22
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
To be sure, the best choice for a pregnant minor may not
be to abort. Marriage to the father of the child, arranging
for the adoption of the baby, or even assuming alone the responsibilities of motherhood might well be in her best longrange interests. Parents or others might continue to furnish
needed economic support and mature guidance, even though
the young mother has become legally an adult in some respects. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that cannot
be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching
consequences.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, supra, at "the State may not impose a blanket
In Massachusetts, for example, although parenthood alone does not
remove a minor from the reach of § 128, it do<>s confer adult legal status
in other respects, such as the right to consent to medical care for the
minor's own child and to other kinds of medical care for the minor herself.
Sec Ma~s. Gen. Laws Ann ., ch. 112, § 12F (Wrst) ; n. 34, infra
22
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proviSIOn
. requiring the consent of a parent or person in
loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried
minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as
stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents may be permissible with tespect to other choices facing a minor, the
unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision make
it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto ov<'r the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding consent." Ibid. If the State decides
to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents'
consent to an abortion, it also must provide a procedure
whereby a denial of parental consent may be reviewed and
possibly reversed.
We conclude that approval of a minor's abortion in such a
review proceeding must be given upon a judicial finding 28 of
either of two facts: (1) that the minor is mature enough and
well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents'
wishes; 21 or (2) that even if she is not able to make this deciAs § 12S provides for involvement of the state superior court in
minors' abortion decisions, we discuss the constitutional issues raised in
these cases in terms of judicial review. We do not suggest, however,
that a State choosing to rrquire parrntal consent could not as~ign the task
of rrviewing denials of that consent to a JUVenilr court or an administrative
agency or officrr. Indeed, much can be sa1d for employing procedures
and a forum le;;s formal than tho~e associated with a court of general
jurisdiction.
24 The nature of bot.h the State's interest in fostering parential authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may resort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as age limits, marital status, or membership m the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal disabilitie::; of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, maturity, but the fact that a minor may be
very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of the abortion de23
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sion independently, the desired abortion would be in her best
interests. The proceeding in which these facts are determined must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any
appeals that may follow, will be completed with sufficient
expedition and anonymity to provide an effective opportunity
for an abortion to be obtained if parental consent is withheld
improperly. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the
withholding of parental consent does not in fact amount to
the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found
impermissible in Danforth. I d., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 128 must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 128 proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." 25 Attorney General,
cision may require the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the
maturity of minors.
25 The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 12S imposed this standard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. See pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." Id., at
293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is permissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
though § 12S was construed by the highest state court to impose this
restriction, the statute is flawed because the restriction is not apparent on
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360 N. E. 2d. at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a r§ 12S] proceedings
may be expected.... The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken. by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W]e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge
may also be achieved." ld., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. lbid. 20
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or immature-to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible
reasons. See Baird Ill, 450 F. Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this as&'riion. As a gem•ral ru.lf', the intE>rpretation
of a state statute by the State's highest court "is as though writtf'n into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953),
and we are obliged to view the rPstriction on the parPntal consPnt requirement "as if [§ 128] has been so amended by the [Massachusetts] legislature." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948).
26 Intervenors take issue with the Supreme Judicial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as t.o the operation of judicial proceE>dings under § 128--and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into efff'ct--we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T] he
consent required by [ § 12S must l be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unma.rried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has deserted his or her family." 27 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion. 28 Id., at 297.
27

The statute also provides that "[i]f both parents have died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
28 This reading of the statute requires parental consultation and consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absence of § 12S: "The mature minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical prooedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of inteJided medical treatmen1 and where the minor is capable of giving in-
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We conclude, therefore, that under the statutory "S'e-lTeffie
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be permitted to go

directly to the court without first consulting or notifying her
/.1 LLI'J_A ~ JtM_ ~
parents.
She must be given the opportunity to 4~ e that
an abortion would be in her best interests or that she is mature
~~~~

I

·•

enough and well enough informed to make ~~ a bortion decision by
herself.

If the court is not persuaded by the minor, it may

refuse to authorize the abortion in lieu of the parents.

If, on

the other hand, the court is persuaded that the abortion is in
the minor's best interests or that she is qualified to make the
determination herself, then it must authorize the operation.
Often parental consultation will be of great value to the
pregnant minor in considering her options, and this value must
be taken into account by the court called upon to determine what
is in the child's best interests.

There may be cases,

therefore, in which the court properly will deny the immature
minor an abortion in part because she has not sought parental
guidance.

But this is the full extent to which parental

consultation may be required.

For although we realize that it

will be difficult for a superior court judge to determine
without the aid of the parents what is in a child's best
interests or whether the child is mature,

78-329 & 78-330-DPINION

24

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

W.e think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortioil.- As the Dist_rict Court recognized,
"there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go .to cou_rt." Baird · III, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be -so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. · But
many parents hold strong vie'YS on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living a.t home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
~ ~ both an abortion and their access to court. It would be un\0\~ ~ ~ ~
realistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in suj)erior court provides an effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
· · ~vVeconclude, . therefore, that un er tile sta.tutory 8ciieme
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be ermitted to o ~
directly to the court without first notifying her parents. consulting or
She must be given eek review of that denial would be obstructed by her parents.
an ~pportuni ~y to If the court is not persuaded by the ri1inor, it may require
sat~sfy the JUdge that the parents be consulted. 29 If, on the other hand, the
hat
consent ld b court IS
· satJs
· fi ed t h at m
· formmg
·
th e parents prob a bl y wou ld
b bl
~~i:d y a~~u th t e have the effect of foreclosing the mino·r 's opportunity for
ubseq~ent
a
timely judicial review of a denial of parental consent, the
ttempts to
minor then is entitled to make her case on the merits- to
establish either that she is mature enough to reach her abortion decision independently, or that the abortion is in her best
interests in any event.
We recognize the challenge facing a superior court judge

C/

--

- ---"'----

formed consent to that treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwealth." ld., at 296. The Supreme Judicial Court held that
the common-law mature minor rule was inapplicable to abortions because
it had been legislatively supC:' rseded by § 12S.
course, 1 the mmor cousu ts with her parents,· e1 1er vo untarily
or as directed by the court, and they withhold ron~;ent, she is free to seek
rev~)" in the court immediately.
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asked to determine, in the absence of the paren s, w e er
they are likely to refuse consent and obstruct their daughter's
access to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or judging what decision is in her best interests also would be facilitated, in many cases, by the testimon of the Qarents. I1
s i of these difficulties we are convinced that, absent the
opportunity to go directly to the superior court prior to seeking parental consent, 30 a substantial number of pregnant
minors would be prevented from having a realistic opportunity
to do so later. _j\ij'assachusetts may choose to reqmre tha[preg
nant minors desiring abortions seek the consent of their parents, who normally will act in the best interest of their
children. But the State must provide an adequate safeguard
against the genuine risk that consultation with some parents
will result in foreclosing the minor's opportunity to obtain
'udicial review of the denial of parental consent. 81
3o This is not to say that the judge'" determination must be made ex
parte. As long as the procedure does not become unduly burdensome,
the State itself, through a designated official, may choose to be the defendant in such a proceeding. This, apparently, was contemplated by
the Supreme Judicial Court as the correct procedure in Matisachusetts,
should it be held that the requirement of parental notice was unconstitutional in some cili'!es. See Attorney General, supm, at 298. Moreover,
subject to prel:lervation of the nec!'l:lsary speed, informality and confidentiality of judicial consent proceeding,;, our decision imposes no special
restrictions on the sources, other than the parent" theml:lelvel:l, to which
the court may turn for evidence.
31 The District
omTl)e!ieved that parental notification should be disensed with whenever it was in the "best interests" of the minor to do
o. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001. While the best-interests standard is
1
pplicable in determining 1the underlying issue of whether the abortion is
proper,l!,! tends to obscure the State's important intereJ!in encouraging
a. family. rather than a judicial, resolution of the minor';; abortion decision.
As long as the minor';; constitutional right to ::;eek the abortion it!:lelf is not
unduly burdened, ~,.8 a cc hesitant to. ~nterfere with the State's efforts to
uvolve parents in t~l!!!!ttyr.
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(2)
Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird Ill, supra, at
1004n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. Both fathers and
mothers have an interest in helping to determine what course is
best for their daughters, and the State is entitled to support
the involvement of both par<"nts, even though doing so may
increase marginally the chance of denial of consent. As we
have said, the fact that parental disapproval may occur is not
itself a reason for dispensing with an otherwise valid consent
requirement.
This general rule, however, must be subject to the same
qualification outlined above with respect to the requirement
of notice to both parents: The minor must be permitted to go
directly to court without consulting the parent who she believes will be hostile. If she convinces the court that seeking
the approval of that parent probably would result in the
denial of consent and the obstruction of subsequent access to
the court, then she is e11titled to establish, without notice to
that parent. either that she is mature enough to make her
decision independently or that the abortion would be in her
best interest in any event. 32
32
lf the onr [Jarent who~r ron. ent has bren sought is 811Jlportivr of the
minor's right to seek review, the reviewing body may be assisted considerably in its difficult factual drterminat.ions. If that parent approves of
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(3)

Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered :
"[W] e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." Id., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 24, supra. But we are concerned here
with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.
See pp. - - - . supra. A State choosing to impose parental
consent also must provide an effective method of judicial review when that consent is denied. If the minor satisfies a
the minor's decision, that cons~nt of course will weigh heavily in favo·r of
judicial approval of the abortion .
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judge that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully
informed decision, she becomes entitled to make her abortion
decision independently.a 3 We therefore agree with the District Court that § 128 cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been
determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the
implications of the choice she has made.

IV
The District Court concluded that, in addition to the substantive infirmities it identified in § 128, the statute also
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, apparently because it excepts minors seeking
abortions from the operation of Massachusetts' common-law
mature minor rule. See p. 9, and n. 28, supra. Appellees
and intervenors argue that virtually every difference under
Massachusetts law between the treatment of abortions and
that of other medical procedures to be performed upon minors
also violates the Equal Protection Clause.:u
For the reasons stated in Part III, supra, we have concluded
that Massachusetts cannot constitutionally permit a judge to
veto the abortion decision of a minor and her physician when
the minor has been found to be mature and fully competent
to act independently in this respect. In light of that conclusion, we need not decide whether such a veto also would violate the Equal Protection Clause. The remaining procedural
83 This rule applies not only wh£>n parental consent has been sought and
denied but also to the exceptional cases described in Parts III-B (1) and
(2), supra, in which the minor is entitled to proceed in court without notice
to one or both parents. In such cases, a judicial finding of maturity
means that the abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age of
the minor.
aJ Under Ma:-;~ . Gen. Law~ An11 ., ch . 112, § 12F, minors falling into any
of six categories, such as those who are or have been married and those
serving in the armed forces, may consent to most kinds of medical and
dental care. Only minors who are married, widowed, or divorced, . however, may consent independently to abortion or sterilization.
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requirements imposed on these mature minors, but not on
adults-parental consultation in most cases and judicial review-are amply justified by the State's substantial interest in
having minors' abortion decisions resolved within the family
whenever possible and preventing improvident abortions by
those not fully qualified to act on their own.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded that treating minors desiring
abortions differently from those seeking other forms of medical
treatment offends the Equal Protection Clause. As we noted
when this case was before us in 1976, "not all distinction
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden." Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. 8., at 149. This is especially true where
minors are involved. The statutory and common-law rules
at issue are designed to determine when minors in various circumstances should be permitted to give independent consent to
different kinds of medical care. We see no reason to subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny Massachusetts' decision to
allow such consent less readily with respect to abortion than
to other medical treatment. "The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements are not imposed for other
medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
termination of a potential human life." Maher v. Roe, 432
u.s. 464, 480 (1977).
Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 128 falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits
judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires a minor to seek the consent of one or both parents,
even if she can satisfy the superior court that as a result consent probably would be denied and access to judicial review
of that denial effectively blocked. 3 G
8 5 Section 1'28 evidently applies to all nonemergency abortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
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As § 128 does not comport in these respects with constitutional standards, it remains to be decided whether the statute
must be invalidated as a whole, or whether only its unconstitutional applications need be enjoined. This question requires analysis of the principles governing the severability of
statutes. 36
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recogmzed, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimest.cr. See Baird III, supra, at 1001 ; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U. S. 113, 164-165 (1973) .
The propriety of parental involV'Cment in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the limits we have
specified on the extent to which a State may defer to parents are adequate
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests
of a minor in the abortion decision. Access to review of a denial of
parental consent, which must accompany the State's decision to require
such consent, and the best-mterests standard applicable to judicial review assure that no minor need be denied an abortion found to be in her
best interests that could not otherwise be prohibited by the State under
Roe v. Wade, supra. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during thP later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
36 The MassachusPtts Suprrme Judicial Court recognizpd I hat its construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some rpspects. See Attorney GeneraL, supra, at 292.
It apparently proposed a ra.ther novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that we have impermissibly
assigned a great-er role to the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretation." Ibid.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 12S differently than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney v. WilbU1·, 421 U. S. 684, 691

.._
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Severance problems typically require deciding whether
striking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
proper when upholding the law in other applications will be
consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect
of the law. "[W]e need not find the language of [a sta.t uteJ
constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular
case.]" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971).
It is only under this latter form of severance that § 12S could
remain enforceable in part.
Although we would have serious doubts about the propriety
of severing § 12S as a matter of federal law, it is essentia.I
to bear in mind that we deal here with state legislation. As is
true of state-court constructions of state law generally, see·
n. 36, supra, the decisions of such courts "as to the severability
of a provision [of state law J is conciusive upon this Court."'
Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 ( 1924). "What they
say the statutes of that State mean we must accept them to
mean whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their
language or by separating their provisions into valid and
invalid parts." H' aters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28,
43 (1900).
n . 11 (1975), the federal courts are bound by the construction of a state
statute by the highest court of that State. E. g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist . No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ . Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976) ; Mullane'Y
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsk'Y v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952) . We
therefore nre obligated to read § 12S as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional inf.inni,tfes. discus f'd in Part Til, S'IJIPI'a..
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In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not asked
to rule on the severability of § 12S, as it was then unclear
to what extent, if any, the statute would be declared unconstitutional.37 We therefore are not precluded from reaching the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, supra, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave this important question of state law to the tribunal best suited to decide
it. See ibid. · The certification procedure already successfully
employed in this case provides a practicable method for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule
3:21 (1978),"s the following question is certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "In light of the
Court's conclusions in this opinion concerning the constitutionality of § 12S, may this statute be severed so that it remain~
enforceable in part as a matter of Massachusetts law?"

So ordered

37 Thn1 rourt ha s made it clcnr in it:> prior dcriHion s, however, that it is
willing to se ver ~Stntutes found to he invalid a~S applied to ~orne persons·
or faetunl :;ptlings. See Del Duca v. 'l'own Administrator, a6g MaHIS. 1,
13- 14, a29 N. (~. 2cl 748, 756 (1975); Thurman v. Chicago. Milwaukee &
St. Paul R ., 254 Mass. 569, 151 N'. E. 6:~ (1926); W . & J . Sloane v. Commonwealth, 25:3 Ma~s. 529, 534, 149 . E. 407, 409 (1925).
us Rule a:21' § 3 (2)' rallH for "a sta tcmC'nt of all fartH relevant to the
questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
t he questions aro e." We believe this opinion, particularly Part I, supra,
satisfie this requirement.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL's proposed opinion for the Court.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976).
I

A
On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1 The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents ·[to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refu~ such con~nt, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall pre~
scribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
were made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout this
opinion.
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C.§ 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 8 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them!
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978).5
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro8 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category rof
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.

78-329 & 78-330-0PINION
BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

vide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stubble.
field, M. D., (intervenors) " appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
'[of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." ·Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp., at 999.
Defendants in the suit. appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued!
an opinion invalidating § 12S. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 . F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird !). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of [these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." Id., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." Id., at 855-856. The court
6 In 1978, the District Court pennitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
1 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
N oe. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively . as
· appellants.
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, . . .
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." Id., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 12S,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor.8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
~ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutionaf challenge to the·
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (Be[[otti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District
Court, concluding that it shouid have abstained and certified
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate
questions concerning the meaning of § 128, pursuant to existing procedure in that State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup·~
Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
8 One member of the three-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 12S was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows :
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
·child's best interests'?
"b); If the parent is n<lt limited. to considering exclusively the min01:'8:

;.
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opmiOn styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d ' 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 128, as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court. are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their da.ughter'e
best interests, can the parent take into consideration the 'long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standard or standards is t.he superior court to apply?
"a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that .Are
not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
"b) If the superior court finds that the minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have
an abortion, may the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachusetts law permit a minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informed consent,' 'to obtain
[a court] order without parental consultation'?
"4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirma.tive, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 128] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to giv.e consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 128]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith , though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which,.
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292-293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
/d., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "a.n
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 /d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. /d., at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
10

Section 128 itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any ·
parent -rho "has died or has deserted his or her family ." ·
·

..
:

78-329 & 78-330-0PINION

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD
State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. Id., at 294. Seen. 28, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." Id., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors--those incapable of giving informed consent-even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed ...." I d., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. Id., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due procees
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." Id., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the statute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, pa.rents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repa.ir."
Id., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 36, infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, decla.ring § 12S unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement. 11 Appellants sought
11 The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: the best-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in t he Supreme Judicial Court 's opinion,
he argued, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read t.he evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents .about
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted prob.
able jurisdiction. - U . S . - (1978) .

II
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." 12 This observation, of course,
is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural," Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensia desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 12S proceeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best interests. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 12S could be severed
under established principles, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unneoessarily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at 1000--1020.
12 Similarly, the Court said in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976) :
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, a.re protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights;"
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tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying the qualification by the state of minors' constitutional rights: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and th'e
importance of the parental role in child-rearing.

A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof be.:.
yond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty
interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult
after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had
violated a criminal statute). Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U. S. 565 (1975), the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistin-
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guishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this sepal'ate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
"conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administrative hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
"concern, ... sympathy, and . .. paternal attention." Id., at
550 (plurality opinion).
B
Second, the Court has held that the States may qualify children's constitutional rights when exercise of those rights
involves the making of important, affirmative choices with
potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been
grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them.18
As MR. JusTICE S'rEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "secur[e] .. . the liberty of each man to
decide for him;elf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result):
"at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
18
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Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. Id., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children rea.ches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944).u The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature ra.tionally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law viola.ted the constitutional
rights of minors.15
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults." /d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted).
H In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a sta.te child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under the statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 165, permitted
the State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncededly ... would be invalid,"
ia., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
u Although the State has considerable latitude in enacting laws affecting·
minors on the bas.is of their lesser capacity for mature, affirmative choice.
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Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in. important decisions by minors. 16
But an additional and more important justifica.tion for state
deference to pa.rental control over children is that "[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 ( 1925). "The
duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." WisconTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S.
503 ( 1969), illusrates that it may not arbitrarily deprive them of their
constitutional rights altogether. The Court held in Tinker that a school
child's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a siLent protest
against American involvement in the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by the Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence in the record that their
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever--even nondisruptive discussion~n important political and
moral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 510.
16 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must. b9!
mad() through parent or guardian) .
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sin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 (1972). This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Ma.ssachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added) .
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 17
17

See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some

;
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Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discha.rge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.18

III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 12S
Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional
right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to termina.t e her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973),
with the special interests of both the State and parents in
assuring the responsible exercise of this right by a minor. As
noted above, § 12S was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132
(1976), where we remanded the case for interpretation of its
provision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
We had previously held in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize
an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. !d., at 74. In Bellotti I, supra, we
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Ginberg-al! have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of Mn. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) . As§ 12S is supportive of the interests of parents in their daughter's abortion decision, we have no occasion to consider here whether the
Constitution places any limits on the State's authority to restrict .a par' ent's involvement in that decision.

.·
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recognized that § 12S could be read as "fundamentally different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto,' " id., at 145,
thus "avoid[ing] or substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute." Id., at 148. The question before us-in light of what we have said in the prior
cases-is whether § 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to
seek an abortion. See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts § 12 (S) does
unduly burden this right. They argue, for example, that the
mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.
As stated in Part II above, however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make important decisions. The
inability of immature minors to make a fully informed choice
that takes account of both immediate and long-range consequences generally makes parental consultation desirable and
in the best interest of the minor. 19 As a general proposition,
such consultation seems particularly desirable with respect to
the abortion decision-one that raises profound moral, ethical,
and religious concerns. 20 As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote in
concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
91 :
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitution any permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize[ d) that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
20 The expert testimony at the hearings in the D1strict Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I, 393 F . Supp., at 853.
19

....
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parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 21
But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to
seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in important
ways from other decisions that may be made during minority.
We conclude that these differences require special limits on
the extent to which the State may restrict a minor's exercise
of her right to seek an abortion.
A
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
21

MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion in Danforth under~cored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortion decisions by describing the procedures followed at the clinic operated by the Parents Aid
Society and Dr. Gerald Zupnick :
"The counseling . . . occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The
physician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques , , , ,
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Baird, id., at 132.
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majority is required simply to postpone her deci~ion. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. 22
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
To be sure, the best choice for a pregnant minor may not
be to abort. Marriage to the father of the child, arranging
for the adoption of the baby, or even assuming alone the responsibilities of motherhood might well be in her best longrange interests. Parents or others might continue to furnish
needed economic support and mature guidance, even though
the young mother has become legally an adult in some respects. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that cannot
be postponed, or it will be made by default with fa.r-reaching
consequences.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, supra, at "the State may not impose a blanket
22

In Massachusetts, for example, although parenthood alone does not
remove a minor from the reach of § 128, it does confer adult legal status
in other respects, such as the right to consent to medical care for the
minor's own child and to other kinds of medical care for the minor herself,
See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F (West ) ; n. 34, infra

..,.
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provision
. requiring the consent of a parent or person in
loco p,arentis as a condition for abortion 'of an unmarried
minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as
stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a minor, the
uuiq ue 11ature and consequences of the abortion decision make
it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnaucy, regardless of the
reason for withholding consent." Ibid. If the State decides
to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents'
consent to an abortion, it also must provide a procedure
whereby a denial of parental consent may be reviewed and
possibly reversed.
We conclude that approval of a minor's abortion in such a
review proceeding must be given upon a judicial finding 23 of
either of two facts: (I) that the minor is mature enough and
well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents'
wishes; 24 or (2) that even if she is not able to make this deci23

As § 12S provides for involvement of the state superior court in
minors' abortion decisions, we discuss the constitutional issues raised in
these cases in terms of judicial review. We do not suggest, however,
that a State choosing to require parental consent could not a8sign the task
of reviewing denials of that consent to a juvenile court or an administrative
agency or officer. Indeed, much can be said for employing procedures
and a forum less formal than those associated with a court of general
jurisdiction.
24 The nature of both the State's interest in fostering parential authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may resort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as age limits, marital status, or membership in the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal disabilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, maturity, but the faet, that a minor may be
very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of the abortion de-
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sion independently, the desired abortion would be in her best
interests. The proceeding in which these facts are determined must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any
appeals that may follow, will be completed with sufficient
expedition and anonymity to provide an effective opportunity
for an abortion to be obtained if parental consent is withheld
improperly. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the
withholding of parental consent does not in fact amount to
the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found
impermissible in Danforth. !d., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 128 must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 128 proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." 25 Attorney General,
cision may require the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the
maturity of minors.
25 The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 12S imposed this standard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. See pp. 6-7,' supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." ld., at
293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is permissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
though § 12S was construed by the highest state court to impose this
restriction, the statute is flawed because the restriction is not apparent on
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360 N. E. 2d, at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a f§ 128] proceedings
may be expected. ... The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W]e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court· judge
may also be achieved." ld., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either -the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the SuprE>.me Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. Ibid. 26
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or immature-to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible
reasons. See Baird Ill, 450 F. Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this assertion. As a general ntle, the interpretation
of a state statute by the State's highest court "is as though written into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953),
and we are obliged to view the restriction on the parental consent requirement "as if [§ 12S] has been so amended by the [Massachusetts] legislature." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,514 (1948).
26 Intervenors take issue with the Supreme Judicial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 128-and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effectr-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T]he
consent required by [§ 12S must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has deserted his or her family." 27 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion. 28 /d., at 297.
27 The statute also provides that " [i]f both parents have died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
28 This reading of the statute requires parental consultation and consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145 ; Attorney General, sup1'a, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule tl1at would
apply in the absence of § 12S: "The mature minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of intemded medical treatmen1 and where the minor is capable of giving U...

...
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We think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortion. As the District Court recognized,
11
there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go to court." B aird III, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be -so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in superior court provides a effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
We conclude, therefore, that under the statutory scheme
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be ermitted to o
directly to the court without first notifying her parents.
She must be given eek review of that denial would be obstructed by her parents.
an ~pportuni ~y to If the court is not persuaded by the minor, it may require
sat~sfy the Judge that the parents be consulted. 29 If, on the other hand, the
that
consent ld b court IS
· sat·ISfi ed th at m
· f ormmg
· .th e paren t s pro b a.bl y wou ld
b bl
a~~i:d y a~~u that e have the effect of foreclosing the minor's opportunity for
subseq~ent
timely judicial review of a denial of parental consent, the
attempts to
minor then is entitled to make her case on the merits-to
establish either that she is mature enough to reach her abortion decision independently, or that the abortion is in her best
. interests in any event.
We recognize the challenge facing a superior court judge
formed consent to that treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwealth.'' Id., at 296. The Supreme Judicial Court held that
the common-law mature mmor rule was inapplicable w abortions because
it had been legislatively superseded by § 128.
29 Of course, if the minor con~ults with her parents, either voluntarily
or as directed by the court, and they withhold consent, she is free to seek
reveiw in the court immediately.

~
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asked to determine, in the absence of the parents, whether
they are likely to refuse consent and obstruct their daughter's
access to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or judgM
ing what decision is in her best interests also would be facilitated, in many cases, by the testimony of the parents. In
spite of these difficulties, we are convinced that, absent the
opportunity to go directly to the superior court prior to seeking parental consent, 80 a substantial number of pregnant
minors would be prevented from having a realistic opportunity
to do so later. Massachusetts may choose to require that preguant minors desiring abortions seek the consent of their parents, who normally will act in the best interest of their
children. But the State must provide an adequate safeguard
against the genuine risk that consultation with some parents
will result in foreclosing the minor's opportunity to obtain
judicial review of the denial of parental consent.81
so This is not to say that the judge's determination must be made ex
parte. As long as the procedure does not become unduly burdensome,
the State itself, through a designated official, may choose to be the defendant in such a proceeding. This, apparently, was contemplated by
the Supreme Judicial Court as the correct procedure in Massachusetts,
should it be held that the requirement of parental notice was unconstitutional in some cases. See Attorney General, supra, at 298. Moreover,
subject to preservation of the necessary speed, informality and confiden·
tiality of judicial consent proceedings, our decision imposes no special
restrictions on the sources, other than the parents themselves, to which
the court may turn for evidence.
:n The District Court believed that parental notification should be dispensed with whenever it was in the "best interests" of the minor to do
so. See Baird III, supra, at 1001. While the best-interests standard is
applicable in determining the underlying issue of whether the abortion is
proper, it tends to obscure the State's important interest in encouraging
a family , rather than a judicial, resolutiOn of the minor's abortion decision.
As loug as the mmor's constitutional right to seek the abortion itself i~; not
unduly burdened, we are hesitant to mterfere with the State's efforts to
involve parents in this important matter.
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(2)

Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be ucustom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird Ill, supra, at
1004n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. Both fathers and
mothers have an interest in helping to determine what course is
best for their daughters, and the State is entitled to support
the involvemeut of both parents, even though doing so may
increase marginally the chance of denial of consent. As we
have said, the fact that parental disapproval may occur is not
itself a reason for dispensing with an otherwise valid consent
requirement.
This general rule, however, must be subject to the same
qualification outlined above with respect to the requirement
of notice to both parents: The minor must be permitted to go
directly to court without consulting the parent who she believes will be hostile. If she couvinces the court that seeking
the approval of that parent probably would result in the
denial of consent and the obstruction of subsequent access to
the court, then she is elltitled to establish, without notice to
that parent, either that she is mature enough to make her
decision independently or that the abortion would be in her
best interest in any event. 32
32

If the one parent who:o;r ronRent has bren sought is supportivE> of the
minor's right to seek review, the reviewing body may be assisted considerably in its difficult factual detrrminations. If that parent approves of
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Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered :
" [W]e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." /d., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 24, supra. But we are concerned here
with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.
See pp. - - - , supra. A State choosing to impose parental
consent also must provide an effective method of judicial review when that consent is denied. If the minor satisfies a
the minor's decision, that consent of course will weigh heavily in favor \of
judicial approval of the abortion.
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judge that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully
informed decision, she becomes entitled to make her abortion
decision independently.a 3 We therefore agree with the District Court that § 128 cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been
determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the
implications of the choice she has made.

IV
The District Court concluded that, in addition to the substantive infirmities it identified in § 128, the statute also
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, apparently because it excepts minors seeking
abortions from the operation of Massachusetts' common-law
mature minor rule. See p. 9, and n. 28, supra. Appellees
and intervenors argue that virtually every difference under
Massachusetts law between the treatment of abortions and
that of other medical procedures to be performed upon minors
also violates the Equal Protection Clause. 34
For the reasons stated in Part III, supra, we have concluded
that Massachusetts cannot constitutionally permit a judge to
veto the abortion decision of a minor and her physician when
the minor has been found to be mature and fully competent
to act independently in this respect. In light of that conclusion, we need not decide whether such a veto also would violate the Equal Protection Clause. The remaining procedural
This rule applies not only when parental consent has been sought and
denied but also to the exceptional cases described in Parts III-B ( 1) and
(2), supra, in which the minor is entitled to proceed in court without notice
to one or both parents. In such cases, a judicial finding of maturity
means that the abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age of
the minor.
34 Under Mass . Gen. Law~ Ann., ch. 112, § 12F, minors falling into any
of six categories, such as those who are or have been married and those
serving in the armed forces, may consent to most kinds of medical and
dental care. Only minors who are married, widowed, or divorced, . however, may consent independently to abortion or sterilization.
83
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:requirements imposed on these mature minors, but not on
adults-parental consultation in most cases and judicial review-are amply justified by the State's substantial interest in
having minors' abortion decisions resolved within the family
whenever possible and preventing improvident abortions by
those not fully qualified to act on their own.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded that treating minors desiring
abortions differently from those seeking other forms of medical
treatment offends the Equal Protection Clause. As we noted
when this case was before us in 1976, "not all distinction
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden." Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S., at 149. This is especially true where
minors are involved. The statutory and common-law rules
at issue are designed to determine when minors in various circumstances should be permitted to give independent consent to
different kinds of medical care. We see no reason to subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny Massachusetts' decision to
allow such consent less readily with respect to abortion than
to other medical treatment. "The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements are not imposed for other
medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
termination of a potential human life." Maher v. Roe, 432
u.s. 464, 480 (1977).

v

Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits
judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires a minor to seek the consent of one or both parents,
even if she can satisfy the superior court tha.t as a result consent probably would be denied and access to judicial review
of that denial effectively blocked.3 "
35
Section 1'28 evidently applies to all nonemergency n.bortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
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As § 128 does not comport in these respects with constitutional standards, it remains to be decided whether the statute
must be invalidated as a whole, or whether only its unconstitutional applications need be enjoined. This question requires analysis of the principles governing the severability of
statutes. 36
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410 u. s. 113, 164-165 (1973) .
The propriety of parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the limits we have
specified on the extent to which a State may defer to parents are adequate
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests
of a minor in the abortion decision. Access to review of a denial of
parental consent, which must accompany the State's decision to require
such consent, and the best-interests standard applicable to judicial review assure that no minor need be denied an abortion found to be in her
best interests that could not otherwise be prohibited by the State under
Roe v. Wade, supra. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them .
ao The Massachu~etts Suprl:'me Judicial Cour1 recognized tlmt its construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney G-eneral, sup1·a, at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that we have impermissibly
assigned a greater role to the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretation." Ibid.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 12S differently tha11 was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 69l
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Severance problems typically require deciding whether
striking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
proper when upholding the law in other applications will be
consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect
of the law. 11 [W] e need not find the language of [a statute J
constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular
case.]" Griffin v. Breckenr·idge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971).
It is only under this latter form of severance that § 12S could
remain enforceable in part.
Although we would have serious doubts about the propriety
of severing § 12S as a matter of federal law, it is essentia.I
to bear in mind that we deal here with state legislation. As is
true of state-court constructions of state law generally, see·
n. 36. supra, the decisions of such courts "as to the severability
of a provision [of state law J is conclusive upon this Court.".
.Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 (1924). "What they
say the statutes of that State mean we must accept them to
mean whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their·
language or by separating their provisions into valid and
invalid parts." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28,
43 (1900).
n. 11 ( 1975), the federal courts are bound by the construction of a state
statute by the highest court of that State. E. g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ . Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976); Mullaney
v. Wilbw·, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas CathedraL, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952). We
therefore are obliga.ted to read § 12S as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional infirmities discUBSed in Part III, supra..
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In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not fl,6ked
to rule on the severability of § 12S, as it was then unclear
to what extent, if any, the statute would be declared unconstitutional.87 We therefore are not precluded from reaching the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, supra, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave this important question of state law to the tribunal best suited to decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure already successfully
employed in this case provides a practicable method for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule
3:21 (1978), 38 the following question is certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "In light of the
Court's conclusions in this opinion concerning the constitution~
ality of § 12S, may this statute be severed so that it remains
·enforceable in part as a matter of Massachusetts law?"

So ordered

87 That court has made it clear in its prior decisions, however, that it il:l'
willing to Sf'ver ~Statutes found to be invalid as applied to some persons
or factual settings. See Del Duca v. Town Administrator, 368 Mal:ls. 1,
13-14, 329 N. E. 2d 74 , 756 (1975); Thurman v. Chicago, Milwaukee &
St . Paul R., 254 Mass. 569, 151 N. E. 68 (1926); W. & J. Sloane v. Commonwealth, 253 Mass. 529, 534, 149 N. E. 407, 409 (1925).
88
Rule 3:21, §3 (2), ralls for "a statement of all facts rf'levant to the·
questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
the questions arose." We believe this opinion, particularly Part I, suprall
satisfies this requirement.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL's proposed opinion for the Court.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). ·
I

A
On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
1

/&
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I{
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann ., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminat ed. No changes of substance
wE're made. We shall refer to t he section as § 128 throughout this
opinion.
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 8 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978).5
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro8 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category ,of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolescents. and Phillip Stubble~
field, M. D .. (intervenors) o appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the plain tiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
·[of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp., at 999.
Defendants in the suit. appella.nts here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7
Following three days of testimony. the District Court issued~
an opinion invalidating § 12S. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird I). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of [these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." I d., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." Id., at 855-856. The court
6 In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
7 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively .as
appellants.
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, . . .
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." Id., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 12S,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor. 8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
§ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the·
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 ( 1976) (Be[lotti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District
Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate
questions concerning the meaning of § 128, pursuant to existing procedure in that State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup·..
Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
8 One member of the thl1ee-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 128 was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows:
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
"b1 If the parent. is M.t limited to considering exclusively the roin01:'S:
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opmwn styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d · 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of ~ 128, as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial C'ourt. arP the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter'e
best interests, ran tlw parent take into con&id<:'ra.tion the 'long-term
consequenres to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standard or st.:mdardi" i~ the superior court. to apply?
"a) Is the superior rourt to disregard all parental objec-tion~ that are
not based exclnsivrly on what would r;rrvr the minor's b('St interests?
"b) If t.hr snp<.'rior ronrt finds that. the minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhcrl'd to, nn informed nne! reasonable dl'rision to have
an abortion, may tlw court. rcfuse its consent. basro on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Dol'B t.he Ma::;sachnf'l'tts law permit. a minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'inrapabll' of giving informed consent,' 'to obta.in
[a court] order without parcntal consnltat.ion'?
"4. If the court answers any of qurstion 3 in the a:ffirmative, may the
superior eourt, for good cause shown, rnter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), wit.hont. prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
impleml'nt c. 112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phascs of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and prQocedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consrnt, that he reasonably,
and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which,
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292-293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
/d., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 /d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. /d. , at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
10

Section 12S itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any .
who "has died or has deserted his or her family ." ·

p~rent
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. I d., at 294. See n. 28, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court.
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings. the
District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird Ill). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
un con sti tu tional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." Id., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent-even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .... " Id., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. Id., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." ld., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the sta.tute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in ".i udicial repair."
Id., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 36. infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, decla.ring § 128 unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement.n Appellants sought
The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: the best-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion,
he argued, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read the evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
11
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review in this Court a second tinw. and we again noted prob.
able jurisdiction. - U . S . - (1978).

II
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 ( 1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." 12 This observation, of course,
is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural,'' Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensia desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 128 prooeeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidenr,e as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best interests. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 128 could be severed
under established principl•es, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be io interfere unnroessarily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at 1006-1020.
12
Similarly, t.he Court said in Planned Parenthood of Centml Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) :
"Constitutional rights do not mature and rome into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adtllts, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
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tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying the qualification by the state of minors' constitutional rights: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child-rearing.

A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 ( 1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. and they may assert the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 ( 1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham, v.
Wright, 430 F. 8. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty
interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult
after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had
violated a criminal statute). Similarly. in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975). the Court held that children may not be deprived of CC'rtain property interC'sts without due process.
These rulings have not been made 011 the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are i:ndistin-
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guishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
"conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administrative hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
"concern, ... sympathy, and .. . paternal attention." I d., at
•~
550 (plurality opinion).
B
~,v<;>f ~ ~

-{&

Second, the Court has held that the States6' £iM-ali""'children's constitutional rights when~E»~Qrl:iil@ Qf tlte1~ tighbe
j.mrp. the making of importa11t, ·affirmative choices with
potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been
grounded in the recognition that. during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them. 13
13

As MR. JusTICE S·rEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "sccur["e] . .. the liberty of each man to
decide for him>elf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result):
"at least in some preci~ ely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
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Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children rea.ches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors.1 5
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally int.olerable for adults." /d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted).
14 In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a sta.te child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under the statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 165, permitted
the State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncededly . .. would be invalid,"
irl., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State hal:' con ·idPrable latitude in enacting laws affecting·
minor~ on tlw ha~i~ of t hrir le;,;ser raparity for maturE>, affirmative ehoice,
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c
Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16
But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that " [ t] he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty. to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 l!. S. 510, 535 (1925). "The
duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." WisconTinker v. Des Moines IndeJJendent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969), illusrates that it may not arbitrarily deprive them of their
OQI'IStitHtiGRRI rigl~ltogether. The Court held in Tinker that a school
chilct:s-First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
- school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a silent protest
against American involvement in the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
~
-~._-~ shielded by the Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
~ (.. ~,(("' substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
\ ,, /
uhpheld the First Abmendm~ntf righdt of t~ed scho~lchhildren ind thhat chas?,
owever, not on 1y ecause It oun no ev1 ence m t e recor t at t e1r
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever--even nondisruptive discussions-on important political and
moral issues. Ser Tinker, supra, at 510.
16 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental conRent required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann ., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must be
made through parent or guardian) .

J '
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sin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 (1972). This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding. and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added).
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 17
17

See Hafen, Children's Ltberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
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Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.18

III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In ~ 12S
MassachusE'tts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional
right of a woman, in consultation with hE'r physician, to terminatE' hE'r pregna11cy as E'Stablislwd by Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 ( 1973),
with the special interests of both the State and parents in
assuring the responsiblE' exercise of this right by a minor. As
noted above. § 12S was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132
( 1976). wherE' we remanded the case for interpretation of its
provision by thE' Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
We had previously held in Pla:nned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U. S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize
an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. !d., at 74. In Bellotti I, supra, we
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Ginberg-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1928). As § 12S i:; ~upportivr of the intereHt~ of parent::; in thrir daughter's abortion decision, wr havr no occasion to con~ider hrre whether the
Con::;titution places any limits on the State's authority to re::;trict a parent'~ involvement in that de<'i:;ion.
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recognized that ~ 12S could be read as "fundan1entally different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto,' '' id., at 145,
thus "avoid[ing] or substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute." ld., at 148. The question before us-in light of what we have said in the prior
cases-is whether ~ 128, as authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to
seek an abortion. See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts~ 12 (S) does
unduly burden this right. They argue, for example, that the
mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.
As stated in Part II above, however, parental notice and co
sent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by e
S~or's right to make important decision . .The
i1 · ·
iminatil're · 1
a e a ful y m orme cHoice
that takes account of both immediate and long-range consequences generally makes parental consultatio.n_desirable and
in the best interest of the minor. 19 ~a general proposition,
,such consultatio~ particularly desirable with respect to
the abortiou decision-one that raises profound moral, ethical,
a1 d re · ~s concerns~. JusTICE STEWART wrote in
concurrence in Pl:cLnned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
91 :
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
19 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize[d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
20
The rxpert te~timony at thr !waring~ in the D1~trict Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I , 393 F . Supp., at 853.
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parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 21
But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to
seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in important
ways from other decisions that may be made during minority.
We conclude that these differences require special limits on
the extent to which the State may restrict a minor's exercise
of her right to seek an abortion.
A

The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
21

MR. Ju:::>TICE 8'l'EWAHT's concurring opinion in Danforth under~cored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortion decisions by describing the procedurrs followed at the clinic operated by the Parents Aid
Society and Dr. Gerald Zupnick :
"The counseling . . . occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The
physician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques . . . .
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, . . . may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
11, 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Baird, id., at 132.
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majority is required simply to postpone her d.eci~ion. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. 22
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
To be sure, the best choice for a pregnant minor may not
be to abort. Marriage to the father of the child, arranging
for the adoption of the baby, or even assuming alone the responsibilities of motherhood might well be in her best longrange interests. Parents or others might continue to furnish
needed economic support and mature guidance, even though
the young mother has become legally an adult in some respects. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that cannot
be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching
consequences.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, supra, at "the State may not impose a blanket
22
In Massachusetts, for example, although parenthood alone does not
remove a minor from the reach of § 128, it does confer adult legal status
in other respects, such as the right to consent to medical care for the
minor's own child and to other kinds of medical care for the minor herself.
See Ma~:; . Gen. Laws Ann ., ch. 112, § 12F (West); n . 34, infra
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provisiOn
. requiring tlw consent of a parent or person in
loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried
minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as
stated in Part II, S'Upra, ::mch deference to parents may be permissible \Vith respect to other choices facing a minor, the
unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision make
it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute. and possibly arbitrary. veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate thr patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding consent." Ibid. If the State decides
to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents'
consent to an abortion. it also must provide a procedure
whereby a denial of parental consent may be reviewed and
possibly reversed.
We conclude that approval of a minor's abortion in such a
review proceeding must be given upon a judicial finding 23 of
either of two facts: (I) that the minor is mature enough and
well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents'
wishes; 2 ·' or (2) that even if she is not able to make this deciAs § 128 provides for involvement of the state superior court in
minors' abortion decisions, we discuss the constitutional issues raised in
the::;o cases in terms of judicial revirw. Wr do not ~ uggrst, howrver,
that n State choosing to rrquirr parrntal consrnt could not astngn the task
of revirwing drnia!H of that consent to a Juvrnik court or an administrative
agrucy or offierr. Indred, much can be ~aid for employing procedure~
nnd a forum lr;;s formnl than tho:;e associ a ted with a court of grneral
jurisdiction.
24 The nature of bot.h the State's intRrest in fostering parential authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may rrFort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, critrria such
as age limits, marital statur::, or member::;hip in the lLrmed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal disabilitie:> of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alon<:> determine, maturity, but. the faet that a minor may be
very much an adult. in some respects doe~> not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of the abortion de23
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sion independently, the desired abortion would be in her best
interests. The proceeding in which these facts are determined must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any
appeals that may follow. will be completed with sufficient
expedition and anonymity to provide an effective opportunity
for an abortion to be obtained if parental consent is withheld
improperly. In sum, thr procedure must ensure that the
withholding of parental consent does not in fact amount to
the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found
impermissible in Danforth. /d., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 128 must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State. the statute satisfies some of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 128 proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." ~ Attorney General,
2

cision may require the opportunity for cal:le-by-case evaluations of the
maturity of minors.
25 The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 12S imposed t.his st.andard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. Sel:' pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judgl:' should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." Id., at

293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parent.al involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is permissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court. that, even
though § 12S was con&trued by the highest state court to impose this
restriction, the st.atute is flawed because the re::;trirtion is not apparent on
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360 N. E. 2d. at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a f§ 12S] proceedings
may be expected. . . . The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken. by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [Wle believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior· Court judge
may also be achieved." Jd., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. lbid. 26
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 128 permits any minors-mature or immature--to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will eneonrage parent;; to withhold eonRrnt for impermissible
reasons. See Baird Ill, 450 F. Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no ba is for this assrrtion. As a genrral rule, the interpretation
of a state statute by the Statr'~ higlwst court. "is as though written into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. Nett• Ilampshire, 345 U.S. a95, 402 (1953),
and we arr obliged to view the restriction on the parental consrnt. rrquirement "as if I§ 12S] has been so amended by the rMassachusetts] legislature." Winters v. New York , 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948).
26 Intervenors take issue with thr Supreme Judicial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, Jack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of Judicial procredings under § 128--and there is
none, since appellers successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effect-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T]he
consent required by [§ 12S must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has deserted his or her family." 27 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion. 28 Id. , at 297.
27 The statute also provides that " [i]f both parents have died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
28 This reading of the statute requires parental consultation and consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absence of § 12S: "The ma.ture minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of inkmded medical treatmen1 and where the minor is capable of giving in-
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W.e think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would impose an undue burden UJ)on the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortioi1: As the Dist_rict Court recognized,
"there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go .to cou_rt." Baird III, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be -so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But
many parents hold strong vie'YS On the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. · It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in suJ)erior court provides a effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
.We conclude, . therefore, that under the statutory scheme
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be ermitted to o ~
directly to the court without first notifying her parents. consulting or
eek review of that denial would be obstructed by her parents.
If the court is not persuaded by the ri1inor, it may require
that the parents be con.sulted. 29 If, on the other hand, the
· satJs
· fi e d t h at m
· f onmng
·
court IS
t 11e parents pro b a bl y wou ld
have the effect of for edosing the minor's opportunity for
· 1y JUOJCJa
· J' • 1 review
·
· o f parenta1 consent, t h e
time
of a d emal
minor then is entitled to make her case on the merits-to
establish either that she is mature enough to reach her abortion decision independently, or that the ·abortion is in her best
interests in any event.
We recognize the challenge facing a superior court judge
formed cono-ent to that treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwpalth." ld., at 296. The Supreme· Judicial Court held that
the common-law mature minor rule was inappli cable to a.bort ions because
it had been legi:>latively supt'rseded by § 128.
21
' Of coursr, if the minor rou,.;u lt s \\'ith her parents, either voluntarily
or a:> directrd by the court, :wd they \Yithhold ronsent, she is free to seek
reveiw in 1he comt imnwdia t ely.
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asked to determine, in the absence of the parents, whether
they are likely to refuse consent and obstruct their daughter's
access to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or judging what decision is in her best interests also would be facilitated, in many cases, by the testimony of the parents. In
spite of these difficulties, we are convinced that, absent the
opportunity to go directly to the superior court prior to seeking parental consent/ 0 a substantial number of pregnant
minors would be prevented from having a realistic opportunity
to do so later. Massachusetts may choose to requirE' that pregnant minors desiring abortions seek the consent of their parents, who normally will act in the best interest of their
children. But thP State must provide an adequate safeguard
against the genuine risk that consultation with some parents
will result in foreclosing the miuor's opportunity to obtain
judicial review of the denial of parental consent.~n
30 This is nol to ~ay that the· judge's detrrmination mu~t br made ex
parte. As long as the procedure does not become unduly burdensome,
the State itself, through a designated official, may choose to be the defendant in such a proceeding. This, apparently, was contemplated by
the Supreme Judicial Court as the correct procedure in Massachusetts,
should it be held that the rrquircment of parental notice was unconstitutional in some cases. See Attorney General, s·upra, at 298. Moreover,
~ubject to pre~ervation of thr nec~::;ary sprrd, informality and confidentiality of judicial consent procerding:S, our drci~ion imposes no special
restriction~ 011 thr ~ourcr:s, othrr than the parent;; thrm:selvrs, to which
thr rourt may turn for evidrnce.
at The District Court brlievrd that parrntal notification should be dispensed with whrnrver it was in the "best interests" of the minor to do
so. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001. While the best-interests standard is
applicable in determining the underlying issue of whether the abortion is
proprr. it trnd~ to obscurr the Stat("~ important intere::;t in rncouraging
a. family. rather than a judicial, rrsolution of the minor'::; abortion decision.
AR long as the minor's con~titutional right to serk the abortion itself is not
unduly burdened, we an• Jw~itant to intrrfrre with the Statr's efforts to
involve parrnts in this important matter.
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(2)

Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothi-ng
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird III, supra, at
1004 n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. Both fathers and
mothers have an interest in helping to determine what course is
best for their daughters. and the State is t=>ntitled to support
the involvement of both parents, even though doing so may
increase marginally the chance of denial of consent. As we
have said, the fact that parental disapproval may occur is not
itself a reason for dispensing with an otherwise valid consent
requirement.
This general rule, however, must be subject to the same
qualification outlined above with respect to the requirement
of 110tice to both parents: The minor must be permitted to go
directly to court without consulting the parent who she believes will be hostile. If she convinces the court that seeking
the approval of that parent probably would result in the
denial of consent and the obstruction of subsequent access to
the court, then she is e11 titled to establish, without notice to
that parent. either that she is mature enough to make her
decision independently or that the abortion would be in her
best interest in any event.a 2
32 If the onr pan,llt who~f' con~ru1 lm~ brrn sought i~ HU)lportivr of the
minor's right to seek review, the reviewing body may be assisted considerably in its difficult factual determinations. If that parent approves of
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(3)

Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own , contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered :
"[W] e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." Id., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 24. supra. But we are concerned here
with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.
See pp.- - - . supra. A State choosing to impose parental
consent also must provide an effective method of judicial review when that consent is denied. If the minor satisfies a
the minor's decision, that consent of course will wrigh heavily in favor 'of
judicial approval of the abortion.
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judge that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully
informed decision, she becomes entitled to make her abortion
decision independently.'13 \:Ve therefore agree with the District Court that § 128 cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been
determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the
implications of the choice she has made.

IV
The District Court concluded that, in addition to the substantive infirmities it identified in § 128, the statute also
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, apparently because it excepts minors seeking
abortions from the operation of Massachusetts' common-law
mature minor rule. See p. 9, and n. 28, supra. Appellees
and intervenors argue that virtually every difference under
Massachusetts law between the treatment of abortions and
that of other medical procedures to be performed upon minors
also violates the Equal Protection Clause.~·~
For the reasons stated in Part III, supra, we have concluded
that Massachusetts cannot constitutionally permit a judge to
veto the abortion decision of a minor and her physician when
the minor has been found to be mature and fully competent
to act independently in this respect. In light of that conclusion, we need not decide whether such a veto also would violate the Equal Protection Clause. The remaining procedural
aa This rule appli<'~ not on!~· whrn parrntal con~ent has been sought and
denied but also to the exceptional cases described in Parts III-B ( 1) and
(2), supra, in which the minor is entitled to prooeed in court without notice
to one or both parents. In such cases, a judicial finding of maturity
means that the abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age of
the minor.
~ t Under Ma~~ . Gen. Law~ Am1., eh. 112 , § 12F, nuuors falling into any
of six categories, such as thosE' who are or have been married and those
serving .in the armed forces, may consf'nt to most kinds of medical and
dental care. Only minors who are married, widowed, or divorced, however, may consent independently to abortion or sterilization.
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requirements imposed on these mature minors, but not on
adults-parental consultatiou in most cases and judicial review-are amply justified by the State's substantial interest in
having minors' abortion decisions resolved within the family
whenever possible and preventing improvident abortions by
those not fully qualified to act on their own.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded that treating minors desiring
abortions differently from those seeking other forms of medical
treatment offends the Equal Protection Clause. As we noted
when this case was before us in 1976, "not all distinction
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden." Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S., at 149. This is especially true where
minors are involved. The statutory and common-law rules
at issue are designed to determine when minors in various circumstances should be permitted to give independent consent to
different kinds of medical care. We see no reason to subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny Massachusetts' decision to
allow such consent less readily with respect to abortion than
to other medical treatment. "The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements are not imposed for other
medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
termination of a potential human life." Maher v. Roe, 432
u.s. 464, 480 (1977).

v

Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits
judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires a minor to seek the consent of one or both parents,
even if she can satisfy the superior court that as a result consent probably would be denied and access to judicial review
of that denial effectively blocked.H"
35
Srction 1'28 rvidently applirs to all nonemergrncy abortions prrformed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
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As ~ 128 does not comport in these respects with constitutional standards. it remains to be decided whether the statute
must be invalidated as a whole. or whether only its unconstitutional applications need be enjoined. This question requires analysis of the principles governing the severability of
statutes. 86
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimest.er. See Baird III, s·upra, at 1001; Baird I, supm, at 853.
This coincides apJ)roximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant womru1's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention . See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164-165 (1973) .
The propriety of parental invohnement in a minor's abort ion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concNns for
the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the limits we have
l:lpecified on the extent to which a State may defer to parents are adequate
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests
of a minor in the abortion derision. Access to review of a denial of
parental consent, which must accompany the State's deci~ion to require
.'UCh consent, and the best-inter<'sts standard applicablP to judicial review assure that no minor need be denied an abortion found to be in her
best interests that could not otherwise be prohibitrd by the State under
Roe v. Wade, supra. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
:w The ::\fassachu~ett~ Supreme Judicial Court n•cognized that its construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney General, supra. at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that we have impermissibly
assigned a great.e r role to the parent!' than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretation." Ib-id.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 128 differently than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney v. Wilb·ur, 421 U. S. 684, 691

a
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Severance problems typically require deciding whether
striking au explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
proper when upholding the law in other applications wiii be
consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect
of the law. "[W]e need not find the language of La sta.t ute]
constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular
case.] " Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971).
It is only under this latter form of severance that § 12S could
remain pnforceable in part.
Although we would have serious doubts about the propriety
of severing ~ 12S as a matter of federal law, it is essential
to bear in mind that we ueal here with state legislation. As is
true of state-court constructions of state law generally, see·
n. 36. supra, the decisions of such courts "as to the severability
of a provision [of state law] is concTusive upon this Court.'''
Dorchy v. Kansas , 264 r. S. 286, 290 ( 1924). "V\.'hat they
say the statutes of that State mean we must accept them to
mean whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their
Iauguagr or by separating their provisions into valid and
invalid parts." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28,
43 (1900).
n . 11 (1975), the federal courts are bound by the const ruction of a sta te
statute by the highest court of t hat State. E. g., Ho1'tonville Joint School
Dist . No.1 v. Ho1'tonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Boa?'d of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954) ; K ed1'ojf v. St. Nicholas Cathedml, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952) . We
therefore arr obligatrd to rrad § 12S a:; interpreted by the Supreme
Jndicial Court, even though doing so results in t he constitutional infirmities. cliscor;sed in Part III, SUI[J1'a...
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In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not asked
to rule on the severability of § 12S, as it was then unclear
to what extent, if any, the statute would be declared unconstitutional.~' \Ye therefore arc not precludt'd from reaching the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, supra, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave this important question of state law to the tribunal best suited to decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure already successfully
employed in this case provides a practicable method for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule
3:21 ( 1978) ,"~ the following question is certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "In light of the
Court's conclusions in this opinion concerning the constitution~
ality of § 12S, may this statute be severed so that it remains
enforceable in part as a matter of Massachusetts law?"
So ordered

37
Thai ronrt ha~ made it rlear in it~ prior dcci,.;ion~, howrvrr, that it i:;
willing to ~t'VE'r ~tatutf'~ found to lw invalid as appliPcl to somE' pPrsons
or faetunl ~ettings. SPP Del Dur-a v. Tmrn Admiuistrator, :~6K Ma~~. 1,
13-14 . 329 N. ~:. 2d HI', 75() (1975) ; Thunnmt " · C'himgo. MiltNw!t·ee &
i:it. Paul R ., 254 .:\lass. 569 , 151 X . E. 6:l (19:26) ; W . & J. ::3/oaue v. Commontcealth. 25:3 :\Ja~~. 5:29, 5:{4, 149 N . E. 407 , 409 (Hl25).
118
Rulp 3:21, §3 (2), call~ for ''a ~t~ltt•mctJt of all fact:,; relPvant to thequestions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
the questions aro ·e." We believe this opinion, particularly Part I, supra»
satisfies this requ:irement.
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL's proposed opinion for the Court.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976) , and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976).

I
A
On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
1

/7-

1/.f
11
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128
(West). 2
Section 128 provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."

Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
were made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout thi&
opinion.

'

.
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94--381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 3 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978).5
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro3 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the conrt's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the cla..."S of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category 'Of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stubble·
field, M. D., (intervenors) " appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
{of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." ·Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp., at 999.
Defendants in the suit. appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued!
an opinion invalidating § 12S. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird I). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of {these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." I d., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." Id., at 855-856. The court
6 In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
7 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively . as
· appellants.
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, ...
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." Id., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 12S,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor.8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
§ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutionaf chailenge to the·
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (Be[[otti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District
Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate
questions concerning the meaning of § 128, pursuant to existing procedure in that State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup·..
Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
8 One member of the three-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 128 was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows:
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
"b); If the parent is n~t limited to considering exclusively the mino:c'S:
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opmwn styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d ' 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of ~ 128, as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court. are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter'e
best interests, ran the parent ta.ke into consideration the 'long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What. standard or standard" is the superior comt to apply?
"a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are
not based exclusively on what would servE' the minor's best interests?
"b) If thE' supprior court finds that t.he minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, an informE'd and reasonable dPCision to have
an abortion, may thE' court, rpfuse its consent based on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachusetts law pPrmit a minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapablE' of giving informed consent,' 'to obtain
[a court] order without parental consultat-ion'?
"4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the a:ffirmative, may the
superior couri;, for good causE' shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribE' a set of procPdures to
implement c. 112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been marriPd?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which,
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292-293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
Id., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 Id., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 128 cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. Id., at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
10

Section 128 itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any .·
p&rent who "has died or has deserted his or her family." ·
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. Id., at 294. Seen. 28, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." Id., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent--even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein , would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .. .. " I d., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. Id., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." !d., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the statute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repa.ir."
Id., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 36, infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement. 11 Appellants sought
11 The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: thf' bf'st-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion,
he argued, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read t.he evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted prob.
a:ble jurisdiction. - U.S. (1978) .

u
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." 12 This observation, of course,
is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural," Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensia desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 12S prooeeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best interests. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 12S could be severed
under established principles, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unnecessa rily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at 1006-1020.
12 Similarly, the Court said in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) :
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
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tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying the qualification by the state of minors' constitutional rights: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child-rearing.

A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651 , 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty
interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult
after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had
violated a criminal statute). Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U. S. 565 (1975), the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are i:ndistin-
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guishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
"conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administrative hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
"concern, ... sympathy, and .. . paternal attention." !d., at
550 (plurality opinion).

B

that~ State/mQ~·

Second, the Court has held
*alit,/chil- 4eS
dren's constitutional rights when exetci~e of those tigh~
.l- , 0 ,-tnvol~s the making of important, affirmative choices with
''MP ~
}
potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been
r~~t...c..h~=- ~lfY\ grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them. 13

t

13

As MR. JusTICE S•rEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "secur[e] . . . the liberty of each man to
decide for him>elf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result):
"at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only

~ tltolcrk /
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Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children rea.ches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors. 15
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults." !d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted) .
14 In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a state child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under the statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 165, permitted
the State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncededly ... would be invalid,"
ia., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State has considerable latitude in enacting laws affecting·
ll'llinors on the ba~is of their lesser capacity for mature, affirmative choice,
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Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16
But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that " [ t] he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). "The
duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." WisconTinker v. Des Moines Independent Communit-y School District, 393 U. S.
503 (1969), illusrates that it may not ar_bitrarily deprive them of their
01. c g - - - l!~itntioinJ rishtiihltogether. The Court held in Tinker that a school
chi d's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a siLent protest
against American involwment in the host.ilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by the Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence in the record that their
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever--even nondisruptive discussions-on important political and
moral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 610.
16 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent reqmred for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (We,st Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must be:
made through parent or guardian) .
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sin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 (1972). This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added) .
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York , supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 17
17

See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
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Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New Y ark, supra, at 639/ 8

III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 12S
Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional
right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113 ( 1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 ( 1973),
with the special interests of both the State and parents in
assuring the responsible exercise of this right by a minor. As
noted above, § 12S was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132
( 1976), where we remanded the case for interpretation of its
provision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
We had previously held in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U. S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize
an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. ld., at 74. In Bellotti I, supra, we
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Ginberg-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebmska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
( 1923) . As § 12S is supportive of the inter!'sts of parents in their daughter's abortion deciRion, we have no occasion to consider here whether the
Con:;titution places any limits on the State's authority to restrict .a parent's involvement in that decision .

~
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recognized that § 12S could be read as "fundamentally different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto,' " id., at 145,
thus "avoid[ing] or substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute." !d., at 148. The question before us-in light of what we have said in the prior
cases-is whether § 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to
seek an abortion. See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts§ 12 (S) does
unduly burden this right. They argue, for example, that the
mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.
As stated in Part II above, however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make important decisions. The
inabilitYof immatureminors to make a fully informed choice
that takes account of both immediate and long-range consequences generally makes parental consultation desirable and
in the best interest of the minor. 19 As a general proposition,
such consultation seems particularly desirable with respect to
the abortion decision-one that raises profound moral..~. ethical,
and r~igious concerns. 20 ] As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote in
concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
91 :
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutiona.Uy permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
19 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize[ d) that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
20
The Pxpert testimony at the hrarmgs in the District Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I, 393 F. Supp., at 853.
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parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 21
But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to
seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in important
ways from other decisions that may be made during minority.
We conclude that these differences require special limits on
the extent to which the State may restrict a minor's exercise
of her right to seek an abortion.

A
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
MH. JusTICE STEWAHT's concurring opinion in Danforth under~cored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortion decisions by describing the procedures followed at the clinic operated by the Parents Aid
Society and Dr. Gerald Zupnick :
"The counseling . . . occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The
physician takos no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques . . . .
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Baird, id., at 132.
21
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majority is required simply to wstpone her decision. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. 22
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
To be sure, the best choice for a pregnant minor may not
be to abort. Marriage to the father of the child, arranging
for the adoption of the baby, or even assuming alone the responsibilities of motherhood might well be in her best longrange interests. Parents or others might continue to furnish
needed economic support and mature guidance, even though
the young mother has become legally an adult in some respects. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that cannot
be postponed, or it will be made by default with fa.r-reaching
consequences.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, supra, at "the State may not impose a blanket
In Massachusetts, for example, although parenthood alone does not
remove a minor from the reach of § 128, it does confer adult legal status
in other respects, such as the right to consent to medical care for the
minor's own child and to other kinds of medical care for the minor herself.
See Ma~s. Gen. Laws Ann ., ch. 112, § 12F (West) ; n . 34, infra
22
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. requiring the consent of a parent or person in
loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried

prov1s10n

minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as
stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other choices fa.cing a minor, the
unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision make
it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding consent.'' Ibid. If the State decides
to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents'
consent to an abortion, it also must provide a procedure
whereby a denial of parental consent may be reviewed and
possibly reversed.
We conclude that approval of a minor's abortion in such a
review proceeding must be given upon a judicial finding 23 of
either of two facts: (1) that the minor is mature enough and
well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents'
wishes; 24 or (2) that even if she is not able to make this deci23 As § 12S provides for involvement of the state superior court in
minors' abortion decisions, we discuss the constitutional issues raised in
these cases in terms of judicial review. We do not suggest, however,
that a State choosing to requirE' parental consent could not a~sign the task
of rcviewmg denials of that consent to a Juvemle court or an administrative
agency or officE'r. Indeed, much can be smd for employing procedures
and a forum le~ formal than those associated with a rourt of general
jurisdiction.
24 The nature of both the State's interest in fostering parential authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may resort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as age limits, marital status, or membership in the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal disabilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, maturity, but the fact that. a minor may be
very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of the abortion de-
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sion independently, the desired abortion would be in her best
interests. The proceeding in which these facts are determined must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any
appeals that may follow, will be completed with sufficient
expedition and anonymity to provide an effective opportunity
for an abortion to be obtained if parental consent is withheld
improperly. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the
withholding of parental consent does not in fact amount to
the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found
impermissible in Danforth . !d., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 128 must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 128 proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." ~ Attorney General,
2

cision may require the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the
maturity of minors.
2
~ The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 12S imposed this standard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. SeP pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." !d., at
293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supportPd parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is pPrmissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
though § 12S was con&trued by the highPst state court to impose this
restriction, the statute is flawed because the restriction is not apparent on

78-329 <' 78-330-0PINION

22

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

360 N. E. 2d. at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a f§ 12S] proceedings
may be expected.... The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken. by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W]e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court· judge
may also be achieved." I d., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. Ibid. 26
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or immature-to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible
reasons. See Baird Ill, 450 F. Supp., at 1004--1005 ; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this asS<'rtion. As a genrral nt!e, the interpretation
of a state statute by the State',; highrst rourt "is as though written into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 895, 402 (1958),
and we are obliged to view lhr rr::;triction on the parental consent. requirement "as if [§ 12S] has bren so amended by the [Massachusetts] legislature." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948) .
26 Intervenors take issue with the Supreme Judicial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 128-and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effect-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T]he
consent required by [§ 12S mustj be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has deserted his or her family." 27 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion. 28 Id., at 297.
27 The statute also provides that " [i]f both parents have died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
28 This reading of the statute requires parental consultation and consent
more strictly than appellants th<:>mselves previously bE'lieved was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145 ; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absence of § 12S: "The ma.ture minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of in·
tended medical treatmeni and where the minor is capable of giving in-
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W.e think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortioil: As the District Court recognized,
{(there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go .to court." Baird III, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believ~ that this would be -so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. ·· But
many parents hold strong vie'YS on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. .. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in superior court provides a effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
_We conclude, _therefore, that under the statutory scheme
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be ermitted to o
directly to the court without first notifying her parents.
eek review of that denial would be obstructed by her parents.
If the court is not persuaded by the rninor, it may require
that the parents be con-sul£ed. 2 v If, on· the other hand, the
· sat1s
· fi ed t1at
1 m
· f ormmg
·
court IS
t h e parents pro b abl y wou ld
have the effect of foreclosing the minor's opportunity for
timely judicial review of a denial of parental consent, the
minor then is entitled to make her case on the merits-to
establish either that she is mature enough to reach her abortion decision independently, or that the -abortion is in her best
interests in any event.
We recognize the challenge facing a superior court judge
formed consent to that treatment, the mature minor 'rule applies in this
Commonwealth." ld., nt 296. The Supreme· Judicial Court held that
the c.ommon-law mature minor rule was inapplicable to abortions because
it had bern legislatively superseded by § 128.
2
~ Of course, if the minor consults with her parents, either voluntarily
or as directrd by the court, and they withhold consent, she is free to seek
reveiw in the court imnwdiately.

~

consulting or
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asked to determine, in the absence of the parents, whether
they are likely to refuse consent and obstruct their daughter's
access to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or judging what decision is in her best interests also would be facilitated, in many cases, by the testimony of the parents. In
spite of these difficulties, we are convinced that, absent the
opportunity to go directly to the superior court prior to seeking parental consent, 30 a substantial number of pregnant
minors would be prevented from having a realistic opportunity
to do so later. Massachusetts may choose to require that pregnant minors desiring abortions seek the consent of their parents, who normally will act in the best interest of their
children. But the State must provide an adequate safeguard
against the genuine risk that consultation with some parents
will result in foreclosing the minor's opportunity to obtain
judicial review of the denial of parental consent. 31
so This is not to say that the judge's determination must be made ex
parte. As long as the procedure does not become unduly burdensome,
the State itself, through a designated official, may choose to be the defendant in such a proceeding. This, apparently, was contemplated by
the Supreme Judicial Court as the correct procedure in Massachusetts,
should it be held that the requirement of parental notice was unconstitutional in some cases. See Attorney General, supra, at 298. Moreover,
subject to pre::;ervation of the nece~:;::;ary speed, informality and confidentiality of judicial consent proceeding;;, our decision imposes no ::;pecial
restrictions 011 the sources, other than the parents themselves, to which
the court may iurn for evidence.
31 The District Court believed that parental notification should be dispensed with whenever it was in the "best interests" of the minor to do
so. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001. While the best-interests standard is
applicable in determining the underlying issue of whether the abortion is
proper, it tends to obscure the State'::; important interc::;t in encouraging
a family. rather than a judicial, resolution of the minor's abortion deci::;ion.
As long as the minor'::; con;;titut ional right to ::;eek the abortion itself i::; not
unduly burdened, we are he::;itant to interfere with the State's efforts to
iuvolve parents in this important matter.

.·
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(2)
Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird III, supra, at
1004n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. Both fathers and
mothers have an interest in helping to determine what course is
best for their daughters, and the State is entitled to support
the involvement of both parrnts, even though doing so may
increase marginally the chance of denial of consent. As we
have said, the fact that parental disapproval may occur is not
itself a reason for dispensing with an otherwise valid conseut
requirement.
This general rule, however, must be subject to the same
qualificatio11 outlined above with respect to the requirement
of notice to both parents: The minor must be permitted to go
directly to court without consulting the parent who she believes will be hostile. If she convinces the court that seeking
the approval of that parent probably would result in the
deuial of consent and the obstruction of subsequent access to
the court, then she is eutitled to establish, without notice to
that parent. either that she is mature enough to make her
decision independently or that the abortion would be in her
best interest in any event.a2
If the one parent whoHe consent has been sought is supportive of the
minor's right to seek review, the reviewing body may be assisted considerably in its difficult factual determination::;, If that parent approves of
32
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(3)
Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered :
11
[W] e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." !d., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 24. supra. But we are concerned here
with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.
See pp. - - - . supra. A State choosing to impose parental
consent also must provide an effective method of judicial review when that consent is denied. If the minor satisfies a
the minor's decision, that consent of course will weigh heavily in favor 'of
judicial approval of the abortion .

78-329 & 78-33o-OPINION
BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

28

judge that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully
informed decision, she becomes entitled to make her abortion
decision independently.'l 3 We therefore agree with the District Court that § 128 cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been
determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the
implications of the choice she has made.

IV
The District Court concluded that, in addition to the substantive infirmities it identified in § 128, the statute also
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, apparently because it excepts minors seeking
abortions from the operation of Massachusetts' common-law
mature minor rule. See p. 9, and n. 28, supra. Appellees
and intervenors argue that virtually every difference under
Massachusetts law between the treatment of abortions and
that of other medical procedures to be performed upon minors
also violates the Equal Protection Clause. 34
For the reasons stated in Part III, supra, we have concluded
that Massachusetts cannot constitutionally permit a judge to
veto the abortion decision of a minor and her physician when
the minor has been found to be mature and fully competent
to act independently in this respect. In light of that conclusion, we need not decide whether such a veto also would violate the Equal Protection Clause. · The remaining procedural
This rule applies not on!~· when parental consent has bePn sought and
denied but also to the exceptional cases described in Parts III-B (1) and
(2), supra, in which the minor is entitled to prooeed in court without notice
to one or both parents. In such cases, a judicial finding of maturity
means that the abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age of
the minor.
31
Under MaH~ . Gen. Laws Ann ., ch. 112, § 12F, minors falling into any
of six categories, such as those who are or have been married and those
serving in the armed forces, may consent to most kinds of medical and
dental care. Only minors who are married, widowed, or divorced, however, may consent independently to abortion or sterilization.
33
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requirements imposed on these mature minors, but not on
adults-parental consultation in most cases and judicial review-are amply justified by the State's substantial interest in
having minors' abortion decisions resolved within the family
whenever possible and preventing improvident abortions by
those not fully qualified to act on their own.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded that treating minors desiring
abortions differently from those seeking other forms of medical
treatment offends the Equal Protection Clause. As we noted
when this case was before us in 1976, "not all distinction
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden." Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S., at 149. This is especially true where
minors are involved. The statutory and common-law rules
at issue are designed to determine when minors in various circumstances should be permitted to give independent consent to
different kinds of medical care. We see no reason to subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny Massachusetts' decision to
allow such consent less readily with respect to abortion than
to other medical treatment. "The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements are not imposed for other
medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
termination of a potential human life." Maher v. Roe, 432
U. S. 464, 480 (1977).
Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits

judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires a minor to seek the consent of one or both parents,
even if she can satisfy the superior court that as a result consent probably would be denied and access to judicial review
of that denial effectively blocked. 85
35 Section 1'28 evidently applies to all nonemergency abortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
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The final question is whether, because of these
shortcomings, §12S must fall as a whole.

~/

While the severability

of state statutes is a matter of state law, we are not precluded from
deciding such questions when properly presented.
264 U.S. 286, 290-291

(1924).

Dorchy v. Kansas,

The constitutional infirmities in §12S

are not produced by particular words or phrases that might be severed
from the remainder of the statute.

Rather, §12S cannot

constitutionally be enforced in its entirety against those to whom it
applies.
We are aware that there is precedence in Massachusetts for
severing state statutes found to be invalid in part.

See Del Duca v.

Town Administrator, 368 Mass. 1, 329 N.E.2d 748 (1975).

On occasion,

the Supreme Judicial Court has severed legislation on an "as applied"
basis.

Thurman v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R., 254 Mass. 569,

151 N.E. 63 (1926); W. & J. Sloane v. Commonwealth, 253 Mass. 529,
149 N.E. 407 (1925).

But we are confident that the Supreme Judicial

Court would agree that, in light of our opinion today, §12S cannot
remain partially enforceable.

Eliminating the statute's defects

would require substantive amendment, which properly falls within the
legislative province.

Although our views on the constitutionality of

§12S differ in some respects from those of the District

C~urt,

we

agree that this provision must be held unconstitutional and its
enforcement enjoined.
Affirmed.
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As § 128 does not comport in these respects with constitutional standards, it remains to be decided whether the statute
must be invalidated as a whole, or whether only its unconstitutional applications need be enjoined. This question requires analysis of the principles governing the severability of
-.......§tatu~

which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. Sec Roe v. Wade,
410 u.s. 113, 164-165 (1973).
The propriety of parental involV'Cment in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the limits we have
specified on the extent to which a State may defer to parents are adequate
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests
of a minor in the abortion decision. Access to review of a denial of
parental consent, which must accompany the State's decision to require
such consent, and the best-mterests standard applicable to judicial review assure that no minor need be denied an abortion found to be in her
best interests that could not otherwise be prohibited by the State under
Roe v. Wade, supra. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
30 The Massachul:letts Supreme Judicial Court recognized that its construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney General, supm, at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that we have impermissibly
assigned a great.er role to the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we wonld have construed the st1~tute to conform
to that interpretation." Ib~d.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 12S differently than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney v. Wilbu1', 421 U. S. 684, 69.1
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Severance problems typically require deciding whether
striking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
proper when upholding the law in other applications wiii be
consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect
of the law. "[W]e need not find the language of [a sta.t ute]
constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular
case.]" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971).
It is only under this latter form of severance that § 12S could
remain enforceable in part.
Although we would have serious doubts about the propriety
of severing ~ 12S as a matter of federal law, it is essential
to bear in mind thatr we deal here with state legislation. As is
true of state-court constructions of state law generally. see·
n. 36, supra, the decisions of such courts "as to the severability
1
of a provision [of state law] is conclusive upon this Court."'
Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 (1924). "What they
say the statutes of that State mean we must accept them to
mea11 whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their
Tanguage or by separating their provisions into valid and
invalid parts." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. 'Texas, 177 U.S. 28,
43
(1900).
'--n. 11 (1975}, the federal courts are bound by the construction of a state
statute by the highest court of that State. E. g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist . No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976); Mullaney
v. WilbUI·, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St . Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952) . We
therefore are obligated to read § 12S as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional infirmities. discu-ssed in Part III, supra..
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In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not asked
to rule on the severability of § 12S, as it was then unclear
to what extent, if any, the statute would be declared unco~
stitutionaJ.8 7 We therefore are not precluded from reaching the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, sup a, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave th' important question ~f state law to the tribunal best suit d to decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure alread successfully
employed in this case provides a practicable ethod for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court, Syp. Jud. Ct. Rule
3:21 (1978),"R the following question is certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "In light of the
Court's conclusions in this opinion concerning the constitution~
ality of § 12S, may this statute be evered so that it remain!3
·enforceable in part as a matter f Massachusetts law?"

So ordered

I

\

I

I

\
\

87
That court Juts madr it clear in itH prior clrei~ion~, howrvrr, that it i:>
willing to Rrvor l:ltatute~ found to be invalid al:l applied to ~umr persons·
or factual ~et'tingl:l. Sre Del Dura v. Town Adrninistmtm·, :368 l\Ja~l:l. 1,
13-14, a29 N. l~. 2cl 74R, 75(:\ (1975) ; Thurman v. Chicago. Milwaukee &
St. Paul !],., 254 Mass. 569 , 151 X . E. 6:3 (1926); W. & J. Sloane v. CommonweaLth, 25:3 Ma~l:l. 529, 5;{4, 149 N. E. 407, 409 (1V25).
18
' R rle 3:21, § :3 (2), ca!ll:l for " a statement of all fact~ rrlevant to the
ques ons certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
the questions arose." We believe this opinion, particularly Part I, supra,
atfsfies this requ:irement.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL's proposed opinion for the Court.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976) , and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976 ).
I
A

On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1 The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were

).."]

)

j
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substa.nce
were made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout thi~:~
opinion.
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 8 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978).6
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro8 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
6 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category ,of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stubble.
field, M. D., (intervenors) 0 appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
{of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." ·Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp., at 999.
Defendants in the suit. appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attor~
neys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued!
an opinion invalidating § 12S. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 · F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird I). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the <lourt was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of [these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." Id., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." Id., at 855-856. The court
In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
7 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively . as
· appellants,
6
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, ...
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." Id., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 128,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor.8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
~ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutionaf challenge to the·
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (Beffotti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District
Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa.chusetts appropriate
questions concerning the meaning of § 128, pursuant to existing procedure in that State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup~
Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
One member of the three-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 128 was consistent with the decisions of this
COurt recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows :
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
·child's best interests'?
·"b )i If the parent is n«lt limited to considering exclusively the mino~:'a
8

'

.
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opm10n styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d · 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 12S, as authorita.tively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court. are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter'e
best interests, can the parent take into consideration the 'long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What. standard or standnrd~ is the superior court. to apply?
"a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are
not based exclusively on what would serv!:' the minor's best interests?
"b) If the superior court finds that t.h!:' minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, nn informed and reasonable d!:'Cision to have
an abortion, may the court r!:'fus!:' its consent based on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachusetts law p!:'rmit a. minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informed consent,' 'to obtain
[a court] order without parental consultation'?
"4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing a.n abortion, (a), without prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which,
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292- 293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
Id., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parenes
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 !d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. I d. , at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
10
Section 128 itself dispenses wit h the need for the consent of any
pa.rent who "has died or has deserted his or her family." ·
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. I d., at 294. See n. 28, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court.
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parenta.l notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." Id., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent-even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .... " Id., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. !d., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due proce!Ss
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." !d., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the sta.tute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute tha.t they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair."
!d., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 36, infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, decla.ring § 128 unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement. 11 Appellants sought
11 The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: the best-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion,
he argued, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read the evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
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review in this Court a second time. and we again noted probable jurisdiction. - U . S . - (1978).

II
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." 12 This observation, of course,
is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, " [ c] hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural," Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensia desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 128 proceeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best interests. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 128 could be severed
under established principles, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unne<lf'ssarily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at. 1006-1020.
12 Similarly, t.he Court said in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) :
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
aditlts, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.''
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tivity and flexibility to the speci~ needs of parents and children. We have recognized thre~reasons justifying the qualification by the state of minors constitutional rights: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
importance of the parental role in child-rearing.

A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 ( 1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674 0977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty
interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult
after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had
violated a criminal statute). Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U. S. 565 (1975). the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional -rights of children are i:ndistin-
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guishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
"conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administra.tive hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 ( 1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generaUy are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
"concern, ... sympathy, and .. . paternal attention." Id., at
550 (plurality opinion).
B
Second, the Court has held that the States may qualify children's constitutional rights when exercise of those rights
involves the making of important, affirmative choices with
potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been
grounded in the recognition that. during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them.' 3
As MR. JusncE S•rEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "secur[e] . . . the liberty of each man to
decide for him-;elf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result):
"at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for in9ividual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
13

(,
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Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children rea.ches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ... ,'" id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors.15
rrpon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults." !d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted) .
14 In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a state child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request . 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under the statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men a.nd citizens," id., at 165, permitted
the State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncededly ... would be invalid,"
irl., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State has considrrable latitude in enacting laws affecting·
minors on the basis of thrir lessrr capacity for lllilture, affirmative choice,
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Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16
But an additional and more important justification for sta.te
deference to parental control over children is that " [ t] he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga.tions."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). "The
duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." Wiscon.
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Tinker v. Des Moine Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
(1969), illusrates
·
·
· •
·
· oLtheir
t~l right a together. The Court held in Tinker that a school
child's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a silent protest
against American involvement in the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by the Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence in the record that their
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever--even nondisruptive discussions-on important political and
moral issues. SeP Tink er, supra, at 510.
16
See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann ., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann ., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must. be
made through parent or guardian) .
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sin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 (1972). This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added).
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief tha.t the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 17
17

See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some

78-329 & 78-330-0PINION

16

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.18

III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 12S
Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional
right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113 ( 1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 ( 1973),
with the special interests of both the State and parents in
assuring the responsible exercise of this right by a minor. As
noted above, § 12S was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132
( 1976). where we remanded the case for interpretation of its
provision'\ by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
We had previously held in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U. S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize
an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. !d., at 74. In Bellotti 1, supra, we
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Ginberg-a.Il have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of Mn. JusTICE PoWELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
( 1923) . As § 12S is supportive of the interests of parents in their daughter's abortion decision, we have no occasion to com;ider here whether the
Constitution places any limits on the State'ii authority to restrict ,a parent's involvement in that deci~ion.
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recognized that § 12S could be read as "fundamentally different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto,' " id., at 145,
thus "avoid[ing] or substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute." Id., at 148. The question before us-in light of what we have said in the prior
cases-is whether § 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to
seek an abortion. See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts§ 12 (S) does
unduly burden this right. They argue, for example, that the
mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.
As stated in Part II above, however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make important decisions. The
inability of immature minors to make a fully informed choice
that takes account of both immediate and long-range consequences generally makes parental consultation desirable and
in the best interest of the minor. 19 As a general proposition,
such consultation seems particularly desirable with respect to
the abortion decision-one that raises profound moral, ethical,
and religious concerns. 20 As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote in
concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
91 :
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutiona.Ily permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
19 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize[d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
20 The expert te:stimony at the hearingR in the District Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I, 393 F. Supp., at 853.
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parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 21
But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to
seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in important
ways from other decisions that may be made during minority.
We conclude that these differences require special limits on
the extent to which the State may restrict a minor's exercise
of her right to seek an abortion.

A
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
21 MR. Jus•rrcE STEWART's concurring opinion in

Danforth under:;cored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortion decisions by describing the procedures followed at the clinic operated by the Parents Aid
Society and Dr. Gerald Zupnick:
"The counseling . . . occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The
physician takos no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques . . . .
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, :Lnd on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, . . . may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Baird, id., a.t 132.
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majority is required simply to postpone her dedsion. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. 22
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
To be sure, the best choice for a pregnant minor may not
be to abort. Marriage to the father of the child, arranging
for the adoption of the baby, or even assuming alone the responsibilities of motherhood might well be in her best longrange interests. Parents or others might continue to furnish
needed economic support and mature guidance, even though
the young mother has become legally an adult in some respects. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that cannot
be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching
consequences.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, supra, at "the State may not impose a blanket
22 In Massachusetts, for example, although parenthood alone does not
remove a minor from the reach of § 128, it does confer adult legal status
in other respects, such as the right to consent to medical care for the
minor's own child and to other kinds of medical care for the minor herself.
See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann ., ch. 112, § 12F (West); n. 34, infra
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proviSIOn
. requiring the consent of a parent or person in
loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried
minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as
stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a minor, the
unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision make
it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute. and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding consent." Ibid. If the State decides
to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents'
consent to a11 abortion, it also must provide
ure
whereby a Elenial: -cl...paren.tal QQ.Ui!8llt..m~' be J:evi~•eEl aad
p~.

We conclude that approval of a minor's abortion in such a
review proceeding must be given upon a judicial finding ~ '---------
either of two facts: (1) that the minor is mature enough and
well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents'
wishes; 24 or (2) that even if she is not able to make this deci23

As § 12S provides for involvement of the state superior court in
minors' abortion decisions, we disruss tl1e constitutional issues raised in
theso cases in t~rms of judicial review. We do not su gest, however,
that a State rhoosing to ~uiF+> fl&PI?Ht!ll eM~fl could not as:;ign t e tas •
!'e'\ i~ dalliRlii gf tllat eeMeent to a juvrnile court or an administrative
agency or offirer. Indeed, much can be Raid for employing procedures
and a forum less formal than those a~:~sociated with a rourt of general
jurisdiction.
24
The nature of both the State's interest in fostering parential a~:~tB4rtty
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may r·e sort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as age limits, marital status, or membership in the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal disabilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, matnrity, but the fact that a minor may be
very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
As discussed in the text, however, the peruliar nature of the abortion de-

d- ..,{
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sion independently, the desired abortion would be in her best
interests. The proceeding in which these facts are determined must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any
appeals that may follow, will be completed with sufficient
expedition and anonymity to provide an effective opportunity
for an abortion to be obtained if parental consent is withheld
im Jro Jerly. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the£
withholding of parental consent does not in fact amount to
the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found
impermissible in Danforth. !d., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 128 must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 128 proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." 25 Attorney General,
cision may require the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the
maturity of minors.
25 The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 12S imposed this standard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. See pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." !d., at
293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is permissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
though § 12S was construed by the highest state court to impose this
restriction, the statute is flawed because the restriction is not apparent on
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360 N. E. 2d. at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a r§ 12S] proceedings
may be expected.... The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken. by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W]e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge
may also be achieved." I d., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. Ibid. 26
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or immature-to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible
reasons. See Baird Ill, 450 F. Supp., at 1004-1005 ; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this as&'rtion. As a general nile, the interpretation
of a state statute by the State's highest <'OUrt "is as though written into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953),
and we are obliged to view the restriction on the pa.rental consent. require-ment "as if [§ 12S] has been so amended by the [Massachusetts] legislature." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,514 (1948).
26 Intervenors take issue with t.he Supreme Judicial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution . In t.he absence of any evidence as t.o the operation of judicial proceedings under § 128-and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effect-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T]he
consent required by [ § 12S must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has deserted his or her family." 27 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available·." Ibid. The ggw:t--alsQA
' ) - J;JJ}e4 that an available parent must be
a
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion. 28 Id., at 297.
27 The statute also provides that "[i]f both parents have died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
28 This reading of the statute requires parental consultation aJJd consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule tl1at would
apply in the absence of § 12S: "The mature minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical prooedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that tile circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the ' best interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of intemded medical treatmen1 and where the minor is capable of givh1g i.u-
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W.e think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would -impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortioi1. As the Dist_rict Court recognized,
"there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go .to court." Baird1II, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be -.so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. · But
many parents hold strong vie\YS on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. - It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
ng
to see r~ in superior court provides a effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
e cone u e, . t ere ore, 1a un er e s a u ory sc erne
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be ermitted to o
directly to the court without first notifying her parents.
eek review of that denial would be obstructed by her parents.
If the court is not persuaded by the 1i.1inor, it may require
that the parents be consulted. 29 If, on the other hand, the
· sat1s
· fi ed t h at m
· formmg
· t 11e parents pro b abl y wou ld
court IS
have the effect of foreclosing the minor's opportunity for
timely judicial review of a denial of parental consent, the
minor then is entitled to make her case on the merits-to
establish either that she is mature enough to reach her abDrtion decision independently, or that the -abortion is in her best
interests in any event.
We recognize the challenge facing a superior court judge

---

formed consent to that treatmelf5. the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwealth." ld ., at 296. X':he Supreme Judicial Court held that
the common-law mature minor rule was inapplicable to abortions because
it had been legislatively superseded by § 128.
29
Of course, if the minor con~nlts with her parents, either voluntarily
or as directed by the court, and they withhold con,;ent, she is free to seek
reveiw in the cou rt immediately.

~
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asked to determine, in the absence of the parents, whether
they are likely to refuse consent and obstruct their daughter's
access to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or judg~
ing what decision is in her best interests also would be facilitated, in many cases, by the testimony of the parents. In
spite of these difficulties, we are convinced that, absent the
opportunity to go directly to the superior court prior to seeking parental consent, 30 a substantial number of pregnant
minors would be prevented from having a realistic opportunity
to do so later. Massachusetts may choose to require that pregnant minors desiring abortions seek the consent of their parents, who normally will act in the best interest of their
children. But the State must provide an adequate safeguard
against the genuine risk that consultation with some parents
will result in foreclosing the minor's opportunity to obtain
judicial review of the denial of parental consent. 31
so This is not to say that the judge's determination must be made ex
parte. As long as the procedure does not become unduly burdensome,
the State itself, through a designated official, may choose to be the defendant in such a proceeding. This, apparently, was contemplated by
the Supreme Judicial Court as the correct procedure in Massachusetts,
should it be held that the requirement of parental notice was unconstitu-~
tiona! in some cases. See Attorney General, supra, a.t 298. Moreover,
subject to preservation of thC' necessary speed, informality and confidentiality of judicial consent proceedings, our decision imposes no special
restrictions ou the sources, other than the parents themselves, to which
the court may turn for evidence.
31 The District Court believed that parental notification should be dispensed with whenever it was in the "best interests" of the minor to do
so. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001. While the best-interests standard is
a licablc in determining (0e-underly.in.g ~ whethe~ the abortion is
proper ~re-th~tat~ intere:;t in encouraging
a fam · y. rather than a judicial, resolution of the minor's abortion decision.
A~ long as the minor's constitutional right to seek the abortion itself is not
unduly burdened, we- an kP~itent t.e~terfere with the tate's efforts to
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(2)
Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothi-ng
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird Ill, supra, a.t
1004 n. 9.

We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. Both fathers and
mothers have an interest in helping to determine what course is
best for their daughters, and the State is entitled to support
the involvement of both parents, even though doing so may
increase marginally the chance of denial of consent. As we
have said, the fact that parental disapproval may occur is not
itself a reason for dispensing with an otherwise valid consent
requirement.
This general rule, however, must be subject to the sa
ualificatw 1
above with respect to the requir ent
of 10tice to~ parents: The minor must be perm· eel to go
directly to court without consulting e paren t,<
e1~ v.:.Hl khQitile. If she convinces the court that seeking
the approval of that parent probably would result in the
deuial of consent and the obstruction of subsequent access to
the court, then she is entitled to establish, without notice to
that parent, either that she is mature enough to make her
decision independently or that the abortion would be in her
best interest in any event. 3 2
If the one rmrl'nl who~e consent ha~ been sought is Hupportivc of the
minor's right to seek review, the reviewing body may be assisted considerably in its difficult factual d('terminations. If that parent approves of
32
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(3)
Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior"
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered :
"[W]e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." !d., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 24. supra. But we are concerned here
with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.
See pp. ----.supra. i\. Stats.chQOsing te iffipese-frl':rental
~~n t

~w
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the minor's decision, that consent of course will weigh heavily in favor 'of
judicial approval of the abortion.
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..(i~~t she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully

informed decision, she ~ en 1 e to ma e er a or 1011
decision independently.'13 We therefore agree with the District Court that § 128 cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been
determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the
implications of the choice she has made.

IV
The District Court concluded that, in addition to the substantive infirmities it identified in § 128, the statute also
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, apparently because it excepts minors seeking
abortions from the operation of Massachusetts' common-law
mature minor rule. See p. 9, and n. 28, supra. Appellees
and intervenors argue that virtually every difference under
Massachusetts law between the treatment of abortions and
that of other medical procedures to be performed upon minors
also violates the Equal Protection Clause. 34
For the reasons stated in Part III, supra, we have concluded
that Massachusetts cannot constitutionally permit a judge to
veto the abortion decision of a minor and her physician when
the minor has been found to be mature and fully competent
to act independently in this respect. In light of that conclusion, we need not decide whether such a veto also would violate the Equal Protection Clause. The remaining procedural
This rule applies not only when parental con~ent has been sought. and
denied but also to the exceptional cases described in Parts III-B (1) and
(2), supra, in which the minor is entitled to proceed in court without notice
to one or both parents. In such cases, a judicial finding of maturity
means that the abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age of
the minor.
3
~ Under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F, minors falling into any
of six categories, such as those who are or have been married and those
serving in the armed forces, may consent to most kinds of medical and
dental care. Only minors who are married, widowed, or divorced, however, may consent independently to abortion or sterilization.
33
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requirements imposed on these mature minors, but not on
adults-parental consultation in most cases and judicial review-are amply justified by the State's substantial interest in
having minors' abortion decisions resolved within the family
whenever possible and preventing improvident abortions by
those not fully qualified to act on their own.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded that treating minors desiring
abortions differently from those seeking other forms of medical
treatment offends the Equal Protection Clause. As we noted
when this case was before us in 1976, "not all distinction
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden." Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S., at 149. This is especially true where
minors are involved. The statutory and common-law rules
at issue are designed to determine when minors in various circumstances should be permitted to give independent consent to
different kinds of medical care. We see no reason to subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny Massachusetts' decision to
allow such consent less readily with respect to abortion than
to other medical treatment. "The simple answer to the argument that similar requirements are not imposed for other
medical procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
termination of a potential human life." Maher v. Roe, 432
u. s. 464, 480 ( 1977).

v

Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits
judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires a minor to seek the consent of one or both parents,
even if she can satisfy the superior court that as a result consent probably would be denied and access to judicial review
of that denial effectively blocked. 3 "
35
Srction 1'28 evidently applies to all nonemergency n,bortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during

..
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As § 128 does not comport in these respects with constitutional standards. it remains to be decided whether the statute
must be invalidated as a whole. or whether only its unconstitutional applications need be enjoined. This question requires analysis of the principles governing the severability of
statutes. 30
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognizPd, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird III, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164-165 {1973).
The propriety of parental involv>ement in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the limits we have
specified on the extent to which a State may defer to parents are adt>quate
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests
of a minor in the abortion dPrision. Access to review of a dt>nial of
parental consent, which must accompany the State's decision to require
such consent, and the best-interests standard applicable to judicial review assure that no minor need be denied an abortion found to be in her
be.st interests that could not otherwise be prohibited by the State under
Roe v. Wade, supra. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
3 " Tlw Massachu~ett:s SupremP .Judicial Court recognized that its construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. Sec Attomey Geneml, supra, at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that we have impermissibly
assigned a great€r role to the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice uncon~titutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretation." Ibid.
If this is to be understood aR a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 12S differently than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney v. Wilb·ur, 421 U. S. 684, 691
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Severance problems typically require deciding whether
striking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
proper when upholding the law in other applications will be
consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect
of the law. "[W]e need not find the language of [a sta.t ute]
constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular
case.]" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971).
It is only under this latter form of severance that § 12S could
remain pnforceable in part.
Although we would have serious doubts about the propriety
of severing ~ 12S as a matter of federal law, it is essential
to bear in mind that we deal here with state legislation. As is
true of state-court constructions of state law generally, see·
n. 36. supra, the decisions of such courts "as to the severability
of a provision [of state law] is conclusive upon this Court.".
Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 'G. R. 286, 290 ( 1924). "What they
say the statutE's of that State mean we must accept them to
mean whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their
Iauguage or by separating their provisions into valid and
invalid parts." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28,
43 (1900).
n . 11 (1975), the federal courts are bound by the construction of a state
statute by the highest court of that State. E. g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist . No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952). We
therefore are obligated to read § 12S as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional infirw.i:ti'es. discussed in Part III, sUt[Jra..
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In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not asked
to rule on the severability of § 12S, as it was then unclear
to what extent, if any, the statute would be declared unconstitutional.~7
We therefore arc not precluded from reaching the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, supra, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave this important question of state law to the tribunal best suited to decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure already successfully
employed in this case provides a practicable method for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court, Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule
3:21 ( 1978) ,:•H the following question is certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "In light of the
Court's conclusions in this opinion concerning the constitutionality of § 12S, may this statute be severed so that it remain~
enforceable in part as a matter of Massachusetts law?"
So ordered

87
That court hns mndr it ckar in it;; prior dreiHion~ , howrvrr, that it i. ·
willing to ~Pvrr ~tntutr~ found to bP invalid aH applircl to ~omr prr~on~·
or fartunl Hrttings. Srr Del Duca v. 1'011'1L Administrator, ao8 1\Ia:,;:-;. 1,
13-14, :329 N. ~:. 2d 74R, 756 (1975); Thurman Y. Chicago. Milwaukee &
i:lt . Paul Fl. , 254 Mass. 569. 151 X. E. ():3 (1926) ; W . & J . i:lloane v. Commomcealth, 25:3 :\Ja~~. 529, 534, 149 N . E. 407 , 409 (HJ25) .
as Rulr 3:21, § 3 (2) , call~ for •·a ~tatemrnt of all fart~ rrlrvant to the
questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
the qurstions arose." We believe this opinion, particularly Part I, supm,
atisfies this requirement.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL's proposed opinion for the Court.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
I
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A
On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. i974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1 The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were ·
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12S
·(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents ·[to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."
·
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions ·and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
·
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the · provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
were made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 through~ut this
opinion.
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2281 {1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 {1976)! Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmar- ·
ried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion with·out informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the ''class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who ·do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978).5
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro• The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in BeUotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136--143 (1976).
' Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never ~re before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to t.he class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors ' who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolescents. and Phillip Stubble·
field, M. D., (intervenors) • appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
'[of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." · Baird Y. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp., at 999.
Defendants in the suit. appellants here in No. 78--329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.'
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued!
an opinion invalidating § 128. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 · F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird I). · The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a. significant number of {these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." I d., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a. female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upori her calendar age." I d. , at 855-856. The court

r:.·...
~-
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···········

• In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees. ·
'As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, _appellants in
NOB. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively . as
· appell.auts.
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was 11Cast not in terms of protecting the minor, ...
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." /d., at
856. The 11 independent" parental rights protected by § 128,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the ·
best interests of the minor.•

...... .
•...............
.

B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 {1975).
After briefing and oral argument, · it became apparent that
~ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutionai challenge to the
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (Bef[otti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District
Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate
questions concerning the meaning of § 128, pursuant to existing procedure in that State. See Mass. Rules of Court, SuP'~
Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme ~udicial Court. 8 These were answered in an
:::-::::::; ;::::;:

One member of the ~hree-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 128 was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children . See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
8 The nine questions certified by the District COurt, with footnotes
omitted, are a.s follows:
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
·''b} If the parent is n<at limited to considering exclusively the mino~'&
1
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opmiOn styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d ·"288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 128, as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court. are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter'e
best interests, can the pa.r ent ta.ke into consideration the 'long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What. standard or standards is the superior court. t() apply?
.
"a) Is the superior court to disrega.rd all parent81 objections that ..a.fe
not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
"b) If the superior rourt. finds that. the minor is ca.pable, and baa, in
fact, made and adhered t(), an informed and reasonable decision to have
an abortion, may the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachusetts law permit a minor (a.) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving infor'med consent,' 'to obtain
[a court] order without parental consultat.ion'?
"4. If the court answers any of qut'Stion 3 in the affirmative, may the
superior court, for good causf' shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a) , without prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notHication?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescrilx> a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 128] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 128]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith , though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the ~urt. make any other comments about the statute which,
in its opinion, might assist us in determining ·whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
.
··
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.................
.. ... ...

abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292-293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good ca.use shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
11
must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
!d., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent uin circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes 118Jl
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 !d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he mustbe notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and'
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. I d., at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298:-300. Nor does the
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Section 128 itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any ·
·
pl\rent fho "has died or has deserted his or her family." ·
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an· exception
to § 12S. I d., at 294. See n. 28, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 128 unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v·. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." ld., ·a t
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent-even to infortn their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed ...." I d., at
1002.
.
.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a · judge to veto the abortion decision of a .minor
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. I d., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." !d., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed 11 formal overbreadth," ibid., because the statute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a 11 chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in 11 judicial repair."
Id., at 1005~ It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the· Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 36, infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, decla.ring § 128 unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement.11 Appellants sought
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The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not pennit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving infonned consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: the best~interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in the Supreme Judici~l . Court-'s opinion,
he argued, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read t.he evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a preg·nant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted prob.
able jurisdiction. - U . S . - (1978).

.. ...............
...... ...

n
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." '"2 This observation, of course,
'is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural," Moore v. City of East Cle.veland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensi-
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a desired · abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 12S proceeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best interests. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 12S could be severed
under established principles, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unneoessarily ,,;ith the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at 1006-1020.
·
2
'" Similarly, the Court said in Planned Parenthood of Central Mi&souri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976):
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
·adUlts, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights;"
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__ ·--·
conclusion that the
constitutional rights
of childr~ cannot be
equated Wl.th those of
adults:
·
·-·~
.
:.

_t,ivity and flexibility_to the special needs of parents and children. We haverecognized three reasons justifying the~Matign by the PState of--mim>~itutional righ~the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and th'e
·unpor
·
tanee of th e parental roe
1 m
· child -rearmg.
·

I

A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to .
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guaran~
tee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In particular, minor8
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequa.t e notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof b~
yond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination·. In re Winship , 397
U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Inuraham v.
Wriuht, 430 U. S. 651 , 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty
interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult
after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had
violated a criminal statute). Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975), the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncriticai assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistin-
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guishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
1
'conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administrative hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966).
. Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
"concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention." /d., at
550 (plurality opinion).
B
Second, the Court has held that the States/may qHalif, eh:il-~~-titutional
ly 1.iitu
- .tStitu.tim~a-1..-t-igA.te-when · exe1ei!!e · of those tights
the freedan of
i'ft •elves t e making of important, affirmative choices with
children to choose
potentially serious consequences. · These rulings have been
for thanselves in
grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years
--- --- of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them. 18

-------

--

As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "secur[e] . . . the liberty of each man to
decide for himself what he will read and to what he will listen," Gimberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J ., concurring in the
result):
"at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that fUll capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment KUarantees. It is only
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Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that ueven where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors. 15
upon snch a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other righta-the right to marry, for example, or the right to vote-deprivations that would .be constitutionally intolerable for adults." ld., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted).
u In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a state child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under the statute, we found that "the interests of ·society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 165, permitted
the State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncededly . .. would be invalid,"
icl., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State has considerable latitude in enacting laws affectingminors on the basis of their Jesser capacity for mature, affirmative choice~

················ ···· . ................. ··············· ········
.. ............. .. . .................
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Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in· important decisions by minors. 18
But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that "[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations/'
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). "The
duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." Wiscon-

........ .. ....
....... ...... .

Tinker v. Des Moines Indeperu:lent Community School District, 393 U. S.
503 (1969), illusrate8 that it may not. arbitrarily deprive them of their
constitutional rights altogether. The Court held in Tinker that a school
child's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a silent protest
against American invol-rement in the hostilities in Viet N am. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shidded by the Copstitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place; or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence in the record that their
. wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever~en nondillruptive discussionlr-On important political and
moral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 1510.
18 See, e. · g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must.b.ez
made through parent or guardian) .
·
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sin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 (1972). This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political in's titutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added).
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation '13 history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity th~t make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 17
17
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Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.u

r···.· ....

l ···········

III

f . . ..

With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 12S
Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional
right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410
the .State -~-en~ -·--, ..Q: S. 1-~~- Q~73.2_ . ~ Doe v. B_olton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973),
couraging an unwith _the speCial int:ere~f~.r~8 etta p~n:nts ill
married pregnant
· 'ftssunug· t.h~enM81eo susPetetrlff:thM> ught ~a m:rnrer. As
minor to seek the ad-·noted above, § 12S was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132
vice and help of her (1976), where we remanded the case for interpretation of its
parents in making the1 provision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
very .J.rnt::.ortant deci- We had previously held in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
sion whether or not : 428 U.S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize
to bear a child.
""' an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor' to
- ----- - - terminate her pregnancy. /d., at 74. In B~llotti I, supra, we

Delete - - - - - - : - -
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Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Gin.berg-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Orgat1ization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Servicu, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
/Ui1t0i.s, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
( 1923) . A.e § 12S-1fMttf'portivroHJie..intert'St.s..()f~parents in -their- <laughfflMbort~oe-h~ve-..no.,occasion..io. consider ht>re .whether·-the
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recognized that § 12S could be rea.d as "fundamentally different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto,' " id., at 145,
thus "avoid[ing] or substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute." ld., at 148. The question before us-in light of what we have said in the prior
cases-is whether § 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the·
Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to
seek an abortion. See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts § 12 (S) does
unduly burden this right. They argue, for example, that the
mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.
As stated in Part II above, however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make important decisions. The
inability of immature minors to make a fully informed choice
that takes account of both immediate and long-range conse_
quences generally makes parental consultation desirable and
for the minor who is in the best_i~~r~~_f_~h~- JE.in~r:.~~ ~~~g_£!~~ proposition,
pregnant and who is ~ltatio? _seems particula~ly desirable ~~to
considering an
t~sron=aone-ih~ses.praiQ.l!H.d...moral~thieai,
abortion. A minor
and 1elig-i~ As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote in
in such a situation · concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S., at
is particularly in
91:
need of gu;idance and
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
support . .::. e:;
constitutiona.Ily permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
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19 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize[ d) that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
20 The expert testimony at the ht-aring:; in the Di:;trict Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I, 393 F. Supp., at 853.
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parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 21
But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to
seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in important
The unique nature of \~~ys from other decisions that may be made during minority.
the constitutional
~onclude that....these differences require special limits on
right at stake and .of'the-extent- t<> which- the State -may restrict-a minor's exercise
the decisi<?n it pro- f her right to seek·an-aOOriion.
tects requrres a State
to act with particular
A
sensitivity
when it
Th e pregnant mmor
. ,sop t'1ons are much d'ff
legislates to
foster
1 erent from t h ose
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parental involvement 1facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
in the abortion de- · marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
cision of a minor ;' 21
MR. JusTICE STEw ART's concurring opinion in Danforth underscoted
daugh ter.
_...-

the need for parental involvement in minors' abortjon decisions by de!cribing the procedures followed at the cliriic operated by the Parents Aid
·
Society and Dr. ~raid Zupnick:
"The counseling . . . · occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It ' lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . • The
physician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques ...•
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in BeUotti v. Baird, id., at 132.
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majority is required simply to postpone her deci.5ion. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. 8., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. 22
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible. M:>reover ~
To be '8ure;-the- best--choice-fer· -pregnant -minormay~not
be-to-abort.-Marriage-to-t8e-fa he~.=-ei-the-c8ild,.....arranging
fol:-the-adoption-ef-t8e- bab.y:~r- en-885uming- alone--the Tesponsibilities of motherhood mig~t well..-he-in--her·best-longrange ·interests.- Parents or -othet migh.t --eontinua-oo-furnish
needed .economic--support-and -m ture--guidancer evetrtheugh - -- - the-Youn·g -nrother--luls--.become-.] gally....a.n.-,a:~Ll!!iJ!! , ~
.spe~· --~~net>h~-~~~e abortion decision i~one that cannot
be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching

..... ........

..

l._Q~e~~~s.
·-----------------------------------------------.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, supra, at "the State may not · impose a blanket

~assachusetts, for example, although paren~~~4 .. tllon&--do-es not
remove a minor from~.t~!_ :_each of § 1~,_jt..does-'tonfer ad~t legal statu[}
in other respects , such as_tbe·-rignt- to <:,2_nsent to .medical care for the
lete
minor's own child -an~other kinds of mediclil--eue for the minor herself.
~ - Masi.'"Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F (West); ~ ~ 34~itrfrd,
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provisiOn
. requiring the consent of a parent or person · in
loco parentis as a condition for abortion 'of an unmarried
minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although , as
stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a minor, the
unique nature and consequences of the abortion decisi01i make
it inappropriate "to give a third party an abwlut€, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
.,___ _ reason for withholding consent."
Ibid. · If the State decides
it must provide a
to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents'
...... .
procedure whereby
consent to an abortion, it also- must provide a procedure
every minor may re- whereby a denial of parentaiConsent may · be reviewed and
: ......... .
ceiv~ a ~udicial de-possibly reverS€d.
. .. -----:---:----a.pr~t minor is l~: . . . . . . . . . . ..
t_:em1nat1on that s}1e 'Ye conclude. that approv~--nprtoP~- a~o:tiOn-n:suclra t1tlec: 1:p~) such a / ~.:.:::::.:_:_:_:.{/
1 ~ . rnatur~ enough to ·~ro-ceediiig-must.. ·be given- uJ:fon a JUdlCHil findmg 23 of P:OCeedmg L:O show
/ : . ;:::::. ::.:..
glve an mfonned
either-6f-twe-4'aeM: (1) tJiat t.:Ae ~or is mature enough and elther: (l) ~t she _) >:·::·:·::(:·:··.
coabonrtsex:t to anthat
, well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in con·· ·· ·······
abort~~~ ~ any an ( sultation with her physician, independently of her parents'
· ·: ··.·.
event would be in (wishes; 2"' or (2) that even if she is not able to make this deci. ··-·· ....
.
I
,
her best mterests. /
on no. ••••·n•

-

23 As § 12S provides for involvement of the state superior court in
· minors' abortion decisions, we discuss the constitutional issues raised in
these cases in terms of · judicial review. ·we do not suggest, however,
that a State choosing to require parental consent could not assign the task
of reviewing denials of that consent to a juvenile court or an administrative
agency or officer. Indeed, much can be said for ·employing procedures
and a forum less formal than those associated with a r.ourt of general
jurisdiction.
24
The nature of both the State's interest in fostering parential authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may ~sort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as age limits, marital status, or membership in the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal disabilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, maturity, but the fact. that a minor may be
very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of the abortion d~
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sion independently, the desired abortion would be in her best
f,.e;,e:t;;r;::_-::::i-.--- - ----.
interests. The proceeding in which
showing is
mined must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any
appeals that may follow, will be completed with sufficient
expedition and anonymity to provide an effective opportunity
for an abortion to be obtained~ 'PBoia'tN:
mt;!e ~,.-Jieff!~-c.'D
--;t-..;;Pitf;etl~ In__sum, .. the_proc~dl!!:.EL!!!~ en.~ure that the
'Ill •• bb r) rn~~ parental consent does not in fact amount tO (Pro;ision ~~[.:'::_: ..
l' ........ .
the "absolutt," and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found
~·:::.·:... .
>:::.:::::: ....
impermissible in Danforth. !d., at 74.

eon -

f) • •

..
.................

B
It is against these requirements that § 128 must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 128 proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." 28 Attorney General,
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---'Pre9nant' ~~~i"'
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( requires \
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the opportunity for case-by~case evaluations of the
- -l!!~.!!!i!L~!Jminors.
2
~ The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 12S imposed this standard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. See pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." !d., at
293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported pa.rental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is permissible, the State·may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed .to be in the
minor's best interests. They agref' with the ·District Court that, even
though § 128 was construed by the highest state court to impose this
restriction,· the statute is flawed because the restriction is. not apparent on
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360 N . E. 2d, at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a [§ 12S] proceedings
may be expected. . . . The proceeding need riot be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor ·and
her parents .... · [W]e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court-judge
may also be achieved." /d., at 298 . . .The court added that if
these expectations were not niet, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. Ibid. 26
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or immature-to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without ~y

f
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its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible
reasons. See Baird III, 450 F. Supp-., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F . Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this assertion. As a general rule, the interpretation
of a state statute by the State's highest court "is· as though written into
the ordinance itself," Pcndos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953),
and we are obliged to view the restriction on tht> parental consent requirement "as if [§ 12S] has been so amended by the [Massachusetta] legislature." Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 514 (1948).
28 Intervenors take issue with the Supreme JudiCial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and Speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 12&:--and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effect--we must assume -that the -Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T]he
consent required by [§ 128 must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has deserted his or her family." 27 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion.28 !d., at 297.

~-

27 The statute also provide3 that "[i]f both parents have died , or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
28 This reading of the statute requires parental consultation and consent
more strictly than ·appellants thPmselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 128 was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 128 might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absence of § 128 : "The ma.ture minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves. • . •
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apa.rt
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of in·
tended medical treatment and where the minor is capable of givinr; in-
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living with one or both parents.

These interests properly

may be taken into account by a court called upon to determine
whether an abortion in fact is in a minor•s best interests.

\:- ---r _.The court may deny the abortion request of an immature ·-minor
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consultation may be required.

For the reasons stated above,

the constitutional right to seek an abortion may not be
unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial
access to the court.
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minor child

- an interest that is particular strong where a

normal family relationship exists and where the child is
living with one or both parents.

These interests properly

may be taken into account by a court called upon to determine
whether an abortion in fact is in a minor's best interests.
If , all things considered, the court detennines that an al:ortion is in the
minor's best interests, she is entitled to court authorization without any
parental involvanent.

But the COurt may deny the al:ortion request of an imnature

minor if it concludes that her best interests ~d be served by parental
consultation, or the court may in such a case defer decision until
there isTparental consultation in which the court may
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\V.e think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortioil.- As the District Court recognized,
11
there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prrwent, the minor's right to go .to court." Baird III, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be -so
in the majority of cases where_ consent is withheld. - But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and.
young pregnant minors, especially those living at horne, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. ·· It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assm~e that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in sui)erior court provides a effective
avenue of relie~~.!~ .Ef....~~e.,.'.Yh9TJ1.~,E1,9. -~~.the._mp.s~, .....-..·-- •.rf.?t!rr. ---~- ·~ •
.,.,. ,__.....-----------'-""".\"Ve-Coi1cl'U(fe, .tnerefore, that under the statutory scheme
,.,-. ·-, ....
r'
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be ermitted to o ~
-.
directly to the court without first notifying her par~ " nsul ting or ~
She must be. g1. ven eek review of that denial would be obstructed by h
e'nts.
an ?pportun1. ~y to If the court is not persuaded by the ri1i1 , may require
,·
sat1.sfy the Judge that the parents be con.sulted. 211
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formed comcnt to that. treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwenlth." 1d., nt 296. The Supreme Judicial Court held that
the common -ln.w ma ture minor rule was inapplicable to abortions because
it ha d b~en .. !cgi sl :tlin'ly~ snp~f::iP._de~ by §)~~:-~~·"'" __ . .. -·-.......~--~....····•· __
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asked to determine, in the absence of the parents. whethe~ . -' ~~-,;they are likely to refuse consent and obstruct their daug?ter's
access to court. Evaluating the minor's competence y r ' judg·
ing what decision is in her best interests also \\·o yJd. be facilitated, in many cases, by the testimony of t})EriJarents. In
spite of these difficulties, we are convinced ·'t hat, absent the
J
opportunity to go directly to the su~r.i'or court prior to seek- ing parental consent,30 a subst,!Lntial number of pregnant
minors would be prevented fl)llri 'having a realistic opportunity I
to do so later. Massachusetts may choose to require that preg- l
nant minors desiri1y(c;rtions seek the consent of their par- J
ents, who normpHy will act in the best interest of their }
children . B the State must provide an adequate safeguard
•
genuine risk that consultation with some parents ,~
in foreclosing the minor's opportunity to obtain
ju icial review of fue...deuiaLof.•par.en.tal conseut.~ 1
~

I

1

mu~e made ex
clui';· burdensome,
as the procedure does not become
ough a designated official,
choose to be the deently, was contemplated by
orrect procedure in :Vlassachusetts,
of parental notice was unconstitutional in some cases.
e Attorney Gen . . supra, at 298. Moreover,
subject to prese
1on of the necessar~· speed,
malitr and confident i11lity of jt · 1al consent proceeding~ , our decision 1 o;;es no special
restrict' ~ ou the sources, other th11n the parent s them:;f
h ourt rna,· turn for evidence.
a
he l5is'tdci''""coliii'i>e~~..tl~a1'"" i;;.~;r~t'ii'ofifiCaflon rsno~]iJ!r.::... ·.
pensed with whenever it was in the " best interests"
- · mmor to do I
'o. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001. While t
::; -interests standard is ~
pplicable in determining the under! ·
, sue of whether the abortion is
lroper . it tends to obscure t
at e '~ important imere"'t in encouraging -~
.........
1 family. rather than
· ICial, resolution of the minor':; a bortion deci:sion .
•-\:> long as t
or's constitutional right to seek the abortion itself is not
un
urdened, we are hesitant to interfere with the State's efforts to :'
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(2)
Section 128 requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be 11 custom" to perform other medical and surgical proc.edures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that 11 nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differen'tly." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird 1II, supra, at
1004n. 9.
We are not persuaded that; as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to _seek an abortion. ·The abortion
decision has implications far broader than those associated
A
with most other kinds of medical treatment. _metli-fathers and . .
mothers-have.a.n-interest in helping to determine what course is
best..fo their-daughters, -and-the -State-is entitled~to · support;' \
th.unvolvement-of--both parents, even though doing so-may
increase marginally the chance of denial of consent. As we
\
have said, the fact that parental disapproval may occur is not
\
itself a reason for dispensing with an otherwise valid consent
requirement.
.
':Ph~--generat-nrle;-however;-must- be subject to the same
qua 1 tion·-outliiied ·above with -respect to the requit:_ement
I
of notice to th parents: The minor must be perl)litt:e"d to go
Delete
~our :-::w·toout-consulting the:-p11rent' who she belie:sres-will be·· hostile:- ·If he coiwinc~the . .court that seeking
the approval of that parent PJ:Obaflly would result in the
denial of consent and the obstruction~of subsequent access to
.the court, then she is entitled to establish, without notice to
that parent. either that she is mature enough to ..tnake her
decision independently or that the abortio11 would b'e'h~er__...
,best interest in any event. 32
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(2)
Section 128 requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical proc.edures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated dif- ·
ferently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird 1II, supra, at
1004n. 9.
We are not persuaded that; as a general rule, the require. ment of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to _seek an abortion. · ·The abortion
decision has implications far broader· than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. JHet'fi-fathenrand .
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given great if not dispositive weight.
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(3)

Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: Hif the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered:
It [W] e do not view the judge's role as limited to a. determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect _that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor· will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." I d., at

293.
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The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 24, supra. But we are concerned here
with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.
See pp.-- - : supra. ~ eheasing t,e ;tnj'ose pal ent~,
~nsent--also-must- provide an - effectWe-method--of-judici1J:l-re-~ J
view when th&t eensent is aenied: If the minor satisfies a
the-minor's decision, thaL consent of course will weigh heavily in fa.vo·r 'of
judicial...appr.9yal....PfJhe ~tbortio~:
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judge that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully
informed decision, she becomes entitled to make her abortion
decision independently. 33 We therefore agree with the District Court that § 128 cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been
determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the .
implications of the choice she has made. /:"

- -i_rn*)

.

I

I

T
District Court conclud a that, in addition to the~
stantive 'nfirmiti~s it. iden · ed in § 128, the statute also .
violates
Equal Pro tion Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a; areritly ecause · it excepts minors seeking
abortions from t
oper. tion of Massachusetts' common-law
\
mature minor rur'e.
e p. 9, and n. 28, mtpra. Appellees
t
and intervenors arg
t virtually every difference under
!
Massachusetts law etween he treatment of abortions and
that of other med' al procedure to be performed upon minors
also violates the qual Protection lause. 34
For the reaso s stated in Part III,
ra, we have concluded
that Massach tts cannot constitution
permit a judge to
veto the abo ion decision of a minor and
physician when
the minots been found to be mature and
y competent
t? act ind endently ~n this respect. In light of t conc~u
.f
swn, we eed not dec1de whether such a· veto also wo d viO· Delete
late thei Equal ProteCtion Clause. · The-.reii:ia,inlng proce
al
discussion
Thi~ rule applies not only when parental consent ha.s been sought and
denied but also to the exceptional cases described in Parts III-B (1) and
(2), supra, in which the minor is entitled to proceed in court without notice
to one or both parents. In such cases, a judicial finding of maturity
means that the abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age of
the minor.
st Under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F, minors falling into any
of six categories, such as those who are or have been married and tbose
serving in the armed .forccs, .may consent to most kinds of medical and
dental care. Only minors who are married, widowed, oi' divorced, . howeyer, may consent · independently to abortion or sterilization.
33
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*The respondents also have argued that the Massachusetts
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the .
Fourteenth Amendment. Since I believe the statute is
constitutionally invalid for other reasons, there is no
occasion to consider their argument.
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uirements imposed on these mature minors, but not/ on
adu -parental consultation in most cases and judicial review- re amply justified by the State's substantis:(interest in
having · ~ors'. abortion decisio~s r~solved. within the. family
whenever p· 1ble and preventmg 1mprov1dent abortwns by
those not fuil , qualified to act on their own./'
·
Similarly, we ,. re unpersuaded that tre.a ting minors desiring
abortions differeri ~rom those seeki~/other forms of medical
treatment offends t Equal Protectwn Clause. As we noted
when this case was
fore us u( 1976, 11 not all distinction
'
'
between abortion and other procedures
is forbidden." Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S., at ~( This is especially true where
minors are involved. ~~~~tutory and common-law rules·
at issue are designed t:9""deter~~ when minors in various circumstances should b~·-permitted o,give independent consent to
different kinds of ~Ihedical care.
~see no reason to subject
to heightened JUdicial scrutiny
sachusetts' decision to
allow such cqn"sent less readily with
pect to abortion than
to other medical treatment. 11 The simp aoswer to the argument tha( similar requirements are not 1 ,, 9sed for other
medicaf procedures is that such procedures do n~t_J_nvolve "the
termiriation of a potential human life." M aher\~oe, 432
u/ s. 464, 480(1977).
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Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 128 falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits
judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
- - - --·...
fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,, _ _ _
it requires ...-minot:trn<eek:tiie consentne-Gr
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tion that she is
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mature enough to consent to
an aJ:ortion or that an
aJ:ortion would be in her
best interests.

u &>ction 128 evidently applies to all nonemergency abortions ~r
formed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy durmg
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The final question is whether, because of these
shortcomings, §12S must fall as a whole.36/
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Wh i le the

·· ···············

severability of state statutes is a matter of state law, we
are not precluded from deciding such questions when properly
presented.

w:.·;.;..;.;;·:

Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290-291 (1924).
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/
As ~ 12S does not comport in these respects with constitu/ tional standarJs. it remains to be decided wlwther the statutE"
/
must be invalidated as a whole. or whether only its unconsti(
tutional applications need be enjoined. This question re\
quires analysis of the principles governing the severability of~)
~tatutes. 3 n

E... ..

t ....
~

r:::.

.--

which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
nre performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. Se-e Baird III, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman 's right to decide , in consultation with her ph~·sicia.n, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410 u.s. 113 , 164-165 (1973).
The propriety of parental invol~ment in a. minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
otf>P"• ft..,~, J
the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the limits we ha.ve
cf.A v"<' C C< r C/JN Jo
specified on the extent to which a State may defer to parents are adequate ~on.... _f.. ·<-c._.&. lA Lv-<
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionall protected i!J!.!:r.ests
~,.,
.~"'
...., ;..J
of a minor_j~ the abortion decision.
~
·
~ ·
.
"'P""~""""~!r..alr+-~ nhieft-fflli
tiSion to reqwre -""":>!~~::.::::::....;

I

~~nd--t.fte-best~i -·~~~t).ooa le-t.o·-i·,m;,..rn.~102
ass ate
~···
04lt~~et't!~:4.j:ttt+~~rrmt-m~rw1~-be~l'eft·ibited by Hit' State ahae

Jt~~c, "hp; a. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them. \
~ -· - · - · · -·--- - - au The ~-la~sachusetts Sup.reme Judicial Court reeognized that its eonstruction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some resp€'cts. See Attorney General. supra.. at 292.
It apparent!~· proposed a rather novel method of sa\·ing the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court. concludes that. we have impermissibly
as;;igned a greater role t.o the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretation." Ibid.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 128 differently than was done by the Supreme .Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, ";th rare
exceptions not. applicable here, see Mullaney \'. ·wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691
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__,,____.. .:-....,..,.~~ ......~..,,.,.,..~~--~ft~~,.......l,;;,H~- ·--Severance problems typically require deciding whether
striking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
~
proper when upholding the law in other applications will be
:\ consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect ~
of the law. "['\V]e need not find the lahguage of [a statute] ~
constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold~
\\ its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular ;\ ~ ____.._.
case.]" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971). ,
It is only under this latter form of severance that § 12S could \
remain pnforceable in part.
Although we would have serious doubts about the propriety
of severing ~ 12S as a matter of federal law. it is essential
to bear in mind tha:t we deal here with state legislation. As is
true of state-court constructions of state law generally. see
n. 36. $Upra, the decisions of such courts "as to the severability
of a provision [of state law] is conclusive upon this Court.;' \
Dorchy ' '· Kansas, 264 l'". S. 286. 290 ( 1924). "'Yhat they
say the statutes of that State mean we must accept them to
mean whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their
Jang~age or by separating their provisions into valid and
J invalid parts .'~ ·waters-Pierce Oil Co. "· Texas , 17i U. S. 28.
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n . 11 (1975) . the federal courts are bound by the con struction of a state
statute by the highest court of that Sta te . E. g., Hort~nville Joint School
Dist . No. 1 \'.Hortonville Educ . Assn., 426 U. S. 482,488 (19iti) ; Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691 ; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 34i U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St . Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952) . We
therefore are obligated to rea.d § 12S as interpreted by thE' Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional infirmities. discm;sed in Part III, stl/)ra...
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-:' ·
In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not asked / . ·
to rule on the severability of § 12S, as it was then unclear/
,.., ·,.
to what. extent. if any, the statute would be declared uncon:t'
stitutional. 3 ' "re therefore are not precluded from r~ih
ing the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, supFa, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave thjl important question of state law to the tribunal best sui¥ t<> decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure already.- successfully
employed in this case provides a practicable method for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court, S~~ Jud. Ct. Rule
3:21 (1978) , 3 ~ the following question is ,c;.~rtified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusettf.' "In light of the
Court's conclusions in this opinion conc{;ning the constitutionality of § 12S, may this statute be ,s§.~ered so that it remains
enforceable in part as a matter o~1vtassachusetts law?"
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So ordered
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That court } ~ made it clear in it ~ prior dE>ei:;ion:;. holl'f'I'E'r, that it i:;
11·illing to H·Ye statutf':; found to bP inYalid a~ appliPd to ~omf' per::on;;
or fat'tunl ~f't ngs. Sf'r Del Duca Y. Toll'n Adrniuiiitrntor. :31)8 :\la~ ~ . 1,
Ia-14. a29
t . 2d i4~ , i5fi (19i5): Thurman\' , ChicU(/11 . Jfilu·aui.. l'e &·
·"t. Paul R. 254 :\Ia~s . 569. 151 X . E. (j:) (1926): lr. ,{· J . :iloa11e , .. Commmuceall . 25:) :\fa,;:;, 529, 5a4, 149 ?\ . E. 40i, -W!:l (1U:!5).
3
~ R1 ' 3:21, § 3 (2) , call:; for ''a statement of all fact:; rf'leYant to the
ques~i ns certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
the . estions arose." We believe this opinion, particularly ~art I, supra;
.
satlI es t h'IS reqwremeni.
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Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, et al.,
Appellants,
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William Baird et al.
Jane Hunerwadel, Etc., Appellant,
78-330
v.
William Baird et al.

IA

78-330

On Appeal from the
United States District
Court for the District
of Massachusetts.

[May - , 1979]

.

LE"-'pl:u JuSTICE PowELL)-propoiecl epiRieR fer the Oom'\...J...
R.

These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti V.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
I

A
On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1 The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12S
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health sha.ll prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."

Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the sectjon was eliminated. No changes of substance
were made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout this
opinion.
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C.§ 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 3 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. ·(Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
tho commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978). 5
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro3 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.

78-329 & 78-330-0PINION

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

4

vide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stubblefield, M. D., (intervenors) 0 appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
{of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp., at 999.
Defendants in the suit, appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued!
an opinion invalidating § 12S. Baird v. B ellotti, 393 F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird !). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id. , at 855,
and "that a significant number of {these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." I d. , at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." !d., at 855- 856. The court
In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intRrvention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
7 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively as
appellants.
6
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, ...
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." Id., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 12S,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor. 8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
§ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (Bellotti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District
Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate
questions concerning the meaning of § 12S, pursuant to existing procedure in that State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup.
Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
One member of the th~ee-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 12S was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows:
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
"b) If the parent is not limited to considering exclusively the minor's
8
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opm10n styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 128, as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court, are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter's
best interests, can the parent take into consideration the 'long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standard or standards is the superior court to apply?
"a) Is the superior court to disrPgard all parental objections that are
not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
"b) If the superior court finds that t.he minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have
an abortion, may the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachusetts law pPrmit a minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informed consent,' 'to obtajn
[a court] order without parental consultat.ion'?
"4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the
superior court, for good rausc shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court. prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application. hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigcncy, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which,
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292-293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
[d., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 I d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. I d., at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
10
Section 128 itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any
parent who "has died or has deserted his or her family."
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. I d., at 294. See n. , infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 128 unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." !d., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent--even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .... " I d., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a min~
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. I d., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." Id., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the statute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair."
Id., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
J11dicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. Gt, infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforeement. 11 Appellants sought

--

11 The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: the best-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion,
he argued, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read the evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about

~
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted probable jurisdiction. - U . S . - (1978).

II
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." 1. 2 This observation, of course,
is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural,'' Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensi- _____a desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 12S proceeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best interests. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 12S could be severed
under established princip1es, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unnecessarily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at 1006-1020.
12 Similarly, the Court said in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976):
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
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-tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying !~i.l!Hiltl
y4ieation- ~inoFEi' eonstitutional 1;
. the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the
t - -- portance of the parental role in child-rearing.

1

I .
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A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham, v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty
interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult
after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had
violated a criminal statute). Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) , the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indis~
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guishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
"conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administrative hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 ( 1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
"concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention." !d., at
550 (plurality opinion).

B
Second, the Court has held that the State~may qHalify ehil i
~al rights when exereise-ef those righ-ts
.J isveh e:! the making of important, affirmative choices with
potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been,
grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experi-.
ence, perspective, and judgment to recognize and· avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them. 13
/
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As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "secur[e] ... the liberty of each man to
decide for himoelf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result) :
"at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
. /"
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice'
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is o n l y /
13
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Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected~
te
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors. 15
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right t.o marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally int.olerable for adults." /d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted).
14 In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a sta.te child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under tho statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 165, permitted
tho State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncededly ... would be invalid,"
id., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State has considerable latitude in enacting laws affecting
minors on the basis of their lesser capacity for mature, affirmative choice,
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c
Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16
But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that "[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). "The
duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." Wiscon/
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S.
503 ( 1969), illusrates that it may not arbitrarily deprive them of their
j eenetitt~tietl Fights altogether. The Court held in Tinker that a school
child's Firs Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a siJ,ent protest
against American involwment in the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by the Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence in the record that their
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever-even nondisruptive discussions--on important political and
moral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 510.
16 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must be
made through parent or guardian).
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sin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 (1972). This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added).
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding./
17

See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some

/

~
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Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639. 18
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With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 12S
Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional
right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973)
with the special int""ijests of ooth the State an
assuFing the Fesponsilile ~-se-of thi& rigRt-by-armi . As
noted above, § 12S was before us in Bellot-ti I, 428 U. S. 132
(1976) , where we remanded the case for interpretation of its
proviSIOI by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
We had previously held in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U. S. 52 ( 1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize
an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. !d., at 74. In Bellotti I, supra, we
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their · "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Ginberg-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972); M eyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). As § 128 is supportive of the interests of parents in their dallg ter's abortion decision, we have no occasion to conaider here whether the
Constitution places any .limits-- on the State's authority to restrict a par~
e ' · lvel'hent inthat decision.

-

-

r
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recognized that§ 12S could be read as "fundamentally
ent from a statute that creates a 'parental veto,' '' id., at 145,
thus "avoid[ing] or substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute." !d., at 148. The question before us-in light of what we have said in the prior
cases-is whether § 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to
seek an abortion. See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts§ 12 (S) does
unduly burden this right. They ~or example, that the \ s t-t~~"'CStJ
mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.
As stated in Part II above, however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make important decisions . ...T
inability of immature minors to make a fully informe choice
that takes account of both immediate and long-range consequences generally makes parental consultation desirable and
in the best interest of the minor. 19 As a general proposition,
such consultation seems particularly desirable with respect to
the abortion aecision-one that raises profound moral, ethical,
and religious concerns. 20 As MR. JusTICE TEWART wrote m
oncurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at
1:

"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her/
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize[d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
20 The expert testimony at the hearings in the District Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I, 393 F. Supp., at 853.
19

RIDER A (oage 17)

As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully
informed choices that take account of both immediate and longrange consequences, a State reasonably may determine that
parental consultation often is desirable and in the best
interest of the minor. 19 1

It may further determine, as a

general proposition, that such consultation is particularly
desirable with respect to the abortion decision -- one that for
some people raises profound moral and religious concerns.

~
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parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 21
But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to
/
seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in importany
ways from other decisions that may be made during minority.
e cone u e a
ese 1 erences reqmre speCia 1
the extent to which the State may restrict a minor's exercise
of her right to seek an abortion.
---------------------------~

A

The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion in Danforth underscored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortjon decisions by describing the procedures followed at the clinic operated by the Parents Aid
Society and Dr. Gerald Zupnick:
"The counseling . . . occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The
physician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques . . . .
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . . " 428 U. S., at 91-92,
~ 2, quoting Bd'f f" AppcllmW ;n B,Uotti v. Boi,d, id., at 132,
21

RIDER B (page 18)
The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique
nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by a
minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity when
it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter.

RIDER C (add to note 21)
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v.

----

-'--

Bolton, id., at 179, we emphasized the importance of the role
of the attending physician.

Those cases involved adult women

presumably capable of selecting and obtaining a competent
physician.

In this case, however, we are concerned only with

minors who, according to the record, may range in age from
children of 12 years to 17-year-old teenagers.

Even the latter

are less likely than adults to know or be able to recognize
ethical, qualified physicians, or to have the means to engage
such professionals.

Many minors who bypass their parents

probably will resort to an abortion clinic, without being able
to distinguish the com?etent and ethical from those that are
incompetent or unethical.

78-329 & 78-330-0PINION

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

19

majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minorityrIn sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
TO be sure, the best choice for a pregnant minor rna
be to abort. Marriage to the father of the chjl.d, arranging
for the adoption of the baby, or even assuming alone the responsibilities of motherhood might well be in her best longrange interests. Parents or others might continue to furnish
needed economic support and mature guidance, even though
the young mother has becorpe legally an adult in some res ects. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that annot
be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching
consequences.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, supra, a.t "the State may not impose a blanket
22 In Massachusetts, for example, although pa7enthood alone ~
remove a minor from the reach of § 128, it does confer adult legal status
in other respects, such as the right to consent to medical care for the
minor's own child and to other kinds of medical care for the minor herself.
See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F (West); n. 34, infra

RIDER D (page 19)

Yet, an abortion may not be the best choice for the minor.

The

circumstances in which this issue arises will vary widely.

In

a given case, alternatives to abortion, such as marriage to the
father of the child, arranging for its adoption, or assuming
the responsibilities of motherhood with the assured support of
family, may be feasible and relevant to the minor's best
interests.
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provision . . requiring the consent of a parent or person in
loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried
minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as
stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a minor, the
unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision make
it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
atient to terminate the patient's pregnan!, regardless of the
reason for withholding consent." Ibid.
the -State decide"SI VJ.Q. t~re. ,-,..-e_
to require a pregnant minor to obtain on or both parentsW c.OV\du.~ tk-t
consent to an abortion, it also must provide
procedur~whereby ~al of parental ~t-may be revleWOO" aoo
l_:;tV\ .:&fen'"~:~
possibly f'CVCFBed.e_.
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a~or~id\"\ c~

~e. o~tCll VI Qc.l ,
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~

l

{(2)

(3-f----e As

1

§ 12S provides for involvement of the state superior court in
----t-.-..,~
minors' abortion decisions, we dis~;s .:,:e
prDc.e.ec ·~~I
J. theae eases in terms of judicial
·
We do not suggest, however,

8

t--:~:----;---:---t==;-;:;:
thF=a;:;t;;;;a;S:;t;;;a;;;te choosing to re~1i~:;~ental consent could not ai~tign tae ~M~
cl12. \ e'l~te t \--..Q_
of Ieviewing denials (}f that.(!(}~ to a juvenile court or an administrative
V
agency or officer. Indeed, much can be said for employing procedures
a.Nev-wd i ~.re. v oc..tct.vve. and a forum less formal than those associated with a court of general
r - - - - - - - -----1 jurisdiction.
(~
The nature of both the State's interest in fostering parential authority
\..:...:..
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may resort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary , criteria such
as age limits, marital status , or membership in the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal disabilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, maturity, but the fact that a minor may bev
very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of the abortion de,

r

o.lte.,. "'""f-;11'~ (:Jroc~d..vve
c:le sc v- ; ~~ ,·~~~, tt--~

+-~----
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sion independently, the desired abortion would be in her best
interests. The proceeding in which ~ t '-vi~ ~~VCI i~
.hnined must assure that a resolution o1 the issue, and any~ .
~.
appeals that may follow, will be completed with sufficient - - - - -- expedition and anonymity to provide an effective opportunity
for an abortion to be obtaineck,~r~ is withnel'-.
·
In sum, the procedure must ensure that the
L..J!!.:t*~~~~rt- parental consent does not in fact amount to
the ' a solute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found
impermissible in Danforth. !d., at 74.

1

fl rovi~I()Y\

re~ult"i~d

B
It is against these requirements that § 128 must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 128 proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." w Attorney General,

I p r!"~~tj
(iY'- /

cJswn
re ui the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the
maturity o minors.
• The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 12S imposed this standard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on parents. See pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." ~at
293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is permissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in th/
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
though § 12S was construed by the highest state court to impose this
restriction, the statute is flawed because the restriction is not apparent on

r

(.9_
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360 N. E. 2d, at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a [§ 12S] proceedin~
may be expected.... The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W]e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge
may also be achieved." /d., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met;· either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order: lbi(P.t
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
pbjectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth~
~ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
~
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or imma~
ture--to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any

I {$)-

its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible
reasons. See Baird III, 450 F. Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this assertion. As a general rule, the interpretation
of a state statute by the State's highest court "is as though written into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953),
and we are obliged to view the restriction on the parental consent requirement "as if [§ 12S] has been so amended by the [Massachusetts] legislature." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948).
Intervenors take issue with the Supreme Judicial Court's assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 12S-and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effect-we must as11u~e that ' the S1,1preme Judicial Court's
judgment is c9~rect.
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parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T]he
consent required by [§ 12S must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died ~
or has deserted his or her family." :r-The Supreme Judicial c}6 J
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of an~
judi~alt-~:~ceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an a or Ion.• I d., at 297.

- - - -• The statute also provides that "[i]f both parents have died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
\..?- "l------4.-e This reading of the statute requires parental consultation and consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, slJ,pra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absence of § 12S: "The ma.ture minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, tho doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
~
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best inter~
ests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of in·
tended medical treatment and where the minor is capable of giving in-

0
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We think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortion. As the District Court recognized,
"there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go to court." Baird Ill, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in superior court provides a effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
e conclude, tlierefore, that under the statutory schem~t ~ l
]
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be permitted Wgo I r-ef' "-C..O.. w
directly to the court without first notifying heyparents.
l<.i ~ E
seek review of that denial would be obstructed by11er parents.
If the court is not persuaded by the mil)or, it may require
that the parents be consulted. 29 If, on the other hand, the
court is satisfied that informing the parents probably would
have the effect of foreclosing the minor's opportunity for
timely judicial review of a denial of parental consent, the
minor then is entitled to make her case on the merits-to
establish either that she is mature enough to reach her abortion decision independently, or that the abortion is in her best
1 in~~rests in any event.
~-=-recognize th_:_ challenge facing a superior court judge

~

\.:3'-

formed consent to that treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwealth ." !d., at 296. The Supreme Judicial Court held that
the common-law rna ture minor rule was inapplicable to abortions because
it had been legislatively superseded by § 128.
__ ~
• Of course, if the minor consults with her parents~voluntarily __ ,__ _ _ _ __

::

.

~
t~::G~: and they withhold consent, she is free to seek
T..,Q.,,~ eemotr~tBm~ilf.

j

v..cA;.e.;of,

n
~.,.

CLu.-\ ~ 0 ~ i

tkt.. Q.~

oo/-1

J ""-

... .;;,..,_
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We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation
such as that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have
the opportunity -- if she so desires -- to go directly to a
court without first consulting or notifying her parents.

If

she satisfies the court that she is mature and well-informed
enough to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own,
the court must authorize her to act without parental
consultation or consent.

If she fails to satisfy the court

that she is competent to make this decision independently, she
must be permitted to show that an abortion nevertheless would
be in her best interest.

If the court is persuaded that it is,

the court must authorize the abortion.

If, however, the court

is not persuaded by the minor that she is mature or that the
abortion would be in her best interest, it may decline to
sanction the operation.

There is, however, an important state interest in
encouraging a family rather than a judicial resolution of a
minor's abortion decision.

Also, as we have observed above,

there is the natural parental interest in the welfare of minor
a child -- an interest that is particularly strong where a
normal family relationship exists and where the child is living
with one or both parents.

These interests properly may be

taken into account by a court called upon to determine whether
an abortion in fact is in a minor's best interests.

If, all

things considered, the court determines that an abortion is in
the minor's bests interests, she is entitled to court
authorization without any parental involvement.

But the court

may deny the abortion request of an immature minor in the
absence of parental consultation if it concludes that her best
interests would be served thereby, or the court may in such a
case defer decision until there is parental consultation in
which the court may participate.

But this is the full extent

to which parental involvement may be required.

28

1

For the

reasons stated abvove, the constitutional right to seek an
abortion may not be unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions
upon initial access to court.
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asked to determine, in the absence of the parents, WE.~
they are likely to refuse consent and obstruct their daughtef's
access to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or judging what decision is in her best interests also would be facilitated, in many cases, by the testimony of the par nts. In
spite of these difficulties, we are convinced t~at, bsent the
opportunity to go directly to the superior court rior to seekof pregnant
ing parental consent, 30 a substantial numb
minors would be prevented from having are 1stic opportunity
to do so later. Massachusetts may choose require that pregnant minors desiring abortions seek the onsent of their par- I
1 ents, who normally will act in the est interest of their
children. But the State must prov· e an adequate safeguard
against the genuine risk that con ltation with some parents
will result in foreclosing the ry nor's opportunity to obtain
judicial review of the denial of parental consent. 31

I

80 This is not to say that th
judge's determination must be made ex
parte. As long as the proceg re does not become unduly burdensome,
the Stat-e itself, through a Msignated official, may choose to be the defendant in such a proct,e(ng. This, apparently, was contemplated by
the Supreme Judicial Co rt as the correct procedure in Massachusetts,
should it be held that t e requirement of parental notice was unconstitutional in some cases. See Attorney General, supra, at 298. Moreover,
subject to prcservati n of the necessary speed, informality and confidentiality of judicial onsent proceedings, our decision imposes no special
rcstrictions on tl sources, other than the parents themselves, to which
the court may tym for evidence.
31 The Dist fct Court believed that parental notification should be dis1 pensed with whenever it was in the "best interests" of the minor to do
so. See B ird III, supra, at 1001. While the best-interests standard is
applicabl in determining the underlying issue of whether the abortion is
proper, It tends to obscure the State's important interest in encouraging
a fa y, rather than a judicial, resolution of the minor's abortion decision.
As ng as the minor's constitutional right to seek the abortion itself is not
u uly burdened, we are hesitant to interfere with the State's efforts to
· volve parents in this important :natter.

I
I

------------------------~

~
I
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(2)
Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird III, supra, at
1004 n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionallv
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
decision has implications far broader than those associate
with mo~other kinds of medical treatment. Botb fatliers aiiQ1 mothers have an interest in helping to etermine what courslisy 'f-e'f \~ Ul.. w/
best for their daughters, and the State is entitled to support .! 1c)..e F
the involvement of both parents, even though doing so may
increase marginally the chance of denial of consent. As we
have said, the fact that parental disapproval may occur is not!
itself a reason for dispensing with an other ise valid consent
requirement.
I
This general rule, however, must b subject to the same
qualification outlined above with r ect to the requirement
of notice to both parents: Them· or must be permitted to go
directly to court without cons ting the parent who she believes will be hostile. If sh convinces the court that seeking
the approval of that p ent probably would result in the
denial of consent and · e obstruction of subsequent access to
the court, then she ·s entitled to establish, without notice to
that parent, eit r that she is mature enough to make her
decision indep 1dently or that the abortion would be in her
best interes m any event. 8 2

J

:.t

32

If tl one parent whose consent has been sought is supportive of the
mino ' right to seek review, the reviewing body may be assisted considerin its difficult factual determinations. If that parent approves ofl

; 'r)Y
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At least when the parents are together and the pregnant minor
is living at home, both the father and mother have an interest
-- one normally supportive -- in helping to determine the
course that is in the best interest of a daughter.

Consent and

involvement by parents in important decisions by minors long
have been recognized as protective of their immaturity.

In the

case of the abortion decision, for reasons we have stated, the
focus of the parents' inquiry should be the best interests of
their daughter.

As every pregnant minor is entitled in the

first instance to go directly to the court for a judicial
determination without prior parental notice, consultation or
consent, the general rule with respect to parental consent does
not unduly burden the constitutional right.

Moreover, where

the pregnant minor goes to her parents and consent is denied,

she still must have recourse to a prompt judical determination
of her maturity or best interests. 29 1

29.

There will be cases where the pregnant minor has received

approval of the abortion decision by one parent.

In that

event, the parent can support the daughter's request for a
prompt judicial determination, and the parent's support should
be given great, if not dispositive, weight.
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(3)
Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered:
"[W] e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
~
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have a~
abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." I d., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights inde~
penaently. See n. --., supra. But we are concerned here
~ "'.J) ...-o~~~~e~:.:the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.
See pp.-- - , supra. A State efioosirtg te impose parental
A consent also must provide an effeetive- method of judicial ref
.. view when that consent is denied. r
e minor satisfies a
LA.s

~~

th e minor's decision, that consent of course will weigh
judicial approval of-the abortion .
_
·-=~ -J

. .·-·-· -- ~
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30.

Appellees and intervenors have argued that §128 violates

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

As we

have concluded that the statute is constitutionally infirm for
other reasons, there is no need to consider this que~
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- " that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully
informed decision, she)Dc~entitled to ma.ke her a or wn '+~"" is J
decisiOn independcntly. 33
e therefore agree with the Disrict Court that § 128 cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been
determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the
r
implications of the choice she has made .
~_j_

.r

·1- ;-

The District Court conclu:: that, in addition to the substantive infirmities it identified in § 128, the statute also
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, apparently because it excepts mino9 seeking
I abortions from the operation of Massachusetts' co'mmon-law
mature minor rule. See p. 9, and n. 28, sup_ 6. Appellees
and intervenors argue that virtually every difference under
Massachusetts law between the treatmen of abortions and
that of other medical procedures to be performed upon minors
also violates the Equal Protection Cla se. 34
I For the reasons stated in Part III upra, we have concluded
that Massachusetts cannot constit tionally permit a judge to
veto the abortion decision of a inor and her physician when
the minor has been found t e mature and fully competent
to act independently in t · respect. In light of that conclusion, we need not decid whether such a veto also would violate the Equal Protec on Clause. The remaining procedural

I

I

applie~-

This rule
l'only when parental consent has been sought and
denied but
cases described in Parts III-B (1) and
(2), supra, in wh· the minor is entitled to proceed in court without notice
to one or bot parents. In such cases, a judicial finding of maturity
means that e abortion cannot be withheld on the basis of the age of
the minor.
34 Und
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F, minors falling into any
of six ategories, such as those who are or have been married and those
serv· g in the armed forces, may consent to most kinds of medical and
d tal care. Only min.ors who are married, widowed, or divorced, how-~
ve~ consent independently to abortion or sterilization.
33

----

als~tote~:~eptional

~
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q/

.
ts 'Impose d on t h ese mature mmors,
.
b ut not on (
reqmremen
adults-parental consultation in most cases and judici:y/review-are amply justified by the State's substantial in~est in
having minors' abortion decisions resolved within the family
whenever possible and preventing improvident abortions by
those not fully qualified to act on their own.
Similarly, we are unpersuaded that treating minors desiring
abortions differently from those seeking other forms of medical
treatment offends the Equal Protection Clause. As we noted
when this case was before us in 1976, "not all distinction
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden." Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U. S., at 149. This is especially true where
minors are involved. The. statutory and common-law rules
at issue are designed to determine when minors in various circumstances should be permitted to give independent consent to
different kinds of medical care. We see no reason to subject
to heightened )ttdicial scrutiny Massachusetts' decision to
allow such coP.sent less readily with respect to abortion than
to other m~dical treatment. "The simple answer to the argument tha't similar requirements are not imposed for other
medi¢ procedures is that such procedures do not involve the
terrrl'ination of a potential human life." Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 480 (1977).

I

Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits

judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
itre uires a mmor o see
e consen of one or o paren s
even if she can satisfy the superior court that as a result con
sent probably would be denied and access to judicial revie
of that denial effectively blocked. 35

~

~ Section

1'28 evidently applies to all nonemergency abortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during

RIDER H (page 29)
parental consultation or notification in every instance,
without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity to receive
an independent judicial determination that she is mature enough
to consent or that an abortion would be in her best

.
31/
1nterests.---
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which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird III, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164-165 (1973).
The propriety of parental involV'ement in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitim:at~e~c~o;n~c;er;n~s;f~o~r~r;;;:;,::;c:-;:k.f\:-:--the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, thefl
Off O,.~U"'-~ ~"'
~on th&exteiJt.-t.&..wh'
adequate
ol ,
.,_
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests ,
're.c o. CCit(),J fo
of a minor in the abortion decision.
COU'-t W~lc.k v.J€.

~ ~<IO....i~col l.s
view assure that no TYl,,....~
best int
at could not otherwise be prohibited by the State uncle
v. Wade, supra. [Thus, although a significant number of a or wns
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
~ The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized that its construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney General, supra, at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that we have impermissibly
asgigned a greater role to the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretation." Ibid.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 12S differently than was done by the. Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691

/~·'
/,/~
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The final question is whet,n'~r, because of these

/

/
32/
shortcomings, §128 must fal.Y 'as a whole. -

While the

/r
severability of state jS tatutes is a matter of state law, we are
not precluded from deciding such questions when properly
presented.

Dorchy v. Kansas, 264

u.s.

286, 290-291

(1924).

The operative provisions of §12S are contained in a single
paragraph.

Portions of this paragraph, as its meaning has been

construed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, are
compatible with the standards of constitutionality set forth in
this opinion.

But the constitutional flaws in the statute are

not isolated in particluar words or phrases.

They are so

interwoven into the fabric of §12S as to make it impossible to
sever them and leave an operative law.

In short, it would be

necessary to rewrite §12S in order for it to comply with
constitutional standards.

This properly is the function of the

legislative branch of government, not the courts.

Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it
invalidates this statute and enjoins its enforcement.
Affirmed

~·--
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r Severance

)JfOblems typically require deciding
-striking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute- is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of se erance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not be ause particular words are found to be defective, but beca e in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be appli without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance ins ch cases may be
1proper when upholding the law in other
plications will be
consistent with the underlying purpo and intended effect
of the law. 11 [W]e need not find the anguage of [a statute]
constitutional in all its possible app · ations in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and it application to [a particular I
case.]" Griffin v. Breckenrid , 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971).
It is only under this latter f m of severance that § 12S could
remain enforceable in part
Although we would h e serious doubts about the propriety
of severing § 12S as
matter of federal law, it is essential
to bear in mind tha e deal here with state legislation. As is
true of state-cou constructions of state law generally, see
n. 36, supra, th aecisions of such courts 11 as to the severability
of a provisio [of state law] is conclusive upon this Court."
Dorchy v. ansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 ( 1924). 11 What they
say the s atutes of that State mean we must accept them to
ether it is declared by limiting the objects of their
lang ge or by separating their provisions into valid and
in~ (~g;;;~ts." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S.

I

I

281 . /

n. 11 (1975), the federal courts are bound by the constructwn of a stat~
statute by the highest court of that State. E. g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ . Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952). We
therefore are obligated to read § 128 as interpreted by the S u p r e m /
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional infirmities discussed in Part III, supra.
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In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not
to rule on the severability of § 12S, as it was then unclear
to what extent, if any, the statute would be declared unco stitutionaP 7 We therefore are not precluded from re hing the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas, sup, a, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave thi important question of state law to the tribunal best suite to decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure alread~ uccessfully
employed in this case provides a practicable m od for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court, Su . Jud. Ct. Rule
3:21 (1978), 38 the following question is c tified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusett . "In light of the
Court's conclusions in this opinion conce ing the constitutionality of § 12S, ma.y this statute be se ered so that it remains
enforceable in part as a matter of assachusetts law?"
So ordered

37 That court
s made it clear in its prior decisions, however, that it is
illing to seve statutes found to be invalid as applied to some persons
r factual se ings. See Del Duca v. Town Administrator, 368 Mass. 1,
3-14, 329 . E. 2d 748, 756 (1975); Thurman v. Chicago, Milwaukee &
t. Paul ., 254 Mass. 569, 151 N. E. 63 (1926); W. & J. Sloane v. Comonwe h, 253 Mass. 529, 534, 149 N. E. 407, 409 (1925).
le 3:21, § 3 (2), calls for "a statement of all facts relevant to the
ue ions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
h questions arose." We believe this opinion, particularly Part I, supra,
tisfies this requirement.
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These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionalit:r
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v,
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
][

A
On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1 The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part :
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files. "
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 128 are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West) .
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen . Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
were made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout this
opinion;
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 3 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent •[to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F . Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978).3
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro8 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stubble.
field, M. D .. (intervenors) 6 appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
{of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp .. at 999'.
Defendants in the suit. appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued
an opinion invalidating § 128. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird !). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of {these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." I d., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." I d., at 855-856. The court
8 In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
1 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
Nos. 78-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively as
appellant8.
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, ...
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." ld., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 12S,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor.8

B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
§ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (Bellotti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District
Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate
questions concerning the meaning of § 12S, pursuant to existing procedure in that State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup.
Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
8 One member of the thl'ee-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 128 was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F. Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows :
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
"b) If the parent is not limited to considering exclusively the minor's

I
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opm10n styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 128, as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court, are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter's
best interests, can the parent take into consideration the 'long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standard or standards is the superior court to apply?
"a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are
not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
"b) If the ::mperior court finds that the minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have
an abortion, ma.y the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachusetts law permit a minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informed consent,' 'to obtain
[a court] order without parental consultation'?
"4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to giv.e consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and pr()oo
cedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which,
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292-293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good cause shown" means that such consent ·shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
!d., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the'
minor is capable of making, .and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 I d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. I d., at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
Section 128 itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any
parent who "has died or has deserted his or her family ."
10
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 128. !d., at 294. Sec n. 27, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 128 until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 128 unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which , in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." !d., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent-even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .... " !d., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. ld., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." ld., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the statute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair."
Id., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 32. infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional. and permanently enjoining its enforcement.11 Appellants sought
11 The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: the best-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion,
he arg4ed, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read the evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted
able jurisdiction. -U.S.- (1978).

pr.ob~

II
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 ( 1967), "whatever may be their pre ..
cise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." 12 This observation. of course,
is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 ( 1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural,'' Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensia desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 12S proceeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best interests. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 12S could be severed
under established principles, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unneoe.ssarily with the vital state
interest in fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at 1006-1020.
12 Similarly, the Court said in Planned Parenthood of Centml Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) :
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
a'dtllts; are protected by the Constitution and posses constitutional rights."
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tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and chil·
drcn. ·w e have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be
equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed. mature manner; and the importance of the parental
role in child-rearing.
A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty
interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult
after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had
violated a criminal statute). Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U. S. 565 (1975), the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistin-

7 -329 & 78-330-SEPARATE

12

7 ' · BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

Indeed, qur acc~ptance of
~· uv~nile cour~s. disti.nct .fr~m t~e: adult c;im~~~l just~ce syste~
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
~reated differently from adults. In order to p:res~rve this ~p~~
:rat~ avenue for dea_ling '£ith ,minors, the C,ou.r t has said that
pearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
"conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administrative hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966):
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsy~._
vania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivati~.ms
a~ are adults, the State is entitled · to adjust its legal syste~
~o account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
uconcern, . ~ ~ sympathy, an~ . : : P!'Lternal attention/' ld., at
§59 (plurality opinion) ,
·
guishable from those of adults.

B
Second, the Court has held that the States validly may
limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the
making of important, affirmative choices with potentially
serious consequences. These rulings have been. grounded in
the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood
and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices tha.t could be
detrimental to them. 13
1s As MR. JusTICE STEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "secur[e] . .. the liberty of each man to
decide for himself what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result):
"at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
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G-insberg v. New York, 390 U. 8. 629 (19~8), illustr.ates :well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved ane
plear examples of constitutionally pr.otect-ep freepOfllS of choice!
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling seKually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the cqnviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. Id., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Collilt always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children r-eaches beyond the
!SCOpe of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally
eould conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors. 15
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults." /d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted) .
a In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a state child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under the statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 165, permitted
the State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncededly . . . would be invalid,"
id., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State has considerable latitude in enacting laws affecting
minors on the basis of their le:sser caparity for mature, affirmative choice,
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c
Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16
But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that "[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). "The
duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." WisconTinJ.·er v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969), illusrates that it may not arbitrarily dC'prive them of their
hrN!om of artion altogrthPr. The Comt JwJd in Tinker thnt a school
child's First Amendment freedom of expre«sion entitled him, contrary to
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a silent protest
against American invohnement in the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by the Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence in the record that their
wearing of black armbands threaten!:'d any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever--<even nondisruptive discussions-on unportant political and
moral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 510.
16 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen . Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
{waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings m'ust be
made through parent or guardian) .
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sin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 (1972) . This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
" [i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added) .
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 17
17

See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism : Some
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Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.18

III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 12S
Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional
right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973),
with the special interest of the State in encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the advice of her parents in making the important decision whether or not to bear a child. As
noted above, § 12S was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132
(1976), where we remanded the case for interpretation of its
provisions by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
We had previously held in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize
an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. !d., at 74. In Bellotti I, supra, we
recognized that § 12S could be read as "fundamentally differReservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above--Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Ginberg-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 842-844 ( 1977) ; Carey v. Population Services, 431 U. S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) ; Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). Cf. Parham v. J. L., - U. S. - (1979) ; id., a t - (opinion
of Mn. JusTICE S'r~;WAR'l', concurring in the esult).
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ent from a statute that creates a 'parental veto,' '' id., at 145,
thus "avoid [ing] or substantially modify [ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute." ld., at 148. The question before us-in light of what we have said in the prior
cases-is whether ~ 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to
seek an abortion. See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ~ 12 (S) does
unduly burden this right. They suggest. for example, that the
mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.
As stated in Part II above, however. parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make important decisions. As
immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed
choices that take account of both immediate and longrange
consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental
consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the
minor. 10 It may further determine, as a general proposition,
that such consultation is particularly desirable with respect to
the abortion decision-one that for some people raises profound moral and religious concerns. 20 As MR. JusTICE STEWART
wrote in concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S., at 91:
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize[d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
20 The expert testimony at the hearings in the District Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I, 393 F. Supp., at 853.
19
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p~r~!lts in nraking the very irnpqrtant decisiqn whE)ther.

or :not to bear a ch11d, That is ~ grav~ decision, an.a -a.
girl of tender years, u~der emotion.al stress, fuay be 'illequipped to make lt without mature a.d.vice ana lemotioxfal
support. It seems unlikely that she will
obtain counsel
'
and support from the attending physiciap at ~n aborfiol}
clinic, where abortions for pregnant mmors frequently
'
•
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 21
'

But we are concernea hf:1fe with a constifUpion11-l righf pg
seek an abortion. The abortion decision diffe~s in important
21

MR. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion in Danforth underscored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortion d~cisio~s by describ:
ing the procedures followed at the clinic operated by the Parents Aid
Society a11d Dr. Gerald Zupniclf:
. ••
"The counseling . . . occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two ho11rs and takes place in groups that
incl4de qoth minors and adult§ who are strangers to one another . . . . The
pljysician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible compli~
cations, and birth control techpiques .•.•
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, . . . may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Ba·ird, id., at 132.
In Roe v. Wade. 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton. id., at 179,
we empha.,;ized the importance of tho role of the attending physician.
Those cn~e::; involved nclult women presuma hly capable of selecting and
obtaining a competent ph~·sirinn . In this ctU:>e, however, we are concerned
only with minors who, according to thr rrcord, mny range in age from
children of 12 years to 17-ycar-old teenagers. Even the latter nre less
likely than adults to know or be able to reeognize ethical, qualified physicians, or to ha,ve 1hr mean::; to engage such profe::>sionals. Many rrtinor~:>
who h)·pa;;:; their parents probably will resort to an abortion clinic, without being able to distingui~h tho competent and ethical from tbo~:~e th[lt
arc incompetent or unethical.
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:ways from other decisions that may be mac4<J during minority.
The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique
nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by a
minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity whei}
it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter.

A
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority.
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
Yet, an abortion may not be the best choice for the minor.
The circumstances in which this issue arises will vary widely.
In a given case, alternatives to abortion, such as marriage to
the father of the child. arranging for its adoption, or assuming
the responsibilities of motherhood with the assured support of
family, may be feasible and relevant to the mnior's best
interests. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that sim-
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ply cannot br postponed. or it will be made by default with
far-reaching consequences.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, supra, at "the State may not impose a blanket
provision ... requiring the consent of a parent or person in
loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried
minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as
stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a minor, the
unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision make
it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding collsent." Ibid. We therefore conclude that if the State decides to require a pregna.nt minor to
obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion. it also
must provide an alternative procedure 22 whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show
either: (1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with
her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; 23 or
2 ~ As § 12S provide~ for involvement. of thr state superior court in
minor;;' abortion drc1~ions, we di sc us.~ the alternative procedure described
in the toext in term~ of judicial procrrding.~ . We do not r:;uggest, however,
that a State chooHing to require parrnt<ll con~ent could not delegate the
alternative proredurr to a juvenile ronrt or an ndministrative agenc~· or
officer. Indeed, murh can be ~aid for employing procrdmes nnd a. forum
le~s formal than tho~e n.-;..o;;ociated with a. court. of gPiwml jurisdiction.
23 ThP nature of both the State's interPst. in for:;tering parental authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may resort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as age limits, marital status, or membership in the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal disabilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, maturity, but the fact that a minor may be
very much a.n adult in some respects does not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidanre and discipline have ended.
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(2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion v,:ould be in her best interests.
The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure
that a resolution of the issur, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed and sufficient expedition and anonymity
to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be
obtained. In sum. the procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to
the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found
impermissible in Danforth. !d., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 128 must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 12S proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests.''~~ Attorney General
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of the abortion decision rrquirr~ tlw opportunit~· for ca;;r-hy-ca:;c evaluation~ of the maturity
of prq~nnnt minors.
21
TllP Suprrmr .Tudirial Court hrld that § 12R impoRrd thiR Rtnndnrd on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same rPst.riction on parent.s. See pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broadrr than that to which a parent mu;;t adhrrc." Attorney Gene1'al, supra, at 293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is prrmissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
though § 128 was construed by the highest state court to impose this
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360 N. E. 2d, at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a [§ 12S] proceedings
may be expected . . . . The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W] e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge
may also be achieved." ld., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. lbid. 25
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or immarestriction, the statute is flawed because the restriction is not apparent on
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible
reasons. See Baird Ill, 450 F . Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this assertion. As a general rule, the interpretation
of a state statute by the State's highest court "is as though written into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 {1953),
and we are obliged to view the restriction on the parental consent requirement "as if [§ 12S] has been so amended by the [Massachusetts] legislature." Winters v. Neu• York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948) .
25 Intervenor,; take i:;~;ue with thr Suprrmr Judicial Court'R assurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 128-and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effectr-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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ture-to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. u[T]he
consent required by [§ 12S must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has udied
or has deserted his or her family." 26 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained uwhere no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion. 27 Id., at 297.
26 The statute al8o providr~ that "riJf both parents havr died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
27 Thi,; reading of the statutE' requires parental com;ultation and consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed wa.s necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absence of § 128: "The ma.ture minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that tl1e circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best inter-
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We think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortion. As the District Court recognized,
1
'there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go to court." Baird III, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in superior court provides a effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation such as
that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have the
opportunity-if she so desires-to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents. If she satisfies
the court that she is mature and well informed enough to
make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the
court must authorize her to act without parental consultation
or consent. If she fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to make this decision independently, she must be permitted to show that an abortion nevertheless would be in her
best interest. If the court is persuaded that it is, the court
must authorize the abortion. If, however, the court is not
persuaded by the minor that she is mature or that the abortion would be in her best interest, it may decline to sanction
the operation.
ests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of intended medical treatment and where the minor is capable of giving informed consent to that treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwealth." Id., at 296. The Supreme Judicial Court held that
the common-law mature minor rule was inapplicable to abortions because
it ha'd been legislatively superseded by § 128.
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There is, however, an important state interest in encouraging a family rather than a judicial resolution of a minor's
abortion decision. Also, as we have observed ab ve, there is
the natural parental interest in the welfare of inor a childan interest that is particularly strong where a normal family
relationship exists and where the child is living with one or
both parents. These interests properly may be taken into
account by a court called upon to determine whether an abortion in fact is in a minor's best interests. If, all things considered, the court determines that an abortion is in the minor's
best interests. she is entitled to court authorization without
any parental involvement. But the court may deny the abortion request of an immature minor in the absence of parental
consultation if it concludes that her best interests would be
served thereby, or the court may in such a case defer decision
until there is parental consultation in which the court may
participate. But this is the full extent to which parental
involvement ma.y be required. 28 For the reasons stated above,
the constitutional right to seek an abortion may not be unduly
burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial access to
court.
(2)
Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird III, supra, at
1004 n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion

or course, if thr minor ron~ults with her parents voluntarily and they
withhold con:sent, :;hr is frf'r to "eek judicinl authorization for the abortion
immedintely.
28
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decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. At least when
the parents arc together and the pregnant minor is living at
home. both the father and mother have an interest-one
normally supportive-ill helping to determine the course that
is in the best interest of a daughter. Consent and involvement by parents in important decisions by minors long have
been recognized as protective of their immaturity. In the
case of the abortion decision, for reasons we have stated, the
focus of the parents' inquiry should be the best interests of
their daughter. As every pregnant minor is entitled in the
first instance to go directly to the court for a judicial determination without prior parental notice, consultation or consent,
the general rule with respect to parental consent does not
unduly burden the constitutional right. Moreover, where
the pregnant minor goes to her parents and consent is denied,
she still must have recourse to a prompt judicial determination
of her maturity or best interests. 20

(3)
Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered:
"[W] e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
20

There will br ca8rs whrrr the prrgnant minor has received approval
of thr abortion df'ri~ion by onr parent. In that event, thr parrnt can
sup]Jort thr daughtrr·~ rc·quest for a ]Jrompt judicial determination, and
the parent's support ~hould be given great, if not cli~po~itive, weight.
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ubortion. Certainly the judge must make a determina.
tion of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role e.f
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor wilt
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." I d., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 23. supra. But we are concerned here
with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.
See pp. - - - , supra. As stated above, if the minor sa tis.
fics a court that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a
fully informf'd decision. she then is entitled to make her abor.
tion decision independelltly. '\Ve therefore agree with the District Court that § 12S cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been
determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the
implications of the choice she has made. 30

IV
Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits
judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
30 Appellrr~ ami int!-'rvPnor~ have arguPd that § 128 viola!<"'::; the Equal
Protection Clan~e of thP FourtePnth AmPndmrnt. A~ we have concluded
that the ~tn tntr i~ ronstitntionally infirm for othrr rpasons, thrrr is no need
to conRider this que;:;tion.
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fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires parental consultation or notification in every instance. without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity·
to recf'ive an independent judicial determination that she is
maturf' enough to consent or that an abortion would be in
her best interests. 31
Th(' final question is whether, because of tlwse shortcomings,
§ 12S must fall as a whole.'~ While the severability of state
2

:n Section 12S rvidently npplies to all nonemergrnc~r nbortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are perfonned during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164-165 (1973).
The propriety of parental involV'Cment in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor'~ health increase. Furthermore, the opportunity for
dirret accr"~ to court which we havr dcscribrd i~ adequate to safrguard
throughout prrgmtnc~· the con~titutionall~· protectf'd intere:<ts of a minor in
the abortion deci~ion. Thus, although n significant number of Rbortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
32 The l\Ia~sac husetts Supremr .Judicial Court recognized that itR construction of § 128 might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney General, supra, at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that we have impermissibly
assigned a greater role to the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretation." Ibid.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 12S differently than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable herP, ~ee Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691
n. 11 {1975), the federal courts are bound by the construction of a state
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statutes is a matter of state law, we are not precluded from
deciding such questions when properly presented. Dorchy v.
Kansas, 264 U. A. 286, 290-291 ( 1924). The operative provisions of § 128 are contained in a single paragraph. Portions
of this paragraph, as its meaning has been construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, are compatible
with the standards of constitutionality set forth in this opinion. But the constitutional flaws in the statute are not isolated in particular words or phrases. They are so interwoven
into the fabric of § 128 as to make it impossible to sever them
and leave an operative law. In short, it would be necessary
to rewrite § 128 in order for it to comply with constitutional
standards. This properly is the function of the legislative
branch of government, not the courts. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidates
this statute and enjoins its enforcement.

Affirmed

statute by the highest court of that State. E. g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952). We
therefore are obligated to read § 128 as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional infirmities discussed in Part III, supra
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These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionalitr
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976) , and Bellotti v,
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) .

I
A

On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1 The court promptly issued a restraining order which remained in effect
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part :
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married, the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of public health sha.ll prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 128 a.re subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Ma s. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was designated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
were made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout this
opinion;
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pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 8 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent '[to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978).G
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro8 The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4 Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof o"f
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the court's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court's opinions in this case, however, that it considered the
constitutionality of § 128 as applied to all pregnant minors who might
be affected by it. We accept that the rights of this entire category of
minors properly were subject to adjudication in this case.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stubble.
field, M. D., (intervenors) 6 appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
{of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp .. at 999.
Defendants in the suit, appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become. pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7
Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued
an opinion invalidating § 12S. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird J). The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id., at 855,
and ''that a significant number of [these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." I d., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." ld., at 855-856. The court
6 In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before this Court as intervenorappellees.
7 As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
Nos. 7&-329 and 78-330 are hereinafter referred to collectively as
appellanl:B.

;
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 128, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, . . .
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." !d., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 128,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor.8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. 8. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
§ 128 was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. 8. 132, 148 ( 1976) (Bellotti 1). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District
Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate
questions concerning the meaning of § 12S, pursuant to existing procedure in that State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup.
Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
8 One member of the three-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 128 was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F . Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows :
" 1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
"b) If the parent is not limited to considering exclusively the minor's

I

7 -329 &

7R-3~0-SEP.\RATE

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

opm10n styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 128, as authoritatively construed by the
upreme Judicial Court, are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter's
best interests, can tl10 parent take into consideration the 'long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standard or standards is the superior court to apply?
"a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are
not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
"b) If the superior court finds that the minor is capable, and has, in
fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have
an abortion, ma.y the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decisiOn is a better one?
" c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachusetts law permit a mmor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informed consent,' 'to obtain
[a court] order without parental consultation'?
"4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 128] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
" 6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecutiOn if a physician performs an
abortion solely with the mmor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about. the statute which,
in its opinion, might assist us in determinmg whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?''
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abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292-293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good cause shown" means that such consent ·shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
ld., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the
minor is capable of making, .and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action." 10 I d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. I d., at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298- 300. Nor does the
Section 12S itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any
parent who "has died or has deserted his or her family."
10
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. !d., at 294. See n. 27, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court,
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 128 until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird Ill). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
unconstitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." !d., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent-even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed . . .." I d., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor

'1
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. Id., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." Id., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the sta.tute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair.')
ld., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 32. i'nfra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement. 11 Appellants sought
The dissenting judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: the best-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion,
he arg4ed, must be treated as if part of the statutory language itself; and
he read the evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's interests be disserved by consulting with her parents about
11
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted
able jurisdiction. -U.S.- (1978).

pr.ob~

II
A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), "whateveP may be their pre ..
cise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." u This observation. of course,
is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural," Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensia desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 128 proceeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidence as to the
minor's maturity and what course would serve her best interests. Finally,
he concluded that the unconstitutional aspect of § 128 could be severed
under established principltes, and that the effect of striking down the statute in its entirety would be to interfere unnecessarily with the vital state
interest m fostering parental rights and responsibilities during the minor's
formative years. See id., at 1006-1020.
12 Similarly, t.he Court said in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) :
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
a'dtilts; are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
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tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and chil·
dren. We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be
equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature ma1mer; and the importance of the parental
role in child-rearing.

'A
The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by ·the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651 , 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty
interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult
after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had
violated a criminal statute) . Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U. S. 565 ( 1975) , the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption .that the constitutional rights of children are indistin-

.
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Indeed, qur aGc~ptance of
;uv~nile cour~s. disti.nct__fr~m t~e: adult c;~m~~~l just\c~ system
assumes that juvenile offenders : constitutionally may . be
~reated differently from adults."
order to p'res~rve this ~P~
ra~ . avenue .for dea_ling ~ith ,Tninors,.. the Cou:rt has .said that
. pearings in juvenile delinquency cases ne~d not necessarily
~'conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
the usual administrative hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
SO, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966);
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsyf:..
'Vania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivati~m~
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
~ account for children's vulnerability and their 'needs f~~
uconcern, . ~ ~ sympathy, anQ. , , , p~ternal attention," Id., a~
{?59 (plurality opinion),
·
guishable from those of adults;

In

of

n

Second, the Court has held that the States validly may
limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the
making of important, affirmative choices with potentially
serious consequences. These rulings have been, grounded in
the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood
and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them. 13

I

11 As MR. JusncE STEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "secur[e] . .. the liberty of each man to
decide for hinL-:elf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in the
result):
"at least in some precisely. delineated a.reas, a child-like someone in a.
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
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Clinsberg v. New York, 390 U. 8. 629 (196,8), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved ane
Glear examples of constitutionally pr.otectep freepOll)S of choice!
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling seKually oriented
magazines to a minor under thfl a,ge of 17 in violation of 11
New York state law. It was conceded that the cqnviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Couvt always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children !leaches beyond the
!'COpe of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 Th~
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors. 15
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults." !d., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted).
14 In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street in violation of a state child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under the statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give them "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 165, permitted
the State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncededly . .. would be invalid,"
id., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State has considerable latitude in enacting laws afi'ecting
minors on the ba:;is of their le:sser capacity for mature, affirmative choice,
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Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adven:·~ governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16
But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that "[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). "The
duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." WisconTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S.
503 (1969) illusrates that it may not arbitrarily deprive them of their
freedom of action altogether. The Court held in Tinker that a school J
·child's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
achool policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a silent protest
against American involvement in the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by the Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." !d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not only because it found no evidence in the record that their
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, but also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever-even nondisruptive discussions-on important political and
moral issues. See Tinker, supra, at 510.
14 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consent required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings m'ust be
made through parent or gu'ardian).
J
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sin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 (1972). This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added) .
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief tha.t the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 17
17

See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
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Under the Constitution, the State can uproperly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge '1f that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.18

III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific con·
stitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 12S
Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional
right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to ter·
minate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973),
with the special interest of the Stat-e in encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the advice of her parents in making the important decision whether or not to bear a child. As
noted above, § 12S was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132
{1976), where we remanded the case for interpretation of its
provisions by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
We had previously held in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U. S. 52 ( 1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize
an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. Id., at 74. In Bellotti I, supra, we
recognized that § 12S could be read as "fundamentally differ-

i

I

.j
I

l

·j

I

Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.
18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above-Pierce, Yoder,
Prince, and Ginberg-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Familiu, 431 U.S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
/Uinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
U. S. (1979); id., a t - (opinion
(1923). Cf. Parham v. J. L., ... of
JusTICE &rEWAR'r, concurring in theK:;ult).
.
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ent from a statute that creates a 'parental veto,''' id., at 145,
thus "avoid[ing] or substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute." ld., at 148. The question before us-in light of what we have saiJ in the prior
cases-is whether § 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to
seek an abortion. See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts § 12 (S) does
unduly burden this right. They suggest, for example, that the
mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.
As stated in Part II above, however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make important decisions. As
immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed
choices that take account of both immediate and lon~ange
consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental
consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the
minor.19 It may further determine, as a general proposition,
that such consultation is particularly desirable with respect to
the abortion decision-one that for some people raises profound moral and religious concerns. 20 As MR. Jus'riCE STEWART
wrote in concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S., at 91:
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
19 In Planned Pal"enthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75, "we emphasize[d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."
so The expert testimony at the hearings in the District Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I, 393 F. Supp., at 853.
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~~r~pts in ntaking the very i~pqrta~t recisiqn wh~ther.
or not to bear a child. That is ~ grav~ decision, ana Ja·
girl of tender years, under emotion.al stress, &ay be tillequipped to make lt without mature ~tdvice ana temotiorf~i
support. It seems unlikely that she will' obtain
counsel
.
and support from the attending physiciap aF ~n !tborFoq
clinic, where abortions for pregnant mmors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitted.) 21
'
•

But we are concerneH hne with a constitufion!l-1 righf f9
seek an abortion. The abortion decision diffe~s in important
11 MR. JusTICE STEWART's

concurring opinion in Danforth underscored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortion d~cisio~s· by describ:
ing the procedures followed at the clinic operated by the Parents Aid
. ..
Society and Dr. Gerald Zupnic~:
"The counseling . . . occurs entirelr on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two ho11rs and takes place in groups that
inclqde 'Qoth Jllinors and adult~ who are strangers to one another. . . . The
pl}ysician takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling i$
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complic~tic;ms, and birth control techpiques , . , ,
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes .. , , The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room . . . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Baird, id., at 132.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, id., at 179,
we emphasized t.hc importance of the role of the attending physician.
Those cas<'8 involved adult women presumably capable of selecting and
obtaining a competent physicinn. In this case, however, we are concerned
only wit.h minors who, according to the record, may range in age from
children of 12 years to 17-year-old teenagers. Even the latter are les8
likely than adults to know or be able to recognize ethical, qualified physicians, or to have the means to engage such profe::;.;;ionals. Many minors
who bypa~ their parents probably will resort. to an abortion clinic, without being able to distingui ~h the competent a.nd ethical from those tha,t
a.fe· incoinpetcut or unethical.

1'8.-:-329 .& ]8-:-33(}--SEPA~AT-:J?
BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

li

:ways from other decisions that may be m~ during minority,
The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique
nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by a
minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity whet)
it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter.

A
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a.
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority.
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
Yet, an abortion may not ·be the best choice for the minor.
The circumstances in which this issue arises will vary widely.
In a given case, alternatives to abortion, such as marriage to
the father of the child. arranging for its adoption, or assuming
the responsibilities of motherhood with the assured support of
family, may be feasible and relevant to the mnior's best
interests. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that sim-

I
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ply cannot be postponed, or it will be made by default with
far-reaching consequences.
For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danfort,'", supra, at "the State may not impose a blanket
provision ... requiring the consent of a parent or person in
loco parentis as a condition for· abortion of an unmarried
minor during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy." Although, as
stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a minor, the
unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision make
it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding consent." Ibid. We therefore conclude that if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to
obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion. it also
must provide an alternative procedure 22 v.:hereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show
either: ( 1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with
her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; 23 or
As § 128 provides for involvement of the sta.te superior court. in
minors' abortion decisions, we discuss the alternative procedure described
in the text in terms of judicial procePdings. We do not suggest, however,
that a State choosing to require parental consent could not. delegate the
altRrnative procedure to a juwnile court or an administrative agency or
officer. Indeed, much can be said for employing procedures and a forum
less formal than those a;;,c:ociated with a court. of geneml juri:;diction.
23 The nature of both the Stat.e's interest in fostering parental authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may resort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as age limits, marital status, br membership in the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal di:;abilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone detem1ine, ma.turity, but the fact that a minor may be
very much an adult in some re:>pccts does not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
22
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('2) that even if she is not abte to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests.
The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure J
that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed and sufficient expedition and anonymity
to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be
obtained. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the pro-,
vision requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to
the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found
impermissible in Danforth. !d., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 12S must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 128 proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests." 24 Attorney General
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of the abortion decision requirrs the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the maturity J
of pregnant minors.
u The SuprPme .Judicial Court hPld that § 12S imposed this standard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same restriction on pa.rents. See pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on a standard broader than that to which a parent must adhere." Attorney General, supra, at 293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision is permissible, the State may not endorse the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the District Court that, even
tho'ugh § 12S wa.s constmed by the highest state court to impose this
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360 N. E. 2d, at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a [§ 12S] proceeding!
may be expected . . . . The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . [W]e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge
may also be achieved." Id., at 298. The court added that if
these expectations were not met, either the Superior Court, in
the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. Ibid. 2 "
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or immarestrictwn, the statute is flawed because the restriction is not apparent on
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible
reasons. See Baird III, 450 F. Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this assertion. As a general rule, the interpretation
of a state statute by the State's highest court "is as though written into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953),
and we are obliged to view the restriction on the parental consent requirement "as if [§ 128] has been so amended by the [Massachusetts] legislature." Winters v. New YorA·, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948) .
25 Intervenors 1ake i~,;ue with thr Suprrme .Judicial Court'R asRurances
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 128-and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effectr-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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ture--to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T]he
consent required by [§ 12S must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has deserted his or her family." 211 The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for
an abortion. 27 Id., at 297.
20 The statutr abo provide;; that "riJf both parents have died, or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
27
Thi~ reading of the :;tatutr rrquirrs parental con~ultation and consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed was necessary. In their first argument before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circumstances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
See 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outlines of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absence of § 12S: "The mature minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical procedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required. If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where the best inter-
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We think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortion. As the District Court recognized,
''there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go to court." Baird Ill, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living a.t home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to ·assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in superior court provides a effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation such as
that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have the
opportunity-if she so desires-to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents. If she satisfies
the court that she is mature and well informed enough to
make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the
court must authorize her to act without parental consultation
or consent. If she fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to make this decision Independently, she must be permitted to show that an abortion nevertheless would be in her
best interest. If the court is persuaded that it is, the court
mu~t authorize the abortion. If, however, the court is not
persuaded by the minor that she is mature or that the abortion would be in her best interest, it may decline to sanction
the operation.
ests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of in·
tended medical treatment. and where the minor is capable of giving informed consent to that treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwealth." !d., at 296. The Supreme Judicial Court held that
the common-law mature minor ru~e was inappiicabie to abortions because
it ·ha'd been legislatively superseded by § 12S.
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There is, however, an important state interest in encouraging a family rather than a judicial resolution of a minor's
abortion decision. Also, as we have observed above, there is
the natural parental interest in the welfare of~ childan interest that is particularly strong where a normal family
relationship exists and where the child is living with one or
both parents: These interests properly may be taken into
account by a court called upon to determine whether an abortion in fact is in a minor's best interests. If, all things considered, the court determines that an abortion is in the minor's
best interests, she is entitled to court authorization without
any parental involvement. But the court may deny the abortion request of an immature minor in the absence of parental
consultation if it concludes that her best interests would be
served thereby, or the court may in such a case defer decision
until there is parental consultation in which the court may
participate. But this is the full extent to which parental
involvement may be required. 28 For the reasons stated above,
the constitutional right to seek an abortion may not be unduly
burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial access to
court.

(2)
Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently." Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird III, supra, at
1004 n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right" to seek an abortion. The abortion
28
Of course, if the minor consults with her parents voluntarily and they
withhold consent , she is frrc to :-rf'k judirial authorization for the abortion
immediately.

Two ~ootlllot£".S
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decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. At least when
the parents are together and the pregnant minor is living at
home, both the father and mother have an interest--one
normally supportive-in helping to determine the course that
is in the best interest of a daughter. Consent and involvement by parents in important decisions by minors long have
been recognized as protective of their immaturity. In the
case of the abortion decision , for reasons we have stated, the
focus of the parents' inquiry should be the best interests of
their daughter. As every pregnant minor is entitled in the
first instance to go directly to the court for a judicial determination without prior parental notice, consultation or consent,
the general rule with respect to parental consent does not
unduly burden the constitutional right. Moreover, where
the pregnant minor goes to her parents and consent is denied,
she still must have recourse to a prompt judicial determination
of her maturity or best interests. 20

(3)
Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered:
"[\V]e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
20 There will be cases where the pn·gnant minor has received approval
of the abortion dC'ci~ion by onC' parent. In that event, the parent can
support thr daughter':; request for a prompt judicial detC'rmination, and
.the parent's support should be given gn·at, if not dispo~ itive, weight .
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fl.bortion. Certainly the judge must make a determina.
tion of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role ef
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." I d., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 23, supra. But we are concerned here
with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.
See pp. - - - - , supra. As stated above, if the minor sa tis.
fies a court that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a
fully informed decision. she then is entitled to make her abor.
tion decision independently. 'Ve therefore agree with the District Court that § 128 cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been
determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the
implications of the choice she has made. 30
·

IV
Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 128 falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits
judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
AppellePs and inh' rvenor~ have argued that § 128 violates the Equal
Prott•ction Clause of th<' Fourternth Amendment. As we have concluded
that the :statute is constitutionally infirm for other real'ons, thrre is no need
to consider this question.
30
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fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires parental consultation or notification in every instance, without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity·
to receive an independent judicial determination that she is
mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in
her best interests. 31
The final question is whether, because of these shortcomings,
§ 128 must fall as a whole. 3 2 While the severability of state
31 Section 12S evidently npplirs to all nonemergrncy abortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are performed during the .carly stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410
113, 164-165 (1973).
The propriety of parental involvoement in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor's health in crease. FurtiH'rmore, thr opportunity for )
direct accr;;s to cou11 which we have drscribccl i;; adrquate to safrguard
throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests of a minor in
the abortion decision . Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
82 The 'Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized that it s construction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney General, supra, at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes that we have impermissibly
assigned a greater role to the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor 's choice unconstitutionally, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretation ." Ibid.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the tenns
of § 12S differently than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invit.ation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Jl1'!1llaney \', Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691
n. n ·.{ 1975), the .federal courts are ·bound by the construction of a state

u.s.

78-329 & 78-330-$EPARATE

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

29

statutes is a matter of state law, we are not precluded from
deciding such questions when properly presented. Dorchy v.
Kansas, 264 U. S. 286. 290-291 (1924). The operative provisions of § 128 are contained in a single paragraph. Portions
of this paragraph, as its meaning has been construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, are compatible
with the standards of constitutionality set forth in this opinion. But the constitutional flaws in the statute are not isolated in particular words or phrases. They are so interwoven
into the fabric of § 128 as to make it impossible to sever them
and leave an operative law. In short, it would be necessary
to rewrite § 128 in order for it to comply with constitutional
standards. This properly is the function of the legislative
branch of government, not the courts. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidates
this statute and enjoins its enforcement.

Affirmed

statute by the highest court of

tha~

State. E. g., Hortonville Joint School

Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; BarJ,;y v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 99 (1952). We
therefore are obligated to read § 12S as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so results in the constitutional infinnities discussed in Part III, supra.

- ------

c..hdV\.AU..tr-

Pr: l I ~ / tt> I

let/ ;2.C> 1...(
I

I

2..'1

I

2..)

1

2.3

I

,_Q\ .

To: The CtJiE:lt" Jus tice
Mr . Just ice Brennan

J»

Mr . Just1c~ Stewart
Mr . J ustice fh1 te
1lr. JU8tJ oe Jl(arehall
lfr. Justice Bl.aok:mun
llr . J ustice R,·•bn-Qllist
Mr . Justic e Stevens

From :
3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE
NOS.

78-329

AND

Mr. Juati oe Powell

Circulated:

-A"..----

UN!~~~ JUN 1~79

78- 330

Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, et al.,
Appellants,
On Appeal from the
78- 329
v.
United States District
William Baird et al.
Court for the District
of Massachusetts.
Jane Hunerwadel, Etc., Appellant,
78-330

v.
William Baird et al.
[May -, 1979]

MR. JusTICE PowELL announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF J usTICE, MR.
J usTICE STEWART, and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST joined.
These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.
They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976) , and Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976 ).
I

A
On August 2, 1974, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass.
Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended
to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."
Shortly before the act was to go into effect, the class action
from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District
Court 1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the
1

The court promptly Issued a restraining order which remained in effect
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act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12S
(West). 2
Section 12S provides in part :
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
has not married , the consent of both the mother and
her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the
mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by
order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such
a hearing will not require appointment of a guardian for
the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent
is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other
person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person
who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is
sufficient. The commissioner of pub1ic health sha.Il prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall
be signed by the proper person or persons and given to
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain
it in his permanent files."
Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent
required by § 12S are subject to injuctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and
12U (West).
until its decision on the merits. Subsequent stays of enforcement were
issued during the complex course of this litigation, with the result that
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 128 (West), never has been enforced by
Massachusetts.
2 As originally enacted, § 128 was destgnated as § 12P of chapter 112.
In 1977, the provision was renumbered as § 128, and the numbering of
subdivisions within the section was eliminated. No changes of substance
wrro made. We shall refer to the section as § 128 throughout this
opinion.
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A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 ( 1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L.
94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). 8 Plaintiffs in the suit,
appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird;
Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is
founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly
performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at
the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home
with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. 4
Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to
give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do
not wish to involve their parents." Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975). Initially there was some
confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions
without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in the
suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr.
Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See·
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.
1978) .5
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that pro8

The proceedings before the court and the substance of its opinion
are described in detail in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 136-143 (1976).
4
Three other minors in similar circumstances were named in the complaint, but the complaint was dismissed as to them for want of proof of
standing. That decision has not been challenged on appeal.
5 Appellants argue that these "immature" minors never were before
the District Court and that the conrt's remedy should have been tailored
to grant relief only to the class of "mature" minors. It is apparent from
the District Court 't< opinion, howevrr, that it conRidered the con~! itutionnlit~· of § 128 a:; applied to all prPgnant minor:s who might bP atferted by
it. Wr nccept that tlw right" of this entin' category of minors proprrly
werr "ubjert to ndjudication.
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vide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stubblefield, M. D .. (intervenors) 6 appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court "accepted [this
group] in a status something more than amici because of
reservations about the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
[of the plaintiff classes in the suit]." Baird v. Bellotti, 450
F. Supp .. at 999.
Defendants in the suit. appellants here in No. 78-329, were
the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the district attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the
class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor
daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She
and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.1
Following three days of testimony. the District Court issued
an opinion invalidating ~ 128. Baird v. Bellotti. 393 F.
Supp. 847 (1975) (Baird J). ·The court rejected appellees'
argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also
are capable of giving informed consent to an abortion, or that
it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an
abortion to have one. See id., at 854. But the court was
convinced that "a substantial number of females under the
age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent." id., at 855,
and "that a significant number of [these] are unwilling to tell
their parents." I d., at 853.
In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the
court stated that "there can be no doubt but that a female's
constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not
depend upon her calendar age." !d., at 855-856. The court
• In 1978, the District Court permitted postjudgment intervention by
these parties, who now appear jointly before tlus Court as intervenorappellees.
r As their positions are closely aligned, if not identical, appellants in
Nos. 78--329 and 78--330 are hereinafter referred to co1lectively as
appellants.
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found no justification for the parental consent limitation
placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the
statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, ...
but in recognizing independent rights of parents." !d., at
856. The "independent" parental rights protected by § 12S,
as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the
best interests of the minor.8
B
Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975).
After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that
§ 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the
statute." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (Bellotti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District
Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate
questions concerning the meaning of § 12S, pursuant to existing procedure in that State. See Mass. Rules of Court, Sup.
Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1978).
On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to
the Supreme Judicial Court. 9 These were answered in an
8 One member of the th11ee-judge court dissented, arguing that the
decision of the majority to allow Mary Moe to proceed in the case without notice to her parents denied them their parental rights without due
process of law, and that § 128 was consistent with the decisions of this
Court recognizing the propriety of parental control over the conduct
of children. See 393 F . Supp., at 857-865.
9 The nine questions certified by the District Court, with footnotes
omitted, are as follows ·
"1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to
apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
"a) Is the parent to consider 'exclusively . . . what will serve the
child's best interests'?
" b) If the parent is not. limited to considering exclusively the minor's
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opmiOn styled Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N. E. 2d 288
(Mass. 1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of ~ 12S. as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court, are the following:
1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter's
best interests, can the parent take into consideration the 'long-term
consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
"c) Other?
"2. What standard or standards is ·the superior court. to apply?
"a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are
not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
"b) If tJ1r superior court finds that thP minor is capable, and has, jn
fact, made and adherPd to, an informed and reasonable decision to have
an abortion, may the court refuse its consPnt basro on a finding that a
parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
"c) Other?
"3. Does the Massachusetts law permit a minor (a) 'capable of giving
informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informed consent,' 'to obtain
[a court] order without parental consultation'?
"4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the
superior court, for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to the parents, and (b), without
subsequent notification?
"5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to
implement c. 112, [§ 12S] which will expedite the application, hearing,
and decision phases of the superior court proceeding provided thereunder?
Appeal?
"6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112,
§ 12F (Stat. 1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to giv.e consent to medical
and dental care in specified circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112, [§ 12S]?
"7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed
counsel?
"8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an
abortion solely w1th the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably,
and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or
more years old or had been married?
"9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which,
in its opinion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the
United States Constitution?"
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abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively
what will serve her best interests. See id., at 292-293.
2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding,
"for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be
granted if found to be in the minor's best interests. The judge
"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.
Id., at 293.
3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the·
minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and
reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to
withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that
the best interests of the minor will not be served by an
abortion." Ibid.
4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may
not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parent's
consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not
available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an
emergency requiring immediate action. " 10 I d., at 294.
Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any
judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.
5. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow
can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and
her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the
Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are
handled expeditiously. I d., at 298.
6. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12F, which provides,
inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most
kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not
apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married,
widowed, or divorced. See id., at 298-300. Nor does the
10
Section 128 itself dispenses with the need for the consent of any
parent who "has died or has deserted his or her family ."
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State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception
to § 12S. I d. , at 294. Sec n. 27, infra.

c
Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court.
appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay
of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could
be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (1977)
(Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding
a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the
District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997
(Mass. 1978) (Baird Ill). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it
un constitutional.
First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is
available. The court believed that the evidence warranted
a finding "that many, perhaps a large ma.iority of 17-year olds
are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial
number of 16-year olds, and some even younger." Id., at
101. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in
the best interests of some "immature" minors-those incapable of giving informed consent--even to inform their parents
of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to
decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her
parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her
right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts
could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be
sought or notice given "in those cases where a court, if given
free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests
that one or both of her parents not be informed .... " Id., at
1002.
Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in
permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor
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found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court
reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. I d., at 1003. Given such a finding,
the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing
between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that
§ 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process
sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as
well]." I d., at 1004.
Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it
termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the sta.tute failed
explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the
minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.
The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's
construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the
statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other,
impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a "chilling
effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent
would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have
to proceed in court.
Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court
considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair."
!d., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give
it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme
Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.
See n. 32, infra. The District Court therefore adhered to its
previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement. 11 Appellants sought
The dissenting Judge agreed that the State could not permit a judge
to override the decision of a minor found to be mature and capable of
giving informed consent to an abortion. He disagreed with the remainder
of the court's conclusions: the best-interests limitation on the withholding of parental consent in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion,
he argued, mnst be treated as 1f part of the statutory language itself; and
he read the evidentiary record as proving that only rarely would a pregnant minor's inten'sts be d.isserved by consulting with her parents about
11
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review in this Court a second time, and we again noted prob..
tl>ble jurisdiction. -U.S.- (1978).

II
A child, merely on account of his minority. is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In
re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967), "whatever may be their pre~
cise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone." ,_ 2 This observation, of course,
is but the beginning of the a11alysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many
respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it, "[c]hildren
have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination
of a State's duty towards children." May v. Anderson, 345
. U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique
role in our society of the family, the institution by which
"we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural," Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion),
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensi~
tivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and chi}..
dren. ''Te have recognilled three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be
a desired abortion. He also noted the value to a judge in a § 12S prooeeding of having the parents before him as a source of evidence as to the
minor's maturit~· and whai eour~c would I"<'ITc her bc~t intcrc~ts. Sec
id., nt lOOG-1020.
12 Similarly, the Court said in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danfo1'th, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) :
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, ate protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."

I dele. t-roll\.
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equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of
children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; aud the importance of the parental
role in child-rearing.
A

The Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is
demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or
property interests by the State. With respect to many of
these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is
virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example,
the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In particular, minors
involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice,
the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their
accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham. v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651. 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children implicates constitutionally protected liberty
interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 l!. 8. 519 (1975) (Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult
after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had
violated a criminal statute). Similarly. in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975), the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.
These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistinguishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of
juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system
assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be
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treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that
hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily
"conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administrative hearing." In re Gault, supra, at
30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by
jury in delinquency adjudications. M cKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1978). Viewed together, our cases show
that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations
as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system
to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
11
concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention." 1d., at
550 (plurality opinion).
B
Second, the Court has held that the States validly may
limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the
making of important, affirmative choices with potentially
serious consequences. These rulings have been grounded in
the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood
and adolescence. minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices tha.t could be
de trim en tal to them. 13
As MR. JusncE STEWART wrote of the exercise by minors of the
First Amendment rights that "sccur[ e] . . . the liberty of each man to
decide for him3clf what he will read and to what he will listen," Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649 (1968) (S•rEWART, J., concurring in the
result):
" [A"lt lra~t in ~orne prcci~rly drlincatcd areas. a child-likE> ~omeon(' in a
captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only
upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults." Jd., at
649-650 (footnotes omitted).

I
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Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), illustrates well
the Court's concern over the inability of children to make
mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are
clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.
At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented
magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a
New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction
could not have stood under the First Amendment if based
upon a sale of the same material to an adult. I d., at 634.
Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached
to First Amendment rights, it concluded that "even where
there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the
state to control the conduct of children rea.ches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults ... ,' " id., at 638, quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944). 14 The
Court was convinced that the New York Legislature ra.tionally
could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in
question presented a danger against which they should be
guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the
argument that the New York law violated the constitutional
rights of minors. 15
In Prince an adult had permitted a child in her custody to sell reli~
gious literature on a public . treet in violation of a state child-labor statute.
The child had been permitted to engage in this activity upon her own
sincere request. 321 U. S., at. 162. In upholding the adult's conviction
under the statute, we found that "the interests of society to protect the
welfare of children" and to give thrm "opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens," id., at 1G5, permitted
the State to enforce its statute, which "[c]oncedeclly ... would be invalid,"
id., at 167, if made applicable to adults.
15 Although the State has considerable latitude in enacting laws affecting
minors on the basis of their le~ser capacity for mature, affirmative choice,
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. 393 U.S.
50:3 (1969), illu~tratr:; that it may not arbitrarily drprive thrm of thrir
heedcm of action alto~<rther . The Court hdcl in Tinker that a school
child's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him, contrary to
14

--
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Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. 16
But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that "[t]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 11 The
duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . .
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 (1972). This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
school policy, to attend school wearing a black armband as a sil.ent protest
against American invohnement in the hostilities in Viet Nam. The Court
acknowledged that the State was permitted to prohibit conduct otherwise
shielded by the Constitution that "for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of thP rights of others." /d., at 513. It
upheld the First Amendment right of the schoolchildren in that case,
however, not, only because it found no evidence in the record that their
wearing of black armbands threatened any substantial interference with
the proper objectives of the school district, bnt also because it appeared
that the challenged policy was intended primarily to stifle any debate
whatsoever-even nondisruptive discussions-on important political and
moral issuPs. Sci' Tinker, supra, at 510.
16 See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., rh. 207, §§ 7, 24, 25, 33, 33A (West
1958 & Supp. 1979) (parental consPnt required for marriage of person
under 18); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 55A (West Supp. 1979)
(waiver of counsel by minor in juvenile delinquency proceedings must be
made through parent or guardian) .

--
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We have believed in this country that this process, in large
·part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical,
religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State
not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the
ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
at 166 (emphasis added) .
Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about
the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role
in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend · any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these
theories, and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, is the belief tha.t the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Ginsberg v. New Y ark, supra, at 639.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 17
Under the Constitution, the State can "properly conclude
17 See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights,'' 1971}
B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605.

7 -329 & 78-330-0PINION

16

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the]
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639. 18

III
With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 128
Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional
right of a woman. in consultation with her physician. to choose
to tC"rminatf' hC'r JH'f'gnancy as f'StablishC'd by Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973),
with the special intf'rest of the State in encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seC'k the advice of her parents in making the important decision whether or not to bear a child. As
noted above, ~ 128 was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132
(1976), where we remanded the case for interpretation of its
provisions by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
We prf'viously hac! held in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U. S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize
an absolute parf'ntal veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. I d., at 74. In Bellotti I, supra, we
recognized that ~ 12S could be read as "fundamentally different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto,' " id., at 145,
thus "avoicl[ing] or substantially modify[ing] the federal con18 The Court's opinions discussed in the text above--Piel'ce, Yoder,
P1ince, and Ginbel'g-all have contributed to a line of decisions suggesting
the existence of a constitutional parental right against undue, adverse
interference by the State. See also Smith v. 01'ganization of Foste1· Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-844 (1977); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S.
678, 708 (1977) (opinion of Mn. JusTICE PowELL); Moore v. City of
i]ast Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). Cf. Parham v. J. L.,- U.S.- (1979); id., a t - (opinion
of MR. Ju;;ncE S·n;WAH'l', concurring in the rc:;ult).
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stitutional challengE' to the statute." Id., at 148. The question before us-in light of what we have said in the prior
cases- is whether § 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to
seek an abortion. See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts§ 12 (S) does
unduly burden this right. They suggest, for example, that the
mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.
As stated in Part II above, however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the
State on a minor's right to make important decisions. As
immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed
choices that take accou 11t of both immediate and long-range
consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental
consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the
minor. 10 It may further determine, as a general proposition,
that such consultation is particularly desirable with respect to
the abortion decision-one that for some people raises profound moral and religious concerns. 20 As MR. JusTICE STEWART
wrote in concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S., at 91:
"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her
parents in making the very important decision whether
10 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 42R U. S., at 75, " we emphasize[d] that our holding [did] not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for tennination of her
pregnancy."
20 The expert trstimon~· at the hrarings in the District Court uniformly
was to the effect that parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision,
if compassionate and supportive, was highly desirable. The findings of
the court reflect this consensus. See Baird I , 393 F. Supp., at 853.

78-329 & 78-330-0PINION

18

BELLOTTI v. BAIRD

or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a
girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be illequipped to make it without mature advice and emotional
support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
and support from the attending physician at an abortion
clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently
take place." (Footnote omitteu.) 21
But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to
seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in important
21 MH. JusTICE STEWART's concurring opinion in Danforth underscored
the need for parental involvement in minors' abortion decisions by describing the procedurPs followed at the rlinic opemted by the Parents Aid
Societ~· and Dr. Gerald Zupnick :
"The rounseling .. . occurs entirPly on the day the abortion is to be
performed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that
include both minors and adults who are strangers to one another. . . . The
physician takes no part in this counseling process .. . . Counseling is
typically limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and birth control techniques . . . .
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being
performed at the [clinic], the physician, . . . may be performing abortions
on many other adults and minors . . . . On busy days patients are scheduled in separate groups, consisting usually of five patients . . . . After
the abortion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and
others in the group in the recovery room .. . ." 428 U. S., at 91-92,
n. 2, quoting Brief for Appellants in Bellotti v. Baird, id. , at 132.
In Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 11:"~ (197:3), and Doe v. Bolton, id., at 179,
we empha~izPd Ow importance of the role of the attending ph~·:sicifm.
Those caPP~ involvNl adult women pre~umably capable of selerting and
obtaining :1 eompPtrnt physirian. In thi~ rm;e, howrver, we arr concerned
only with miuor:s who, nrrording to thr rrcord, ma~· range in agr from
childrPn of 12 ~·ean; to 17-year-old tPPnagrr:,;. Even the latter are less
like])· than adults to know or br ablr to rerognizP rthical, qualified physician;;, or to havr the mPan,.; to rngagP such profe::'--<ional;;. :\Iany minor~
who bypa;.;;; their parent~ probabl~· will rrKort. to all clbortion clinir, without bring ablr to distingui~h tlw competeut and l'thical from those that
are incompeteJJL or unethical.
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ways from other decisions that may be made during minority.
The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique
nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by a
minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity when
it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter.

A
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those
facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to
marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of
majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She
and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for
later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant
adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty
of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks
from the onset of pregnancy.
Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable
education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a
child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood,
like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional
criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority.
In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible.
Yet, a.n abortion may not be the best choice for the minor.
The circumstances in which this issue arises will vary widely.
In a given case, alternatives to abortion , such as marriage to
the father of the child, arranging for its adoption, or assuming
the responsibilities of motherhood with the assured support of
family, may be feasible alld relevant to the minor's best I
interests. :\fonetheless, tht> abortion decision is one that sim-
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ply cannot be postponed. or it will be made by default with
far-reaching consequences.
For these reasons. as we held in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth. supra., at 74. "the State may not impose a bla11ket l
provision ... requiring the consent of a parent or person in
loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried
minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy." Although, 1
as stated in Part IT. supra, such deference to parents may be
permissible with respect to other choices facing a miuor, the
unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision make
it inappropriate "to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary. veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding consent." Ibid. We therefore conclude that if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to
obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also
must provide an alternative procedure 22 whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.
A pregnant niinor is entitled in such a proceeding to show
either: ( 1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision. in consultation with
her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; 23 or
22 As § 128 provideR for involvement. of the state superior court in
minorti' abortion derisions, we discuss the :Uternative procedure described
in the text in terms of judicial proceeding::;. We do not suggest, however,
that a State choosing to require parental consent could not delegate the
alternative procedure to a. juvenilo court or an administrative agenr~' or
officer. Indeed, much can be said for employing procedmes and a forum
less formal than those a:;sociated with a court of general jurisdiction.
23 The nature of both the StatJe'8 interest in fostering parental authority
and the problem of determining "maturity" makes clear why the State generally may resort to objectiYe, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as ago limits, marital status, or membership in the armed forces for lifting
some or all of the legal disabilities of minority. Not only is it difficult to
define, let alone determine, maturity, but the fact that a minor may be
very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended.
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{2) that even if she is not able to make this decision indc~
pendently, the desired abortion \Vould be in her best interests.
The proceeding i11 which this showing is made must assure
that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will b<' completed with anonynimity and sufficient expedition to provicl<' an effective opportunity for an abortion to be
obtained. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the pro.
vision requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to
the "absolute, and possibly at:bitrary, veto" that was found
impermissible in Danforth. !d., at 74.

B
It is against these requirements that § 12S must be tested.
We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the
highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the
concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion
decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the
superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he
deems necessary." A superior court judge presiding over a
§ 12S proceeding "must disregard all parental objections, and
other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what
would serve the minor's best interests."~' Attorney General
As discussed in the text, however, the peculiar nature of the abortion decision re()uireR the 011portunity for eaHe-by-cm;e evaluations of the maturity
of prt>gnant minors.
21 The Suprt>me .Tudic·ial Court held that § 12S impo;;€'d this Rtnndard on
the Superior Court in large part because it construed the statute as containing the same rest.riction on parents. See pp. 6-7, supra. The court
concluded that the judge should not be entitled "to exercise his authority
on n ~tnndnrd broach•r 1han that to which a parent mu~t adhere." Attorney Gen!'ral. supra. a1 293.
Intervenors argue that, assuming state-supported parental involvement
in the minor's abortion decision if' prrmissible, the State may not rndorsr the
withholding of parental consent for any reason not believed to be in the
minor's best interests. They agree with the Di~trict Court. that, even
though § 12S wa.~ eohf'inted hy the highest state eourt to impose thi~

I
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360 N. E. 2d. at 293. The Rupreme Judicial Court also
stated that "[p]rompt resolution of a r§ 12S] proceedings
may be expected . . . . The proceeding need not be brought in
the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment
or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and
her parents. . . . rwl e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a jurl~ment of a Superior Court judge
may also be achieverl." lrl .. at. 29R The court adclecl t.hat if
thC'SC' C''XIW('bltioJI.' 11 C'n' 11ot 1111'l. l·ither tl1e Snpl'l'ior Court. in
the exercise of its rulemaking power. or the Supreme Judicial
Court would be \Yilling to eliminate any undue burdens by
rule or order. Ib·id. 2 "
Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was
objectionable in the statute succesfully challenged in Danforth,
§ 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.
We now consider these.
(1)
Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court
was whether § 12S permits any minors-mature or imma~
restriction, the statute is Aawed because the restriction is not apparent on
its face. Intervenors thus concur in the District Court's assumption that
the statute will encourage parents to withhold consent for impermissible
reasons. See Baird III, 450 F. Supp., at 1004-1005; Baird II, 428 F. Supp.,
at 855-856.
There is no basis for this assertion. As a general rule, the interpretation
of a state statute by the State's highest court "is as t.hough written into
the ordinance itself," Poulos v. New Hampshire. 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953),
and we are obliged to view the restriction on the pa.rental consent requirement "as if [§ 12S] ha>; been so amended by the [Massachusetts] legislature." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948) .
25 Intrrvrnor.~ iakr iR~\H' with thr Supreme Judicial Conrt's as~uranres
that judicial proceedings will provide the necessary confidentiality, lack of
procedural burden, and speed of resolution. In the absence of any evidence as to the operation of judicial proceedings under § 128-and there is
none, since appellees successfully sought to enjoin Massachusetts from putting it into effectr-we must assume that the Supreme Judicial Court's
judgment is correct.
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ture-to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any
parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The
state court answered that, in general, they may not. "[T]he
consent required by [ § 12S must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen
years of age and unmarried." Attorney General, supra, at
294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule,
making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died
or has desrrted his or hrr family." :!G The Supreme Judicial
Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or
statutory substitute) is available." Ibid. The court also
ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any
judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent foi'
an abortion. 27 /d., at 297.
2
n The statute al~o provirles that " riJf both parents have died, or hav!!
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person
having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who has assumed the
care and custody of mother is sufficient."
27
Thi~ rrading of thr ~tatutr I"PCJuirr~ parental consultation and consent
more strictly than appellants themselves previously believed was necessary. In their fir t argument ·before this Court, and again before the
Supreme Judicial Court, appellants argued that § 12S was not intended
to abrogate Massachusetts' common-law "mature minor" rule as it applies
to abortions. See 428 U. S., at 144. They also suggested that, under
some circum tances, § 12S might permit even immature minors to obtain
judicial approval for an abortion without any parental consultation.
Sec 428 U. S., at 145; Attorney General, supra, at 294. The Supreme
Judicial Court sketched the outline of the mature minor rule that would
apply in the absenre of § 12S: "The mature minor rule calls for an analysis
of the nature of the operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the
minor to understand fully what the medical prooedure involves. . . .
Judicial intervention is not required . If judicial approval is obtained,
however, the doctor is protected from a subsequent claim that the circumstances did not warrant his reliance on the mature minor rule, and, of
course, the minor is afforded advance protection against a misapplication
of the rule ." Attorney General, supra, at 295. "We conclude that, apart
{rom statutory lim1tati£>ns. wh~h are conatittttion:l.l, where the best inter-
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We think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortion. As the District Court recognized,
"there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
pnwent, the minor's right to go to court." Baird III, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be so
in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in superior court provides an effective I
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation such as
that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have the
opportunity-if she so desires-to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents. If she satisfies
the court that she is mature and well-informed enough to
make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the
court must authorize her to act without parental consultation
or consent. If she fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to make this decision independently, she must be permitted to show that an abortion nevertheless would be in her
best interest. If the court is persuaded that it is, the court
must authorize the abortion. If, however, the court is not
persuaded by the minor that she is mature or that the abortion would be in her best interest, it may decline to sanction
the operation.
ests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her parents of intended medical treatment and where the minor is capable of giving informed consent to that treatment, the mature minor rule applies in this
Commonwealth." ld., at 296. The Supreme Judicial Court held that
the common-law mature minor rule was inapplicable to abortions because
it had been legislatively superseded by § 128.

18-il29 &
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There is, however, an important state interest in encouraging a family rather than a judicial resolution of a minor's
abortion decision. Also. as we have observed above, parents
naturally takr an interrst iu thr welfare of their childrenan interest that is particularly strong where a normal family
relationship exists and where the child is living with oue or
both parents. These factors properly may be taken into
account by a court called upon to determine whether an abortion in fact is in a minor's best interests. If, all things considered , the court determines that an abortion is in the minor's
best interests, she is entitled to court authorization without
any parental involvem('nt. On the other hand, the court may
deny thr abortion Tequest of an immature minor in the absence
of pareutal consultation if it concludes that her best interests
would be served thereby. or the court may in such a case defer
decision until there is parental cousultation in which the court
may participate. But this is the full extent to which parental
involvement may be required .28 For the reasons stated above,
the coustitutional right to seek an abortion may not be unduly
burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial access to
court.
(2)
Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's
abortion. The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with
the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing
about abortions requires the minor's interest to be treated differently. " Baird I, supra, at 852. See Baird Ill, supra, at
1004n. 9.
We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally
burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion. The abortion
Of course, if the minor commits with her parent::; voluntarily and th e~·
withhold consrnt, ~ hr is frPe to ~er k judicial authorization for the abortion
immcclia t e l~· .
28

I
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decision has implications far broader than those associated
with most other kinds of medical treatment. At least when
the parents arc together and the pregnant minor is living at
homE:'. both the father and mother have an interest--one
normally supportive-in helping to determine the course that
is in the best interest of a daughter. Consent and involvement by parents in important decisions by minors long have
been recognized as protective of their immaturity. In the
case of the abortion decision, for reasons we have sta.ted, the
focus of the parents' inquiry should be the best interests of
their daughter. As every pregnant minor is entitled in the
first instance to go directly to the court for a judicial determination without prior parental notice, consultation or consent,
the general rule with respect to parental consent does not
unduly burden the constitutional right. Moreover, where
the pregnant minor goes to her parents and consent is denied,
she still must have recourse to a prompt judicial determination
of her maturity or best interests. 29
(3)

Another of the questions certified by the District Court to
the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: "If the superior
court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has,
in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent on a
finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better
one?" Attorney General, supra, at 293 n. 5. To this the
state court answered:
"[W] e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an
29

There will be eases where the pregnant minor has received approval
of the abortion deci~ion by one parent. In that event, the parent can
~;>upport the daughter's request for a prompt judicial determination, and
the parent's ::;upport :-;hould be given grrnt, if not dispo~itive, weight.
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abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of
the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is
to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of
all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the
judge will give great weight to the minor's determination,
if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where
he determines that the best interests of the minor will
not he served by an abortion, the judge's determination
should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported
by the evidence and adequate findings of fact." !d., at
293.
The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general
rule that a Sta.te may require a minor to wait until the age of
majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 23, supra. But we are concerned here
with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.
See pp. 18-20, supra. As stated above. if the minor sa.tisfies a court that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a
fully informed decision. she then is entitled to make her abortion decision independently. We therefore agree with the District Court that § 12S cannot constitutionally permit judicial
disregard of the abortio11 decision of a minor who has been
determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the
implications of the choice she has made. 30

IV
Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
§ 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits

judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a
minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and
30 Appellees and intervenor~' haw argued that § 128 violate~ the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fomteenth Amendment. As we have concluded
that the statute is constitutionally infirm foF other reasons, there is no need
to con8ider this que~tion.
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fully competent to make this decision independently. Second,
it requires parental consultation or notification in every instance, without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity
to receive an independent judicial determination that she is
mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in
her best interests.H 1 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of \
the District Court insofar as it invalidates this statute and
enjoins its enforcement. 32
Affirmed
Section 128 evidently applies to all nonemergency abortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird Ill, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, t~
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade, .
410 U. 8. 113, 164-165 (1973).
The propriety of parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns forthe pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the opportunity for·
direct access to court which we have described is adequate to safeguard
throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests of a minor in
the abortion decision. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 128 might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required'
for them.
12 The opinion of Mu . .Tus'I'JCE Snw~:Ns, concurring in the judgment,_
joined by three Members of the Court, characterizes this opinion as "advisory" and the questions it addresses as "hypothPtical. " Apparently this
is criticism of our attempt to provide some guidance as to how a State
constitutionall~· may provide for adult. involvemPnt-eithrr by parents or
a state official such a~< a judge-in the abortion decisions of minors. In
view of the import~mce of the i;s,;ue mir:Pd, and thP protracted litigatioiJ to
which the:;:e parties already havP been subjected . we think it would be
irrespon~<ible :;imply to invalidate § 128 without stating our vi ew ~ a ~ to the
controlling principles.
The statute before us today is the same one that was here in Bellotti I,
su,ra. The issues it present.s were not thrn deemed "hypothetical." In
31

d~le l-r/1\o'\.
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a unanimous opm10n, we remanded the case with directions that appropriate questions l:>f' certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts "concerning the mt>aning of [§ 12S] and the procedure it imposes."
Id., at 151. We directffi that. this be done because, as stated in the opinion, we thought the construction of§ 128 urged by appellants would "avoid
or substantially modify t.he federal constitutional challrnge to the statute."
!d., at 148. The central feature of § 12S was its provision that a state
court judge could make the ult.imate decision, when necessary, as to the
exercise by a minor of the right. t.o an abortion. See id., at 145. We held
that this "would be fundamentally different from a statute that creates a
'paft'ntal veto' [of the kind rejected in Danj01·th.]" Ibid. (footnote
omitted). Thus, all Members of the Court agreed that providing for decisionmaking authority in a judge was not the kind of veto power held
invalid in Danforth. The ba:;ic is:;ues that wer<' before us in Bellotti I
remain in the case, sharpened by the const.mction of§ 12S by the Supreme
Judicial Court.

lfp/ss

5/30/79

Rider A, p. 17 (Bellotti)

With these principles in mind, we consider their
relevance to the case before us .

In §12(S) Massachusetts has

attempted to reconcile the constituional right of a woman to
terminate her pregnancy as stated and limited in Roe v. Wade,
410

u.s.

113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410

u.s.

179 (1973)

with the special interests of both the state and parents in
the exercise of this right by a minor.

As noted above, §12

(S) was before us in Bellotti v. Baird, 428

u.s.

132 (1976)

(Bellotti I), where we remanded the case for interpretation
of its provision by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.

We had previously held in Planned Parenthood

v. Danforth, 428

u.s.

52 (1976) that a state could not

lawfully authorize an absolute parental veto over the
decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy.

Id., at 74.

In Bellotti I we recognized that if §12(S) were interpreted
as appellants argued it should be, it would be "fundamentally
different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto'"·
Id., at 145.

We also observed that the Massachusetts statute

is "susceptible of the interpretation offered by appellants •
• • and that such an interpretation would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to
the statute." Id., at 148.

The question before us- in light

of what we have said in the prior cases - is whether §12(5)
as now interpreted provides for parental notice and consent
in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to seek an

2.

abortion.

See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors, sustained in large part

by the district court, contend that even as interpreted by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts §12(8) does
unduly burden this right.

They argue, first, that the mere

requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.

We

think this argument lacks merit in view of what was said in
Bellotti, id., at 145-148.

Moreover, as stated in Part II

above, both parental notice and consent are qualifications
that typically may be imposed by the state on a minor's right
to make informed decisions.

The inability of immature minors

to make a fully informed choice that takes account of both
immediate and long-range consequences generally makes
parental consultation desirable and in the best interest of
the minor.

As a general proposition such consultation seems

particularly desirable with respect to the abortion decision
- one that

implicates profound moral, ethical, and religious

concerns.l9/

As Mr. Justice Stewart wrote in concurrence in

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428

u.s.,

at 91:

{here copy quotation beginning at the bottom
of page 17 and ending at top of page 18)

But we are concerned here with a constitutional

3.

right to seek an abortion.

We conclude, therefore, that

although a state may impose certain requirements with respect
to parental notification and consent, these must be limited
to assure the minor's freedom to exercise her right to seek
an abortion if she is found to be mature or if this is found
to be in her best interest.

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 24 (Bellotti)

We conclude, therefore, that under the statutory
scheme adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be permitted
to go directly to the court without first consulting or
notifying her parents. She must be given an opportunity to
satisfy the judge that consent probably would be denied, with
consequent parental efforts to block access to the Court.

If

the court is not persuaded by the minor, or if he concludes
that - by virtue of her manifestly immature age or otherwise
- it would be in her best interests to have parental
guidance, he may require that the parents be consulted.

If,

on the other hand, the Court is convinced that informing the
parents probably would have the effect of foreclosing the
minor's opportunity for timely judicial review of a denial of
parental consent, the minor then is entitled to make her case
on the merits - to establish either that she is mature enough
to reach her abortion decision independently, or that the
abortion is in her best interests in any event.

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 25 (Bellotti)

Massachusetts may choose to require that a pregnant minor
seek her parents' consent to the abortion decision, as
normally they will be motivated by the best interest of their
child.

But the state must provide an adequate safeguard

against the genuine risk that consultation with some parents
will result in foreclosing the minor's opportunity to obtain
judicial review of the abortion decisions. lQ/

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 26 (Bellotti)

This general rule, however, must be subject to the
same qualification outlined above with respect to the
requirement of parental notice:
the Court, and if she

the minor may go directly to

~

~85~a8e~

~

it that seeking the approval

of both parents rather than one probably would result in the
denial of consent, with consequent parental efforts to block
access to the Court, then the minor is entitled to establish
either that she is mature or that the abortion would be in
her best interest in any event.l!/
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Rider A, p. 28 (Bellotti.)

But we are concerned here with the exercise of a
constitutional right, and one of unique character.

A state

choosing to impose parental consent as a preliminary
requirement also must provide an effective method of judicial
review.

lfp/ss

~

Rid!£.JY p... · 11 (Bellotti)
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t .h e special ~.~interests of both the state and parents in

''1 Q'"h<.

~fu-1'-f

/tgiA

~A: xercise of this right by a minor.

As noted above,

before us in Bellotti v. Baird, 428

u.s.

§l2T

(1976~

132

(Bellot ti I) , where we remanded the case for interpretation

~
~

of its provision by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.

We had previously held in Planned Parenthood

v. Danforth, 428

u.s.

52 (1976} that a

~ate

could not

lawfully authorize an absolute parental veto over the
decision of a minor to terminate her

5X'iP V:~ /

In Bellotti IfWe recognized tha~

u 1/71 t~l/)

-

preg~anc

'r

J

+¥§l2@?l
~

•

Id., at 74.

~~~

~~~~~~~~~
«A(}

as ~pellants ~~·~sh~~~~~~~~~~~"J

different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto'"?

7

_9_., at

1~

We= elee ebeerveet t'As& \Jse

Meeeer~et!ft'\l"t'"e-

is ""' ~useeptible- o£- t-h-e-I n erpreta (- 1~ . offered by . appelrcrnt
- - - . and that: su

substantially

~ ) \.

\G:'A;'\1.1>

~n interpretatio11 wou d ' avo1d) (51-

mod~e

federal constitutional challenge to

the statute." Id., at 148.

The question before us- in light

of what we have said in the prior cases - is whether §12(S)
.tw 'J~--;>
(
~ -~ as · now~interpreted Aprovides for parental notice and consent

l

~t unduly burden the right to seek an

in a manner

.s"r. .~(.
T~k<.~tt'
~

---

)

..,/

2.

abortion.

See id., at 147.
Appellees and intervenors , su~tained in large part

r by the- g i strict cow:.tY::ntend that even as interpreted by

the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts §12(S) does
unduly burden this right.

They argue, first, that the mere

requirement of parental notice constitutes sue~ bur~
ink this argument lacks mer1

Bellotti,

~

above ~both

at

1n view of what was said i

145-1~ s

stated in Part II

parental notice and consent are qualifications

that typically may be imposed by the state on a minor's right
to make informed decisions.

The inability of immature minors

to make a fully informed choice that takes account of both
immediate and long-range consequences generally makes
parental consultation desirable and in the best interest of

-lYAs a genera 1 propos1t1on
. .
.
.
t h e m1nor.
sue h consu 1 tat1on
seems
particularly desirable with respect to the abortion decision
-one that

J:"tllcaLEt, profound

~

concerns.~

moral, ethical, and religious

As Mr. Justice Stewart wrote in concurrence in

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428

u.s.,

at 91:

(here copy quotation beginning at the

botto~

\ of page 17 and ending at top of page 18)

""--

~t

~

-~

we are concerned here with a constitutional

---

-....

r---

3.

~~~~--a~ abor~~~·
~

We conclude, therefore, that

although a state may impose certain requirements with respect
to parental notification and consent, these must be limited
to assure the minor's freedom to exercise her right to seek
an abortion if she ,is found to be mature or if this is found
be in her best interest.

lfp/ss

--s~

Rider

C-

«,

p-. 24- ("mrti"ottit

We conclude, therefore, that under the statutory
scheme adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be permitted
to go directly to the court without first consulting or
notifying her parents. She must be given an opportunity to
~ lrfl "'"
satisfy the judge that consent probably would be denied, witl'l*
5~~/o;.-147 rlc4-«-1z~·,u ~f~~~.f~(~,~r<_~'-.l'lr~
consef:JI29At paretrt.al efforts to b-~ a~s- t-o- the- €ourt.
If v ~ ·'~

the court is not persuaded by the minor,
)~~<-

that; B

·

her

r

if~

manifest~mmatur~+t~et

pt~~

concludes

•• a'lb tvui:!!e-

best interests to have parental

guidance, \~

may require that the parents be consulted.

If,

on the other hand, the )iourt is convinced that informing the
parents probably would have the effect of foreclosing the
minor's opportunity for timely judicial review of a denial of
parental consent, the minor then is entitled to make her case
on the merits - to establish either that she is mature enough
to reach her abortion decision independently, or that the
abortion is in her best interests in any event.

(

lfp/ss
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0
;R._id~r It;

-p. ¥5 ( B~lle!£j:)

9

Massachusetts may choos~ to require ~hat ~egnant minor s
~Y.I~ ~v-( ~ ~/c_ V'-< ~~4 "( 'r.c.u-p ~.. ~.., t..(. {
seek nen; parents' cam;Qnt;, te 'eh~ abortion decision, -as

A..

t!ii/1"-..d~

normally ~will l;a :u to :is e al~e by the best in teres;{ of their
child~But the ~tate must provide an adequate safeguard

against the genuine risk that consultation with some parents
will result in foreclosing the minor's opportunity to obtain
. d'1c1a
. 1 rev1ew
.
:{p~,
c.n-4~
30/
JU
of t he ~
auortlOA
uee1~1en~ __
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This general rule, however, must be subject to the
same qualification outlined above with respect to the

.

requirement of parental notice:

!ohs

C)..-

Go~,-and

.

1£ she

.

\f.tbQ'f1-~ifte~
(. ~(/'
~ay go

~
A

:pet:e~ades

directly

-.
_,-~ o-

~~

.

a that seek1ng the approval

of both parents rather than one probably

~~~result

in the

~ 0~5-trtAcJ..,~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ c.f
·
denial of consent ,-with con~e~tleA~ par:ental. efforts to· ::btne+access to

the~ourt,

~-~ ~'-Gt ~(l;Y. ~

then the minor is entitled to

establis~)

either that she is mature or that the abortion would be in
her best interest in any event.l!/

~
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Rider A, p. 28 (Bellotti)

But we are concerned here with the exercise
constitutional right, and
choosing to
~r!:j~u'tEiill"ftt

also must provide an effective method of

-

~-~
v--~ '~rt-

tS

~f.J.
I

~ndicial

>--
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Rider A, p. 17 (Bellotti)

As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully
informed choices that take account of both intermediate and
long-range consequences, a state reasonably may determine
generally that parental consultation is desirable and in the
best interest of the minor.

It may further determine, as a

general proposition, that such consultation is particularly
desirable with respect to the abortion decision - one that
raises profound moral, ethical and religious concerns.20/

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 30 (Bellotti)

The final question is whether, because of these
shortcomings, S12S must fall as a whole.2!/

While the

severability of state statutes is a matter of state law, we
are not precluded from deciding such questions when properly
presented.

Dorchy v. Kansas, 264

u.s.

286, 290-291 (1924).

The operative provisions of S12S are contained in a single
paragraph.

Portions of this paragraph, as its meaning has

been construed by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, are compatible with the standards of
constitutionality set forth in today's opinion.

But the

constitutional flaws are so interwoven into the fabric of
§12S as to make it impossible to severe them and leave an
operative statute.

In short, it would be necessary to

rewrite S12S to comply with constitutional standards.
properly is the function of the legislative branch of
government, not the courts.

Accordingly, we affirm the

This

2.

judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidated this
statute and enjoined its enforceability.

Affirmed.

RIDER B (page 19)

a- abt',l~ ~

'"Vf,

To be sure, \ the best choice for the

.f ~,.. ....
minor ~ ma¥-~be-~ .• ~t.

Serious indecision on the part of the minor or deeply held
reliqious or moral beliefs likely to cause subsequent remorse
and regret would weigh against an abortion for a minor who is
understandably preoccupied with the immediate embarrassment and
hardship of her pregnancy.

The possibility of other

alternatives realistically open in a given case, such a mariage
to the father of the child, arranging for the adoption of the
baby, or assuming the responsibilities of motherhood with the
support of family and friends, also could be relevant to a
minor's best interest in an abortion decision.

l~p/ss
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Rider

A~

p. · 24 (Bellotti)

We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation
such as that undertaken by Massachusetts, the minor must be
permitted - if she so desires - to go directly to the court
without first consulting or notifying her parents.

She must

be given the opportunity to satisfy the court that an
.................
..... .. .. ..-· ....

_abortion would be in her best interests or that she is mature
enough and well enough informed to make intelligently the
abortion decision without parental consultation.

. . ...
..... .. ..
············-····

········· ········
----- --------

If the

court is not persuaded by the minor, it may decline to
.... ....

·-··········

authorize the abortion.

If, however, the court is persuaded

that the abortion is in the minor's best interests or that
she is qualified to make the determination herself, then it
must authorize the operation.
There · is, however, an important state interest in
encouraging a family rather than a judicial resolution of a
minor's abortion decision.

Also, as we have observed above,

there is the natural parental interest in the. welfare of a

.. ...............
.. .......... .......•..
.

2.

minor child

. ....
··········

- an interest that is particular strong where a

normal family relationship exists and where the child is
living with one or both parents.

These interests properly

may be taken into account by a court called upon to determine
whether an abortion in fact is in a minor's best interests.
...•... . ........•.

· ··· ············

The court may deny the abortion request of an immature minor
if it concludes that her best interests would be served by
parental consultation, or the court may defer decision until
there is parental consultation in which the court may
participate.

But this is the full extent to which parental

w
consultation may be required.

For the reasons stated above,

the constitutional right to seek an abortion may not be
..

unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial
access to the court .

..... .. ... ... . . .
........................

.........•• •••• •.. ............•...•.............

.................

,.

················ ·······

.............
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.
We think that, construed in this manner, § 128 would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the
right to seek an abortioi1. As the District Court recognized,
"there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether
prevent, the minor's right to go .to court." Baird III, supra,
at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be -so
in the majority of cases where. consent is withheld. · But
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are
particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court. ·· It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal
right to seek relief in suj)erior court provides a effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.
----------.Wie~ conclude, .therefore, that u nder the statutory scheme
adopted by Massachusetts the minor must be ermitted to o
directly to the court without first notifying her parents.
She must be given ·eek review of that denial would be obstructed by her parents.
an ?pportuni ~y to If the court is not persuaded by the t11inor it may require
sat~sfy the JUdge that the parents be con.sulted. 29 If, on· the other hand, the
that
consent ld b court 1s
· satts
· fi ed t1at
·
· for...l)lmg
1 111
t h e parents prob a bl y wou ld
b bl
~~~i=d y a~~u that e have the effect of foreclosing the minor's opportunity for
subseq~ent
timely ju icia. review of a denial of parental consent, -the
attempts to
mjpo
1en is entitl ed to make her case on the merits-to
?----establish either that she is mature enough to reach her abor·. tion decision independently, or that the · abortion is in her best
interests in any event.
We recognize the challenge fa.cing a superior court judge

r:.... ..

~

?}:;,:..

r···

consulting or

·

_L

form ed con<ent to that. trea tment, the mature minor rul e applies in this
Commonwealth." ld., at 296. The Supreme· Judicial Court held that
the common-la.w mature minor rule was inapplicabl e w abortions because
it bad been lcgishtiYely superseded by § 128.
2
~
course, if the minor consult s with her parent s, either voluntarily
or ns dircctrd by the court, and they withhold con ~ent, she is free to seek
reveiw in the court inum·diately.

£-..

..
...

··:.·.::::·.·.·.·.·:::::::::··

. ...............

····~ .. :::::::::::::::::.:::.:_. :.-:-.:.:.-:::
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asked to determine, in the absence of the parents. whether
they are likely to refuse consent and obstruct their daughter'
access to court. Evaluating the minor's competence or ju'clging what decision is in her best interests also woul_p
.. .. b~ facilitated, in many cases, by the testimony of the..-parents. In
spite of these difficulties, we are convincep that, absent the
opportunity to go directly to the superjor court prior to seeking parental consent, 30 a subst 1tial number of pregnant
minors would be prevented fr n -having a realistic opportunity
to do so later. Massachuset s may choose to require that pregnant minors desiring abortions seek the consent of their parents, who normally will act in the best interest of their
children. But the State must provide an adequate safeguard
against the genuine risk that consultation with some parents
will result in foreclosing the minor's opportunity to obtain
judicial review of the denial of )ar ntal consent 3 1
This is not to say that the judge':; determination must be made ex
parte. As long as the procedure does not become unduly burdensome,
the State itself, through a designated official , may choose to be the defendant in such a proceeding. This, apparently, was contemplated by
the Supreme Judicial Court as the correct procedure in ::\Iassachusetts,
should it be held that the requirement of parental notice was unconstitutional in some cases. See Attorney General, supra, at 298. Moreover,
subject to preservation of the nece:;sar~· speed, informality and confident ialit~· of judicial consent proceeding~, our decision imposes no special
r es triction~ on the sources, other than the parents them:;elve , to which
the court may turn for evidence.
he District Court believed that parental notification should be d" ·
pensed with whenever it was in the "best interests" of the minot to do
so. See Baird III, supra, at 1001. While the best.-in~rests standard is
applicable in determining the underlying; i~
of whether the abortion is
proper. it tends to obscure tJle · Stitfe's important interest in encouraging
u family. rather than a jnmcial, resolution of the minor's abortion decision.
As long as t.he mor's constitutional right to seek the abortion itself is not
uQdtt · burdened, we are hesitant to interfere with the State's efforts to
· tvolve parents ill this important matter.

,,...
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Rider A; p. 30 (Bellotti)

The final question is whether, because of these
shortcomings, §12S must fall as a

whole.~/

While the

severability of state statutes is a matter of state law, we
are not precluded from deciding such questions when properly

,,,

.. .. ......... .

. -·

presented.

Dorchy v. Kansas, 264

u.s.

f

286, 290-291 (1924).

........ .. .
... .

~- - ··· · · · ··

.... .. .

r:::.·:.·::::::.·:.·.

•············ ····

····· ······ ···

The operative provisions of §12S are contained in a single
paragraph.

Portions of this paragraph, as its meaning has

been construed by the Supreme Judicial Court of

.................
............... ...

Massachusetts, are compatible with the standards of
i .........._

constitutionality set forth in today's opinion.

But the

constitutional flaws are so interwoven into the fabric of
§12S as to make it impossible to sever~hem and leave an
operative statute.

i

. ..... .....
.. ..........
........

.................
········· ··· ·····

In short, it would be necessary to

rewrite §12S to comply with constitutional standards.

This

properly is the function of the legislative branch of
government, not the courts.

...........................
............. ....... ··········..

Accordingly, we affirm the
1:::::::::::::::.
~ ·:::::::::::::::

!················

[:E~-z~. /:~. t~~~,_ ............ .. .

··············•····· .............
· · · · · · ·...
- - ··· ··· .·...
··· · · · ·
•······
..................
.......................... ........... .....
. ··········...·····
.......................................................
····························
········
·· ···· · .........................
.................. .......... .
······· ••·· · ···· •······•····· · ····· ··· ·· · ··· · · · ······•· ··•· ••••···

.........................
.
..........
.... .......... .. .....

.............. ...... .......

.................... .

.

.

.

2.
............. ..
.................

judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidated this
statute and enjoined its enforceability.
···············.
..............

Affirmed.

....
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...................
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... ... ........ ..
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compo;·t~-th~~;;;~~cts

\i/2

As 128 does not
with constitutional standards. it remains to be decided whether the statute
must be invalidated as a whole, or whether only its unconstitutiollal applications need be enjoined. This question requires analysis of the principles governi11g the severability of )
'-....... statutes. 3 n
-~

,

r~lL~/.,~("-J.~

1

1

......

i·. .
t:.

f' . .

which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognizE:'({, most abortions
are performed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird III, supra, at 1001; Baird I , supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164-165 (1973).
The propriety of parental involv>emcnt in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor's health increase. Furthermore, the limits we have
specified on the extent to which a State may defer to parents are adequate
to safeguard throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected interests
of a minor in the abortion decision. Access to review of a dt'nial of
parental consent, which must accompany the State's decision to require
such consent, and the best-interests standard applicable to judicial review assure that no minor need be denied an abortion found to be in her
best interests that could not otherwise be prohibitl'd by the State under
Roe v. Wade, supra. Thus, although a significant number of abortions
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later o;tages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
:H; The ?vlassachusetto; Supreme Judicial Court recognized that its eonstruction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the statute is
unconstitutional in some rPspects. See Attorney General. supm. at 292.
It apparent!~· proposed a rather novel method of saving the statute in
that event: "If the Supreme Court concludes t.hat. we have impermissibly
assigned a greater role to the parents than we should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choice uncon s titutionall~·, we add as a
general principle that we would have construed the statute to conform
to that interpretation." Ibid.
If this is to be understood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 12S differently than was done by tl1e Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline the invitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exceptions not applicable here, see Mullaney \'. H'ilb'Ur, 421 U. S. 684, 691

C.:

t:::::: ....

- ·· ..
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Severance problems ypically require
striking an explicit word, phrase, or sentence of a statute is
preferable to declaring the entire challenged provision invalid.
A less common, though well-recognized, form of severance
occurs when a statute is declared invalid, not because particular words are found to be defective, but because in certain
factual situations the statute cannot be applied without exceeding constitutional limits. Severance in such cases may be
proper when upholding the law in other applications will be
consistent with the underlying purpose and intended effect
/
of the law. "[W]e need not find the language of [a statute]
constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold
its facial constitutionality and its application to [a particular
case.]" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 104 (1971).
It is only under this latter form of severance that § 12S could
remain enforceable in part.
Although we would have serious doubts about the propriety
of severing § 12S as a matter of federal law, it is essential
to bear in mind that we deal here with state legislation. As is
true of state-court constructions of state law generally. see·
n. 36, supra, the decisions of such courts "as to the severability
of a provision [of state law] is conclusive upon this Court.".
Dorchy Y. Kansas , 264 U. S. 286, 290 ( 1924). "What they
say the statutes of that State mean we must accept them to
mean whether it is declared by limiting the objects of their
fangbage or by separating their provisions into valid and
invalid parts." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. \". Texas, 177 U. S. 28,
43 1900).
n. 11 (1975), the federal courts are bound by the con ~truction of a state
statute by the highest court of that Sta.te. E . g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist. No.1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U. S. 482,488 (1976) ; Mullaney
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 34i U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952) . We
therefore are obligated to read § 128 as interpreted by the Supreme
Judicial Court, even though doing so re:sults in the constitutional infuw.i,..
ties. discm;sed in Part III, st~~pra...

.... ...... ..

1

•... ... .......
.....

...........
........
.
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In this case the Supreme Judicial Court was not asked
to rule on the severability of § 128, as it was then uncle
to what extent, if any, the statute would be declared un
stitutionaP' \Ye therefore are not precluded from n c1ling the severance question. Dorchy v. Kansas,~pra, at
291. But we believe the wiser course is to leave
s' important question of state law to the tribunal best su·
to decide
it. See ibid. The certification procedure alre~ successfully
employed in this case provides a pra.cticable ethod for doing
so. Pursuant to Mass. Rules of Court,
p. Jud. Ct. Rule
38
3:21 (1978). the following question · ,cfrtified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu I ts: "In light of the
Court's conclusions in this opinion c cerning the constitutionality of § 12S, may this statute be / severed so that it remainl5
enforceable in part as a matte of Massachusetts law?"

..

..

So ordered

..............
...............
I

.lw s made it clear in it~ prior deei~ion~, howp,·er, that it i:;
\\'illing to ~ ·er ~ tatute:; found to be invalid a" applied to ,:orne per"'ons
or fac·tual ettinJ!S. See Del Dura Y. Toll'n Arhniui~;trator. ;{(j8 .\Ia,::<. 1,
13-1-t , :~2 I\ . t. 2d i48, i51i (19i5); Thurman \'. C'hil'ago. Miill'aukee <e·
St. Pau 1? .. 25-t .\~lass . 569. 151 :X. E. U:) (19:26): H'. & J . Sloaue " · Com11101111'e It h. :25:3 .\I a:<:>. 5:29, 53-t, H9 ?\ . E. 40i , .fO!:J ( HJ:25) .
8
" ~)li e 3:21, § 3 (2), rail~ for ''a statement of all fact ::; relevant to the
qu yions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
th , questions arose." We believe this opinion, particularly ~art I, supra;,
s~ tisfies this reqttirement.

. ......... . ... .
....... ..................
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Rider A, p. 24 {Bellotti)

We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation
such as that undertaken by Massachusetts, the minor must be
permitted - if she so desires - to go directly to the court
without first consulting or notifying her parents.

She must

be given the opportunity to satisfy the court that an
abortion would be in her best interests or that she is mature
enough and well enough informed to make intelligently the
abortion decision without parental consultation.

If the

court is not persuaded by the minor, it may decline to
authorize the abortion.

If, however, the court is persuaded

that the abortion is in the minor's best interests or that
. she is qualified to make the determination herself, then it
must authorize the operation.
There is, however, an important state interest in
encouraging a family rather than a judicial resolution of a
minor's abortion decision.

Also, as we have observed above,

there is the natural parental interest in the welfare of a

-2.

minor child

- an interest that is oarticular strong where a

normal family relationship exists and where the child is
living with one or both parents.

These interests properly

may be taken into account by a court called upon to determine
whether an abortion in fact is in a minor's best interests.
The court may deny the abortion request of an immature minor
if it concludes that her best interests would be served by
parental consultation, or the court may defer decision until
there is parental consultation in which the court may
participate.

But this is the full extent to which parental

consultation may be required.

For the reasons stated above,

the constitutional right to seek an abortion may not be
unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial
access to the court.

3.

Note to Eric:

Discuss with David the above revision of his

draft of a rider for pages 24 and 25.
changes, let me take a look at them.

If you wish to suggest
When we have this rider

in satisfactory form, you will have to revise the last
paragraph on page 26, and reexamine the footnotes on these
three paqes.

Footnote 31, for example, will come out.

You

might also check carefully to see whether other changes are
necessary.
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Consider adding a note along the following lines:

__

I

.;.....

Mr. Justice Stevens has filed an opinion

joined by three Justices, "concurring in part and dissenting
in part".

It concurs to the extent we find constittuional

flaws in §128, but dissents from the views herein expressed
as to positive features of the Massachusetts plan as well as
~i)~

those intended to afford guidance for the future.
A

Indeed,

the dissent rejects wholly the attempt of Massachusetts to
5

accord some recognition to the interestA of the state and
parents where minors are concerned.
The dissenting views today cannot be

reconciled

with the unanimous opinion of the Court in Bellotti I.
There, writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Blackmun summarized

2.

the State Attorney General's description of how §12S would
operate:

"[The] statute • • • prefers parental consultation
and consent, but • • • permits a mature minor
capable of giving informed consent to obtain,
without undue burden, an order permitting the
abortion without parental consultation, and,
further, permits even a minor incapable of giving
informed consent to obtain an order without parental
consultation where there is a showing that the
abortion would be in her best interests." Bellotti
.!.r at 145.
As the foregoing interpretation of the statute by the
Attorney General was not binding, we directed that
appropriate questions be certified to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts "concerning the meaning of [§128] and
the procedure it imposes".

Id., at 151.

In directing this

procedure our unanimous opinion stated:

0

t2U.r ~e~.J)

"It is sufficient that the (~tatute is susceptive of
the interpretation offered by)app~~s, and we so
find, and that such an interpretation would avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional
challenge to the statute, as it clearly would."
Bellotti I, at 148.

3.

We thus stated explicitly that if the
interpretation of the Attorney General (quoted above) were
adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court, this would "avoid or
substantially modify" the constitutional challenge to the
statute.
The Supreme Judicial Court did not agree entirely
with the Attorney General's views, but it did accordet"
•'

recognition to the rights of a mature minor and of the "best
interests" standard as to other minors.

In this plurality

opinion we have identified changes in the statute's
provisions that - if adopted - would bring it into full
accord with the interpretation implicitly approved in
Bellotti I.

~

t

~

~~~-A~-~

The dissent of Mr. Justice Stevens rejects this
J\

view of Bellotti I

•

It affords no guidance to Massachusetts

4.

or other states

as to how to protect the various interests

implicated where minors seek abortions.

The dissenting

opinion, criticizing the vesting of any authority in a judge
or state agency, describes the Massachusetts plan as
"potentially even more restrictive" of constitutional rights
than the Missouri statute in Danforth.

Indeed, the dissent

can only be read as concluding that if a pregnant minor, of
whatever age, can obtain the consent of an abortion clinic
physician (see n.

' p.

), a state may impose no

provision for consultation or guidance by parents or of
state court or agency.

any

Neither Danforth nor Bellotti I

foreclosed a parental or state role short of an absolute
veto.

Neither gave any indication that the participation of

--

a judge as final arbiter was invalid per se.
~

'

would have been no purpose in t~ remand i; Bellotti I, as

5.

the role of the superior court was central to the
Massachusetts plan.
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At least when the parents are together and the pregnant minor
is living at home, both the father and mother have an
interest - and one normally supportive - in helping to
determine the course that is in the best interest of a
daughter.

Consent and involvement by parents in important

decisions by minors long has been recognized as protective of
their immaturity.

In the case of the abortion decision, for

reasons we have stated, the sole inquiry of parents must be
to ascertain and further the best interests of their ·
daughter.

As every pregnant minor is entitled in the first

instance to go directly to the court for a judicial
determination without prior parental notice, consultation or
consent, the general rule with respect to parental consent
does not unduly burden the constitutional right.

Moreover,

where the pregnant minor goes to her parents and consent is
denied, she still has recourse

&,.£4.·.L~
~1

the Massachusetts plan

to judicial review.*

*There will 6e cases where the pregnant minor has received
approval of the abortion decision by one parent. In that
event, the parent can support the daughter's request for a
prompt judicial determination, and the parents' support
should be given great weight if not dispositive weight.
* * *
Note of Justice Stewart:

I prefer the foregoing revision of

your proposed insert A, p. 26.

It accords with long settled

law, and also express~ preserves all of the minor's riqhts.

I
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fully competent to make this decision independently. Second.
it requires parental consultation or notification in every instance. without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity
to receive an independent judicial determination that she is
mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in
her best interests.31 -------------------e
The final question is whet er. ecau .
Vi"hile the severability of state
Section 128 e\'identl~· applies to all nonE>mergE>nc~· abortions pE-rformed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are ~erformed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird III, supra, at 1001; Baird I, supra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe''· Wade,
410 u.s. 113, 164-165 (1973).
The propriety of parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnant minor's health increMe. Furthermore, the opportunity for
direct access to court which we have described is adequlltf' to safegu11rd
throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected intf'rt>:;ts of a minor in
the nbortion decision. Thus, although :1 l:'ignificant number of abortiol)S
within the scope of § 128 might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
32 The :\Ia~achusetts Supreme .Tudic1al
ourt recogmze t at 1 s c
ute is
struction of § 128 might result in a ruling by this Court that the
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney General.
ra. at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of sa ' g the statute in
that e,·ent: "If the Supreme Court concludes th
•e have impermissibly
e should or that we have
assigned a greater role to the parents th
otherwise burdened the minor's choi
unconstitutionally, we add as a
ave construed the statute to conform
general principle that we woul
to that interpretation." I · .
If this is to be un
toad as a suggestion that we construe the terms
than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
of § 128 differen
decline th . · vita.tion. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exce · ns not applicable here, see Mullaney "· Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691
. 1 · 1975 the .federal courts are ·bound by the construction of a state
31

c~o
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f:tatutes is a matter of state law, we are not precluded
deciding such questions when properly presented. Do . J.Y v.
1
Kan.c;as, 264 r. S. 286. 29~291 (1924). The op
ive provisions of § 12S are contained in a single para ,:rj)h. Portions
of this paragraph~ as its meaning has be construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massach setts, are compatible
with the standards of constitution'ality set forth in this opin"
10n. But the constitution_ll.}. . . fiaws
in the statute are not isolated in particular words or phrases. They are so interwoven
into the fabric of.§ 12S as to make it impossible to sever them
and leave an operative law. In short, it would be necessary
to re"•:rite ~ '12S in order for it to comply with constitutional
stan aids. This properly is the function of the legislative
n h f overnment not the courts. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidates
this statute and enjoins its enforcement.
Affirmed

l stat~t~

b;·

-the highe-s t -c~urt -of. tb~t -State. E. g., Hortonv!lle Joi
ool ;
Dist. No.1 ,•.,Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482,~-(-19io ; Mullaney ·
v. Wilbur, supra, at 691; Banlqf v. Board_of-Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff v. St. Nichol~_!Altheilral, 344 U.S. 94, 99 (1952). We
therefore are obliga.:red -tO
§ 128 as interpreted by the Supreme
. Judicial <:;aurt;-even though doing so results in the constitutional infinni, · -discussed in Part III su ra.

read
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fully competent to make this decision independently. Second.
it requires parental consultation or notification in every instance. without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity·
to receive an independent judicial determination that she is
mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in
her best interests.111 -------------------e
The final question is whet
Section 12S evidently applies to all nonemergency nbortions performed on minors, without regard to the period in pregnancy during
which the procedure occurs. As the court below recognized, most abortions
are ~erformed during the early stages of pregnancy, before the end of the
first trimester. See Baird III, 8Upra, at 1001; Bai.rd I , 8Upra, at 853.
This coincides approximately with the previability period during which a
pregnant woman's right to decide, in consultation with her physician, to
have an abortion is most immune to state intervention. See Roe"· Wade,
410 u.s. 113, 164-165 (19i3).
The propriety of parental involvt!ment in a minor's abortion decision
does not diminish as the pregnancy progresses and legitimate concerns for
the pregnnnt minor's henlth increase. Furthermore, the opportunity for
direct. access to court which we have described is adequnte to safeguard
throughout pregnancy the constitutionally protected intert-:>t s of a minor in
the abortion decision. Thus, although n :>ignificant number of abortioJ)S
within the scope of § 12S might be performed during the later stages of
pregnancy, we do not believe a different analysis of the statute is required
for them.
32 The :-.Iassachusetts Supreme .Tudicial
ourt recogmze t a 1 s c
struction of § 12S might result in a ruling by this Court that the
ute is
unconstitutional in some respects. See Attorney General.
ra, at 292.
It apparently proposed a rather novel method of sa ' g the statute in
that e,·ent: "If the Supreme Court concludes th
•e have impermissibly
assigned a greater role to the parents th
e should or that we have
otherwise burdened the minor's choi
unconstitutionally, we add as a
ave construed the statute to conform
general principle that we woul
to that interpretation." I · .
If this is to be un
tood as a suggestion that we construe the terms
of § 128 differen
than was done by the Supreme Judicial Court, we must
decline th · vitation. We long have adhered to the view that, with rare
exce · s not applicable here, eee Mullaney ,., Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 691
. 1 · 19i5 the .federal courts are ·bound by the construction of a state
31
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8tututes is a matter of stat€ law, we are not precluded
I deciding such questions when properly presented. Dor: . y v.
Ka11.~a.s, 264 r. S. 286. 290-291 (1924). The op
ive provisions of § 12S are contained in a single par a-ph. Portions
of this paragraph, as its meaning has be construed by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Mas~ setts, are compatible
with the standards of constitutionality
set forth in this opin_..ion. But the constitutional-1iaws in the statute are not isolated in particular words or phrases. They are so interwoven
into the fabric of § 12S as to make it impossible to sever them
and leave an operative law. In short, it would be necessary
to re";rite ~ 12S in order for it to comply with constitutional
stan 'ds. This properly is the function of the legislative
n h f overnment not the courts. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidates
this statute and enjoins its enforcement.
Affirmed
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. statute b~· the highest court of that State. E. g., Hortonv!1le Joi
ool
Di_$t. No.1 '' . .Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482,j§8-(~l9io ; Mullaney '
"· Wilbur, supra, at 691; Barsky v. Board_of-Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448
(1954); Kedroff "· St. Nichola$ Catheil"ral, 344 U. S. 94, 99 (1952). We 1
therefore are oblig!!ted t<>~ read § 128 as interpreted by the Supreme I
Judicial Co.urt ~ ·even though doing so results in the constitutional infirmi'es-diScussed in Part III su ra .

The separate opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, joined by
three other Justices, concludes that if parents may not have
the final say in minors' abortion decisions, neither may any
other person.

He purports to support this remarkable assertion

by reference to the statement in Planned Parenthood v.
Danfo;th, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), that a State may not "give a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the
patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding
consent."

Id., at 74.

The most cursory examination of both

Danforth and our opinion in Bellotti I, id., at 132, however,
demonstrates that Mr. Justice Steven's view cannot be sustained
by precedent.

In Danforth we said:

"We emphasize that our holding •

• • does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or
maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy."

Id., at 75.

Mr. Justice Stevens' view, however,

reads Danforth as making precisely that suggestion.

Our

unanimous holding in Bellotti I was that the construction of
§125 urged by appellants "would avoid or substantially modify
the federal constitutional challenge to the statute."
148.

Id., at

Appellants' view was that a state court judge would make

the ultimate decision for many, if not most, minors seeking
authorization for that operation.

See id., at 145.

We

observed that this "would be fundamentally different from a
statute that creates a 'parental veto'
Danforth.]"

Id. (footnote omitted).

[of the kind rejected in
Thus, placing final

decision-making authority in a judge was clearly not the kind
of veto power condemned in Danforth.

Indeed, if Mr. Justice

Stevens' view of the holding in Danforth were correct, there

would have been no purpose whatsoever in remanding in Bellotti
I and directing that appropriate questions be certified to the

-'

Supreme Judicial Court.
The concern motivating our prior opinions is that an
unrestricted parental veto would result in the preclusion of
minors' abortions for unsound reasons or no reasons at all.
There is simply no basis in our cases or, for that matter, in
common sense for rejecting out of hand the attempt of a State
to require that immature minors seeking abortions be subject to
adult authority from some source.

lfp/ss
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Rider X, p. 24 (Bellotti)

If she satisfies the court that she is mature and wellinformed enough to make intelligently the abortion decision
on her own, the court must authorize her to act without
requiring parental consul tat ion or consent.

If she fa.ils to

sa.tisfy the court that she is competent to make this
decision, she must be permitted to show that an abortion
nevertheless would be in her best interest.

If the court is

persuaded that it is, the court thereupon must authorize the
abortion.29/

If, however, the court is not persuaded by the

minor that she is mature or

tha~the

abortion would be in her

best interest, it may decline to sanction the abortion •

. /
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Bellotti footnote

~~

.(
.
Poss1'bl y a dd a f ootnote a 1 ong t h e f o 11 ow1ng
l1nes

"
response to JPS I s note 4 a d de d to h'1s op1n1on

.
1n

~

~d

~~

The opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in
the judgment, joined by three members of the Court,
characterizes this opinion as "advisory" and the questions it
addresses as "hypothetical".

Apparently this is criticism of

the attempt of this opinion to provide some guidance as to
how a state constitutionally may provide for adult
involvement - either by parents or a state official such as a
judge - in the abortion decisions of minors.

In view of the

importance of the issues raised, and the protracted
litigation to which these parties

§v~ alread yt been

subjected, we think it would be irresponsible simply to
condemn §12S without stating our views as to the controlling
principles.

The statute before us today is the same one that
was
~

beYer~in
~et~ee

Bellotti I.

~tevene~

In a unanimous opinion,

~gined,

we remanded the case with directions that

appropriate questions be certified to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts "concerning the meaning of [§12S] and
the procedure it imposes".

Id., at 151.

We directed this

procedure because, as stated in the opinion, we thought the
construction of §12S urged by appellants would "avoid or
substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to
the statute".

Id., at 148.

The central feature of §12S was

its provision that a state court judge could make the
ultimate decision, when necessary, as to the exercise by a
minor of the right to an abortion.

See id., at 145.

We

observed that this "would be fundamentally different from a
statute that creates a 'parental veto'
in

Danfor~h]'

id., (footnote omitted)."

[of the kind rejected
Thus, providing for

3.

decision making authority in a judge was not the kind of veto
power held invalid in Danforth.

Apparently, JuRtices \t7ho

join the concurring opinion now read Danforth as standing for
precisely thef pposi te proposition.

It would have been well,

and some may think fairer to the litigants and the courts
below, if the views expressed today in Mr. Justice Stevens
opinion had been stated when S12S was before us in Bellotti I

- ~· /&.t t..f,rt ~~·~ t/'1./'.t~
rather than agreeing to a remand

tha~\ could

result in a decision upholding the statute.

not possibly

o;
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Possibly add a footnot e along the following lines, in
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response to JPS's nota 4 added to his opinion on yesterday:

The opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in
the judgment, joined by three members of the Court,
char a cterizes this opinion as "advisory" and the questions it
addresses as "hypothetical".

Apparently this is criticism of

the attempt of thi s opinion to provide some guidance as to
how

~

state constitutionally may provide for adult

involvement - either by parents or a state official such as a
judge - in the abortion decisions of minors.

I n view of th e

importance of the issues raised, and the protracted
l itigation to which th e se parties already have been
s u bjected, we think it would b e irresponsible simply to

~~
eendemn §128 without stating our views as to the controJling

"
principles.

~~~~

2.

~~~~

)14)Ul~.'.'

-...
The

the same one that
In a unanimous opinion,

joirre-€l-S.y

Jt:te~t:i-ee

£tox,nns, we remanded the case with

directions that appropriate questions be certified to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts "concerning the
meaning of [ § 12S] and the procedure it imposes".
151.

we

Id., at

directed this procedure because, as stated in the

opinion, we thought the construction of §12S urged by
appellants would "avoid or substantially modify the federal
constitutional challenge to the statute" •

.!_~.,at

148.

•rhe

central feature of §125 was its provision that a state court
judge could make the ultimate decision, when necessary, as to
the exercise by a minor of the right to an abortion.
id., at 145.

See

We held that this "would be fundamentally

different from a statute that creates a 'parental veto'
the kind rejected in pan f~tr~]

id., (footnote omit ted) • "

(of

3.

Thus, providing for decision-making authority in a judge was
not the kind of veto power held invalid in Danforth.
Apparently, the Justices who join the concurring opinion now
read Da nforth as standing for precisely the opposite
'

--. "----

proposition.)~ It

f

would have been well, a-Rd

fairer to the litigants and

seHHs-ma~d-

-he c-Our-t-S-Be-le-w_, had our

concurring Brethren expressed their views when §128 was
before us in Bellotti I rather than having agreed to a reman

j that theF -vef could not possibly result in a deci':_ion j
~

upholding the statute.

RIDER A (page 17)

As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully
informed choices that take account of both immediate and longrange consequences, a State reasonably may determine that
parental consultation often is desirable and in the best
interest of the minor. 19 /

It may further determine, as a

general proposition, that such consultation is particularly
desirable with respect to the abortion decision -- one that for
some minors raises profound moral and religious concerns.

20

1
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Rider A, p. 18 (Bellotti)

The need to preserve the constitutional right, and the unique
nature of the abortion decision especially when made by a
minor, requires a state to act with particular sensitivity
when it legislates to foster parental involvement.

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 19 Bellotti

Yet, an abortion may not be the best choice for the
minor.

The circumstances in which this issue arises will

vary widely.

In a given case, alternatives to abortion may

be feasible and relevant to the minor's best interest, such
as marriaqe to the father of the child, arranging for its
adoption, or assuming the responsibilities of motherhood with
the assured support of family.

Nonetheless, the abortion

~

decisionAis one that cannot be postponed, or it will be made
by default with far-reaching consequences.
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